501.BC/10–848
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State 1
You may care to discuss with Lovett, Smith and Kennan the following brief analysis of the problems we will encounter in the Berlin case before the Security Council which is written not from the point of view of the procedures in the Council or tactics to be followed there but rather from the point of view of the possible dangers to our position in Berlin.
As in all international conferences and bodies there is already visible the tendency among the members of the Security Council to regard as a solution of the problem a formula which can be got through the Security Council—in other words, to divorce the actual discussions and maneuverings in the Security Council from the realities of the problem itself. The danger in this tendency is obvious in that it may produce a so-called solution or formula which would permit an agreement in the Council but would be totally unworkable and even catastrophic on the spot.
As I see it, there is a visible contradiction which may grow to greater proportions in the position of the three Western Powers. We have brought the case to the Security Council on the grounds that the Soviet actions constitute a threat to the peace yet the French and, it is to be expected, the neutral powers on the Council are tending to regard our approach as a request of the Council to use its conciliatory [Page 1215] powers to bring the two parties to a dispute together. The French position, as expressed by Parodi, is clearly that; they take the view that the Moscow negotiations broke down at a point when the two parties were not very far apart and that the Security Council therefore might close this slight gap and “solve the question”. Parodi makes a considerable point of the fact that before the Security Council we cannot appear less anxious to achieve a pacific settlement than we were a month ago in Moscow when we were willing to accept a simultaneous lifting of the blockade and the introduction of the Soviet mark under four-power control as the sole currency in Berlin. We have developed with him to the full all the arguments against this approach, pointing out that the three Governments have formally taken the position in their final notes and in the statements before the Council that we would not negotiate as long as the blockade remains. The basis of course of the French position is their fear of facing up to consequences of treating the Soviet position as it deserves.
My concern is that the Russians will immediately detect the evidence of weakness which the approach of conciliation will reveal and will exploit it to the full. The end result might well be that neutral members in the Security Council will come up with some suggestion which will in effect mean the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the August 30 directive2 as the Soviet note of October 33 proposes plus possibly some additional Soviet assurances as to good behavior. The British and possibly even ourselves might be left alone in our position against any such proposition. We will of course do everything we can to prevent the worst from developing along those lines but in view of the French attitude I am not entirely sure that we will be steadily successful.
The one element, and a very important one, is the fact that the Soviets will very probably veto any recommendation of the Security Council. But a weak resolution calling on the parties to compose their seemingly slight differences on the technical aspects of the Berlin matter would be a great propaganda victory for them which they can use to very good effect and as the new basis for any new negotiations on the subject.
Basically the attitude that concerns me is that the French and the neutral members of the Council, instead of, as Chapter VII would imply, taking the attitude that the Russians are violating the Charter in this respect before the bar of the Security Council, are, while in full agreement with the justice of our case, approaching it merely as another party to the dispute with rights and wrongs on both sides. We all desire a solution, and no one is seeking to promote a situation leading [Page 1216] to war but one of our difficulties is to convince the French and the neutral members that the way to arrive at a solution that would not be a sellout with the Russians, in circumstances of this character is to start with a very inflexible and nonconciliatory attitude. To begin with conciliation is to invite inflexibility on their part.
I am in entire agreement with the Department’s 39514 in that we should not enter into too much detail concerning the Berlin affair but should adopt a simpler version.
From the point of view of political realism there is a curious paradox in the present position. While we want public opinion of course to support the justice of our position and its corollary, the illegality of the Russian actions, the more we prove our case the stronger the fears of the European powers become and the greater their tendency to shrink from the logic of the very justice of the Western position.