740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–2748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup)
Yesterday, at about noon, Ambassador Douglas, Dean Rusk and I met with the Secretary at the Residence to discuss the Berlin Case. During the course of the conversation the discussion turned to the question of our objectives in appealing to the UN. Mr. Douglas pointed out to the Secretary that he had detected some uncertainty among some members of the U.S. Delegation as to whether our appeal to the UN was designed merely to give us strong moral backing for any action which might ultimately become necessary, even contemplating the possible necessity of the utilization of measures of force; or whether the appeal to the Security Council was sincerely designed to assist in reaching some kind of a solution. He said that he thought it was of great importance for me in my preparation and handling of the case to have some directive on this point. I stated my very strong concurrence of this view. I pointed out that not only in terms of our official presentation but also in terms of our essential contacts with other delegates one of the first questions to be answered would be our choice between these two general points of view to which Mr. Douglas had referred. I said that I thought we would be in a very much stronger position if we were able to say that in going to the Security Council we sincerely desired a solution, that we were referring the matter in good faith, and were prepared to abide by a UN resolution. Mr. Douglas, on this last point, noted that some proposal might eventuate from the discussions which would be unpalatable to us and the question was whether we would be prepared to accede to it.
The Secretary said that any statement I made on this line would have to be very carefully weighed since great importance would be attached to it and we had to consider both the immediate situation and the precedent which might be established. He went on to refer to Mr. Douglas’ hypothesis and mentioned as an extreme example a possible resolution calling upon the Western Powers to get out of Berlin. [Page 1194] He then remarked that in going into the UN we had to recognize the implications of the step we had taken and had to be prepared to carry through. I did not understand this as a commitment of the specific example which he mentioned but an indication of a general line of approach.
Mr. Douglas told the Secretary that he had prepared a memorandum1 on this issue but that he had not yet transmitted it to the Secretary because he had first wished to show it to Mr. Bohlen, before any meeting with the Secretary, Dulles, Bohlen and myself. In view of the Secretary’s statement, he decided that it was unnecessary to submit the memorandum. He and I in talking it over later felt that the Secretary had given a sufficient indication of our general policy and that the matter need not be pursued further.
- Not found in Department files.↩