Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

507.BC/10–2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Paris, October 27, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 503. Eyes Only Lovett from Jessup. At meeting with Secretary yesterday approval was given to memo relating to future courses of action in Berlin case, summary of which is set forth below.¹ Memo based on assumption that case remains on SC agenda and any program would be fully coordinated with French and UK.

1. Reference to GA. Although we would probably receive overwhelming supporting vote in GA, recommended that this step not be taken at present stage on ground that it would make actual settlement of case more difficult and mere GA condemnation would not result in lifting blockade; furthermore present flexibility and potential of SYG or other influential delegates would be lost.

2. Wait and see period of ten days to three weeks. This course would involve deliberate non-action in UN and at same time taking steps in Berlin first of which would be introductions Western mark B as sole currency in Western sectors. Recommended that this step not be taken until after other measures have been tried on the ground that it would indicate a conclusion that there is no likelihood of securing Soviet agreement to any solution of problem and that steps taken in Berlin would be interpreted in SC and elsewhere as deliberate aggravation of the situation.

3. Attempt to carry out SC resolution despite Soviet veto. This program could be put into effect by a letter to SC President referring to USSR statement that it wants a settlement and that blockade measures are necessary to protect economy of Soviet Zone. Letter would inform President that Western powers would present rail, road and barge traffic at border Soviet Zone on stated future date, that such traffic would be subject to safeguards against currency abuse, that meeting of Military Governors would be called, that restrictions imposed by Western powers would be lifted and thereafter a CFM meeting held. If traffic were permitted to move through Soviet Zone Military Governors would immediately meet. Recommendation that this procedure not be followed at present stage on ground that no indication that Soviets would acquiesce and that it would exclude the six neutral members of SC from participating in attempt to find a solution.²

4. Implementation of arrangements for currency, etc., through an intermediary. This procedure would make use of intermediary actually to frame the kind of regulation for currency in Berlin which under SC resolution would have been drawn up by Military Governors. Procedure has many variants, one of which was suggested in Department’s 4124 of October 22.³ Another variant would be for SC to ask the SYG to have operational arrangements prepared and authorize him to use such experts as he desired. Another variant would be to have President make similar request to SYG in order to avoid formal SC resolution. Both Soviet and Western Powers might be invited to supply SYG or neutral experts with suggestions as to terms of satisfactory operational arrangements.

Authority of SYG or expert group might be either to prepare operational arrangements which would be submitted to SC for consideration and adoption as recommendation to the parities or for submission to the parities for voluntary agreement. Consideration should be given to time of lifting the blockade in relation to report of SYG or export group.

Recommendation that immediate steps be started along this line. Wide variation and flexibility of possibilities within general framework of this procedure make it desirable to discuss forthwith with British and French so that we may obtain their general reaction and so that we can work on elaboration of details of the plan.

Secretary is meeting Bevin and Schuman this afternoon, but not probable that program set forth in paragraph 4 above will be discussed.

Sent Department Delga 503; repeated London Eyes Only Douglas as 1120, Berlin Eyes Only Murphy and Clay as 659. Department repeat Moscow Eyes Only Smith as 563. [Jessup.]

Marshall

1. The full text of the memorandum was sent as an enclosure to a letter from Bancroft to Reber, October 28, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–2848).

2. In a memorandum October 26, not printed, Bohlen had stated the following:

   “I do not feel that the proposals designed to put the Security Council resolution into effect despite USSR veto are very practicable or desirable. They are based on certain assumptions, such as that the USSR wants a settlement, which are by no means proven. It continues to place us in a position of being something in the nature of begging for a solution. Also there are serious disadvantages to sending a train up to the border in the almost certain knowledge that it would be turned back under humiliating conditions.” Bohlen then expressed his preference for the course of action outlined in paragraph 4. (501.BC/10–2648)

3. Ante, p. 1231.