Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

501.BC/10–1648: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

Paris, October 16, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 361. Eyes Only Lovett from Jessup. French are disturbed by their belief that adoption or vetoing of a resolution in SC would mark the end of the road closing all doors. While we agree SC should not rush into resolution state to meet this attitude, we have drafted following memorandum to show possible developments. Memorandum not yet in final form and we have questions on details of it but in view time element send it for your comments. Time schedule is merely illustrative and each successive step would be subject to reconsideration in light developments. Contemplate discussing some such program British and French Monday or Tuesday.

• “1. October 19. Meeting of SC at which the three powers will answer the questions of the six.

  [“]Note: Consideration of the nature of the replies.

• “2. October 21 and 23. Continuation of debate with possible statements by members of the six.

• “3. October 25. Further session of SC at which one or more members of the six might introduce a resolution along the lines of the three power draft¹ on which the memorandum of October 10 to Bramuglia² was based.

  “Note: Consideration of the nature of the statements which the three powers might make in talking to the draft resolution, particularly with reference to reaffirmation at the time of assurances regarding the items which the three powers would be prepared to accept once the blockade is lifted, e.g., meeting of the CFM. Consideration should also be given to a possible statement that once the CFM has been able to meet, there would no longer be any reason for the SC to keep matter on agenda.

• “4. October 26 or 27. Further meeting of SC to continue debate on the resolution and possibly a vote.

  “Note: After the vote on the resolution and the Soviet veto or abstention, declarations by the three powers that they are prepared to act in accordance with the resolution.

• “5. October 29. Joint communiqué of the three powers announcing their readiness to participate in CFM meeting in three weeks time, on the assumption that the blockade would be lifted by that date.

  “Note: The advantages of this procedure are as follows:

  • “a. It makes the minor concession of announcing a projected CFM meeting outside of the SC to whose jurisdiction the Russians object.
  • “b. It avoids the development of a feeling on the part of the members of the UN that the whole matter is closed and that no solution is possible. In this connection, it should be considered whether the proposed communiqué of the three powers should not be issued immediately after SC action on the resolution in order to avoid the development of tension during the interval.
  • “c. It provides an interval, if the Russians are so inclined, for any possible development which might contribute to a solution, recognizing throughout that the three powers are agreed that they will not sit down around a table to resume discussions with the Soviet Union so long as the duress of the blockade is maintained.
  • “d. It leaves open the possibility of eventual resort to the GA.

• “6. Around November 10 invitations might be issued by the French Government to the UK, US, and USSR to attend a meeting of the CFM on November 16. The invitation should contain a carefully phrased statement to the effect that the meeting is predicated on the assumption that the blockade measures will not be in existence at the time the CFM meets.

  “Note: It is desirable that the actual invitation should not be issued too long in advance of the meeting in order that in case of a possible flat refusal of the Soviet Union, further action might be necessary at too early a date. We have doubts whether invitation should actually be issued unless by this time Soviets had given some lead.³

• “7. If the Soviet Union refuses the invitation, the three foreign ministers should consider whether it is desirable to refer the question to the GA.

• “8. If Molotov comes to the meeting of the CFM the chairman, Schuman, might begin by saying that before proceeding to a consideration of agenda, it was necessary for him to ask Molotov whether the blockade has been lifted. If Molotov said, yes, the Foreign Ministers would proceed with discussion of the agenda and at the same time, the three military governors in Berlin would inform Sokolovsky that certain traffic would begin to move at indicated time. If Molotov replied that the blockade had not been lifted, the president should refer to the indication in the invitation that that was essential to the discussions and should declare the meeting adjourned.

  “Note: While such a situation might have caused the three western foreign ministers some inconvenience, it would have caused Molotov more inconvenience and if other considerations point to desirability of the step, the inconvenience of coming to a futile meeting might be disregarded.

• “9. If Molotov says that the blockade is lifted and the discussions in the CFM continue, it would be recognized that it always lies in the power of the Soviet Union to reimpose the blockade at any time. This, however, is true under any circumstances and should not prevent the opening of discussions provided the actual lifting takes place and traffic begins to move. Presumably at that stage there would be no let-up of the air lift.

• “10. If in accordance with Paragraph 7 the CFM is forced to adjourn, one might assume that the Soviets count on the failure of the air lift during the winter months and are unwilling to lift the blockade until they have felt out the situation during the winter. The western powers would then continue the air lift and would need to consider what further measures it might be possible to take in Berlin for the protection of the economy and the welfare of the people.

  “Note: While the resulting situation would be a return to the impasse existing at the end of September when the matter was referred to the SC, we would enter the new phase with the added strength of UN action and with the possibility that after the demonstration of the success of the air lift during the winter, the Soviets might be prepared to change their position.”⁴

Repeated Eyes Only Berlin for Murphy and Clay as 637; Department repeat Moscow for Smith as 538, repeated London Eyes Only for Douglas as 1072. [Jessup.]

Austin

1. Not printed.
2. Transmitted in Delga 280, October 11, from Paris, p. 1216.
3. Telegram 2533, October 21, from Berlin, not printed, asked why the invitation to the CFM should come from a western power, and if it would not be tactically better for the USSR to request such a meeting (740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–1848).
4. In Gadel 229, October 17, to Paris, not printed, the Department expressed its general agreement with paragraphs 1 through 5 of this telegram, and told Jessup that it shared his doubts about issuing an invitation for a CFM before the Soviets indicated that they were prepared to accept. Jessup’s proposal did not deal with the currency question, however, and the Department was studying the idea of a neutral commission which would prepare an agreement based on the August 30 Directive to regulate the use and issue of Soviet currency in Berlin. (501.BC/10–1748)