Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret   priority

Paris, November 12, 1948—7 p. m.

Delga 716. Developments in Berlin case since Delga 580¹ follow:

1. Upon Bramuglia’s return to Paris he talked with Die in respect of the latter’s plan of drawing up arrangements for Berlin currency and indicated to Lie that he thought the idea might be a productive one. Bramuglia then called a meeting of the six neutrals and indicated to them some resentment of Lie’s intervention. The six agreed, however, that there might be some utility in having experts work out operational arrangements but that the “diplomatic” work, i.e. contacts with the four powers should be done on behalf of the six by Bramuglia in his capacity as President of the Council.

2. Accordingly Bramuglia called a meeting of the three on November 12 at which he outlined the attitude of the six and stated his hope that they might be helpful. He said, however, that he did not wish to start acting unless there was some prospect of success. He is going to see Vishinsky today. Cadogan, Parodi and Jessup reiterated our willingness to play our part as members of SC and that if the six decided to use experts we would be prepared to cooperate with them. We stressed that real problem apart from the basic problem of the blockade was not merely currency change-over, but involved the principle and application of quadripartite control.

3. Another development which has been reported in the press is that Evatt is entertaining two ideas for a solution: The first is that as President of the GA he should communicate with the four powers and suggest that they implement the Mexican resolution² by getting together and settling the Berlin question among themselves. The UK has been making every effort to discourage Evatt, but he is clinging to the idea and may carry it through. Evatt’s second idea is to refer the Berlin question to the GA.

4. Cadogan told me confidentially yesterday that British are working on a plan whereby UK experts would draw up details of operational arrangements for Berlin currency and other financial affairs of the city with a view to obtaining the agreement of France and ourselves and then submitting it to Bramuglia who would in turn submit it to the Soviets. Aside from this, British attitude as expressed by Cadogan is that they would be willing to agree that in light of Lie’s and Evatt’s activities they should encourage any activities looking toward a solution to be handled by the six. Cadogan had no instructions as to British attitude on further stages, but he indicated that if the six did continue their efforts it would, of course, be impossible to forbid them to use UN technical experts to assist them.

5. After clearance with the Secretary, Jessup told Cadogan and Parodi that if the six believed there was merit in their further activity the US would respond affirmatively to it, but would not, of course, take any initiative. The US was prepared to give such assistance to the six and on a technical level to the technical experts as they required. We believe that if experts were to work out operational arrangements they should be under the supervision of the six because of the influence that men like Pearson and Spaak would have.

6. Prior to the meetings yesterday with the British and French and with the six, the Secretary approved a memorandum recommending that we should respond affirmatively to further action under the aegis of the SC in order to influence the course which any further steps may take.³ That we should be willing to accept a program under which the six enlist the services of neutral experts to work out detailed operational arrangements for the introduction and continued circulation of the Soviet mark as the sole currency for Berlin under adequate quadripartite control and such other arrangements as are necessary for like control of budget, credit facilities and trade of Berlin. Such operational arrangements if worked out under the supervision of the six might be recommended to the four powers by the President for adoption and to be put into effect simultaneously with lifting of blockade. It was thought best that no advance commitment should be made to accept operational arrangements inasmuch as this might present a difficulty at the outset which would prevent any program from getting started, but it was recognized that it would be difficult to reject a plan, and that we should be in a frame of mind to accept the recommended arrangements even though they do not meet our optimum position on all points. The Secretary’s approval of course outlined was for purposes of guiding Jessup in his conversations with the British, French, the six and the SYG.

7. It may well be that as result of Bramuglia’s conversation with Vishinsky this afternoon nothing further will come of this renewed activity. On the other hand, the present attitude of Bramuglia and the other neutral members appears sound and they have evidenced an awareness of the political realities of the Berlin situation. Cadogan will doubtless be getting further instructions from his government. French attitude appears to be substantially similar to our own. Canadians are prepared to cooperate fully.⁴

Sent Department Delga 716, repeated London (Eyes Only Douglas) as 1248, Berlin (Eyes Only Murphy and Clay) as 706. Department please pass Moscow (Eyes Only Smith) as 593.

Marshall

1. November 3, p. 1247.
2. The reference here is to the resolution introduced by Mexico September 30 in the General Assembly and passed unanimously with amendments November 3, calling upon the Great Powers to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. For the full text of the resolution, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part 1, Resolutions, pp. 15–16.
3. Not found in the files of the Department of State.
4. Gadel 472, November 13, to Paris, not printed, reported that this outline approach to the further United Nations treatment of the Berlin problem seemed completely reasonable (501.BC/11–1348).