Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 64 D 563: Box 20036

Report by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

Washington, November 2, 1948.

PPS 42

Position of the United States With Respect to Germany Following the Breakdown of Moscow Discussions¹

problem

To determine the most favorable line of approach to the Berlin problem in the light of the breakdown of the Moscow discussions.

discussion

1. The Berlin problem is so complicated, so apt to be altered by events which cannot now be foreseen, and so much a problem which will have to be handled jointly with other governments whose future reactions we cannot now predict, that it would be useless to attempt to lay down in advance any fixed and detailed line of conduct which we could hope to follow rigidly regardless of the turn which events, may take. For this reason, no set of concepts arrived at at this time could constitute more than an initial line of approach, which would have to be reviewed and modified currently in the light of future developments.

2. The Berlin situation poses for this Government a genuine dilemma. The outlines of this dilemma are simple.

On the one hand, every consideration of national interest, aside from the Berlin situation, indicates that we should not become involved in a war at this time. In the development of the European situation in general, time is on our side. There is still a chance that if war can be avoided at this juncture, a continuing deterioration in the communist political position in Europe will eventually make war unnecessary. Our own military position, furthermore, is less favorable today in relation to the Soviet Union than it can be expected to be a year or two hence. Finally, both the military strength and the self-confidence of our western European friends can presumably be considerably enhanced by a further period of progress toward a North Atlantic defense arrangement and of development of military collaboration among the Brussels powers. Thus if we can avoid war at this time, there seems to be a good prospect

(a) that we may possibly be able to avoid it altogether (this is perhaps the vital difference between this situation and that of the French and British at the time of Munich), and

(b) in any case we may be sure that if it has to come we will be in a better position to fight it a year or two hence than we would today.

On the other hand, we must recognize that in the confidence and enthusiasm which our position has inspired in the population of Berlin and in the symbolic meaning which this situation has acquired as a test of strength and determination between east and west, we have factors of enormous importance. These factors militate against any unilateral western withdrawal from that city which would involve surrendering the population of the western sectors to communist oppression and revenge. Since the termination of hostilities, we have thus far successfully prevented the Kremlin from extending its police system over any European peoples beyond the high water mark of the Soviet military advance during the war and the Austrian and German zonal arrangements. To permit such extension now, by the abandonment of our position in Berlin, even though the persons whom we would be sacrificing are Germans for whose fate we would have been very little concerned three years ago, would inevitably undermine confidence in us elsewhere in Europe, and above all in such delicate and exposed spots as Vienna and Trieste. We have here one of the great recurrent imponderables of foreign policy: an emotional factor which may bear little logical relation to the practical considerations involved but which is of major, and unanswerable, importance. And to these objective considerations which argue against a western withdrawal from Berlin, we must add the numerous firm statements which have already been made committing the present administration as well as its political opponents to the proposition that “we will not get out of Berlin”.

It must be noted that if the western powers were to withdraw from Berlin under humiliating circumstances which would constitute a blow to confidence throughout Europe in the western determination to stand up to Russia, this would undoubtedly be vigorously and skillfully exploited by the Russians for their own political purposes. It might well halt or reverse the favorable political trend which we have observed in western Europe in the past year. In that case, the hope that our interests might eventually be protected, and our objectives attained, by political rather than military developments—the hope, in other words, that war might be avoided in the long run—would be frustrated. This means that a unilateral western withdrawal from Berlin might in itself offset one of the two main reasons why we should try to avoid war at this time. Although avoiding war today, it might increase the likelihood of our having to fight it tomorrow. While it would still give us time to improve our military preparations and position, it might go far to forfeit the possibility of an eventual peaceful issue of the conflict between Russia and the western world.

3. We must recognize that Berlin cannot be left indefinitely dependent on the air lift for its source of supply. It is not sufficient to judge the air lift from its technical aspects alone, in estimating the length of time in which we can hope to supply Berlin by this means. We must also take into account psychological and political considerations. We must recognize that the population of a great city, particularly one which is in dire need of reconstruction on a grand scale, cannot get along indefinitely with just the absolute minimum of food and fuel. Sooner or later the sacrifices involved, and above all the uncertainty itself, must breed discouragement and unrest and resentment even against ourselves. The fact that it may be calculated that the air lift would be technically and theoretically adequate to maintain life in the western sectors of the city over the winter must therefore not be over-rated. It merely means that we have a brief respite in which to find a solution of the problem; but it is not itself a solution.

4. It is important to note that the Berlin deadlock has created an extremely awkard situation for the Russians, as well as for ourselves. Our situations are converse. While we are in a weak, and increasingly unfavorable position in the immediate conflict over Berlin, this conflict has steadily improved our position in the remainder of Germany and has created conditions in which we could go much further in risking the immediate establishment of a German authority than would have been the case six months or a year ago. As for the Russians, while their position in the Berlin conflict is strong and increasingly favorable as the air lift becomes more difficult and expensive, the continuation of this conflict is nevertheless causing them a steady loss of their political assets in Germany as a whole. If the continuation of the present deadlock threatens us with the loss of Berlin, it threatens them with the loss of Germany itself. We must bear in mind, therefore, that they, too, are under great strain as a result of this matter, and that if this strain can be increased, there is still a possibility that they may be brought to change their position.

5. It flows from the considerations set forth above that this country must follow a course which:

(a) avoids, insofar as it is within the choice of this country, war at this time; but

(b) does not involve a unilateral and humiliating withdrawal of the western powers from Berlin,

(c) promises to assert increasing pressure on the Russians, and

(d) offers at least some hope that we may get away from our dependence on the air lift at some time within the next year.

6. The Russians have made it evident that they are not going to settle in good faith for a solution which permits us both to remain in Berlin in the full enjoyment of our quadripartite rights, and at the same time to proceed with the organization and development of a western German state. This attitude probably stems from their realization that in the long run a communist regime in eastern Germany will not be able to compete successfully with the non-communist German regime in western Germany, particularly if the political development of the eastern zone along communist lines continues to be disrupted by the presence of western forces in Berlin.

In pressing outwardly for the withdrawal of western forces from Berlin, the Russians are probably pressing for what is in reality their second choice, and a poor second at that. Such withdrawal would certainly ease for them the further political organization of their own zone; and they doubtless reckon that the blow to western prestige would prove a blow to the pro-western political groupings in western Germany and a boon to the communist party there. If, therefore, they cannot get an abandonment of the western German arrangements, our withdrawal from Berlin would be the next best thing.

It is imperative, however, in Russian eyes, that one or the other of these objectives be achieved: if not the second, then the first. This line of conduct is motivated on their part by defensive considerations of the most serious nature. We may expect them to fight tooth and nail against any solution which does not achieve one or the other of the two objectives.

This being the case, there is little likelihood that we will have any success with a policy which aims to maneuver them, either through direct negotiation or through United Nations pressures, into a continued acceptance of our rightful status in Berlin, without relation to the German problem as a whole. No matter what the Russians might be brought to agree to in the way of written undertakings along these lines, the objective possibilities for sabotage and evasion in practice, combined with the formidable native talents of the Russians in this direction, make it clear that we can never have in practice any solution along these lines which will really work to our satisfaction. It is conceivable that after the most tortuous maneuvers and negotiations, we could bring this horse to water; but it is hardly probable that we could make him drink.

7. All this seems to point to the conclusion that there can hardly be any satisfactory solution of the Berlin problem within the limits of the Berlin situation itself, and that the problem could be soluble only if fitted into a larger framework. In other words, it is unlikely that there could be any satisfactory solution along the lines of a narrowing of the problem through negotiations over currency control, trade, communications, etc. The only conceivably satisfactory line of advance would be by a broadening of the problem: by “losing” the Berlin problem in a broader solution which would change completely the external framework in which it operated, as for example a solution providing for the withdrawal of both western and Russian forces from Berlin. If this view is correct, then the Berlin problem could not be solved without bringing it into relation to the general problem of Germany as a whole and without taking steps which would constitute important moves in the handling of the general German problem.

8. Examples of such steps are the following:

(a) A mutual withdrawal from Berlin with guarantees concerning treatment of the Berlin population, possibly providing for UN supervision;

(b) Establishment of a neutral unoccupied area elsewhere in Germany where a German authority would be established by mutual agreement and permitted to assume certain of the sovereign rights of government, together with the evacuation of Berlin by the western forces and the removal of large numbers of Germans from that city to the new capital;

(c) Withdrawal of all occupying forces from a portion of Germany, including areas from both the present western and eastern zones and embracing the province of Brandenburg, with the understanding that this entire area would be placed under some German authority and Berlin would remain the capital of Germany;

(d) A general termination of military government in Germany and withdrawal of all occupying forces to specified garrison areas, with simultaneous establishment of a German authority.

9. Clearly, any solution along these lines, involving the German situation as a whole, would be one which the western powers could not discuss directly with the Soviet Government while duress is maintained. However, there is no reason why they should not discuss such a solution if they are requested by the UN to do so and if the UN can make some provision for the termination of the restrictions on land and water access to Berlin, at least during the period that discussions are in progress.

10. Should the UN make possible the discussion of a solution along these lines, there seems to be every reason why this Government should accept. It is difficult to see that any development of the German situation resulting from such discussions could be more dangerous to this country’s security than the present Berlin situation, provided we resolutely oppose any solution which would put Germany as a whole at the mercy of communist elements. We cannot view the general German problem today as though everything were normal and as though we were under no particular pressure from any quarter. We are in an extremely dangerous and unsatisfactory position in Berlin; and the Russians have only to stand their ground and wait in order to make that position increasingly dangerous and expensive. We can therefore not afford to be perfectionists about the general German problem. We must consider ourselves well out of it if we can find any solution which gets us out of Berlin without serious detriment to western prestige and does not at the same time deliver up Germany as a whole to communist control. At the same time, we must recognize that changes have occurred in Germany since the last CFM meeting which might actually justify a re-examination of the differences among the four powers over that subject.

11. On the other hand, we must recognize that we are not likely to agree with the Russians about the general German problem at this time. The Russian attitude with respect to Germany as a whole is no less dominated by fear of western superiority than is the Russian attitude with respect to Berlin. With respect to Germany as a whole, just as with respect to Berlin, the Russians will probably continue to insist on unreasonable advantages, because without unreasonable advantages they cannot hope to maintain any influence at all. They know that without a considerable handicap in their favor, they cannot compete. They will probably therefore raise demands, in connection with any settlement involving the larger German problem, inconsistent with our concepts of what is required for a peaceful and free Germany.

12. For this reason, the advantages which we could expect to obtain from discussing the general German problem as a means of solving the problem of Berlin would probably be:

(a) That we gain time;

(b) That we get the restrictions removed temporarily, permitting some relief to the Berlin population, and possibly some stockpiling; and

(c) That we will have demonstrated to the people of Berlin and the Germans in general our willingness to proceed with a broad and constructive solution of both the Berlin problem and the general German problem.

However, it is not out of the question, although improbable, that some actual agreement might emerge which would permit the general withdrawal of forces from Berlin. As long as there is any such possibility at all, negotiations along this line would be warranted; for it is hard to see how else the Berlin situation can be solved.

13. If we are to set our course toward a solution based on some such move toward a settlement of the German problem in general, then it is desirable that we do this when and if the matter comes before the United Nations Assembly. As pointed out above, we cannot ourselves discuss such matters directly with the Russians while under duress. We would therefore presumably be dependent on the mediation of some outside agency, which could hardly be other than the United Nations. If, therefore, as seems the more probable outcome, the Security Council does not succeed in inducing Moscow to lift the restrictions, the Assembly might be our last chance to obtain a solution of the sort that we must have.

14. Actually, there is a good deal to be said, aside from the Berlin problem, for a statement by this Government at this time of its overall aspirations with respect to Germany and its basic desire for general withdrawal of forces from Germany under proper safeguards. Only by our taking a position along these lines can we offset Soviet propaganda which aims to make it appear that this country wishes to keep its forces in the heart of Europe and keep Europe divided whereas the U.S.S.R. would be prepared for a mutual withdrawal of forces from Germany and Austria. Since the withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a German government is our ultimate aim in any case, we have nothing to lose in stating this vigorously at the present time, as long as we make sure that the conditions we place upon any agreement of this nature are such as to safeguard our position in Germany. If the Russians accept a proposal along these lines, we have solved the Berlin situation, gained at least a further period of time, and lessened the Soviet military intimidation of western Europe. If they refuse it, or refuse to accept it on our minimum conditions (which is likely), we have at least demonstrated to the Germans that we would have been prepared to go in for a mutual evacuation of Berlin in order to put an end to the present situation, and to Europe at large that we were prepared to consider a bold and generous solution which would have served to lessen the tension in Europe. It should be noted that it was the consensus among the group of outside consultants who recently discussed the German question with the Planning Staff that this Government should not hesitate to reiterate its desire to see a solution along these lines under proper safeguards.

15. Since, as pointed out above, we are not likely to get Soviet agreement to such a solution on our minimum terms, we cannot view this course of action as one likely to produce any early solution of the Berlin question. In fact, it may only lead to another deadlock and produce no solution at all. But since it appears to be the only line of conduct which could conceivably produce a solution, and which has not yet been tried, it would seem to be our obligation to explore it to the end. Even though it does not yield agreement with the Russians at once, it should improve our propaganda position considerably if we state our case skillfully and convincingly. If, after we have taken this step, we will still have to settle down to a continuation for a further indefinite period of the ordeal of supplying Berlin by air, there will then at least be greater pressure of public opinion on the Russians, and therefore a greater possibility that they will eventually yield under the strain, than there would otherwise. And if, in the end, there is still no solution other than a violent one, our record will be better, and our moral cause stronger, for the fact that we have been willing to consider a bold and broad step with respect to Germany as a whole, if peace could thereby be preserved.

1. On September 16, 1948, the National Security Council agreed that the Department of State should prepare a paper on the position of the United States with respect to Germany in the event that the negotiations, in progress with the Russians at that time, should be unsuccessful. The Policy Planning Staff completed the paper October 4, and sent one copy to Paris for the comments of Bohlen and Marshall. Bohlen felt there was no chance of acceptance by the Russians and suggested several textual changes; Marshall’s comments have not been found. The receipt of Delga 503, October 27 (ante, p. 1236) indicated that the line of action proposed in PPS 42 was not approved and that a decision had been taken to try to reach agreement with the Russians along the lines of the August 30 Directive. (Policy Planning Staff Files)