740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–448
Record of Meetings of the Secretary of State With the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France1
The following are a record of the meetings and decisions taken by the three Ministers of Sunday, September 26, concerning:
- (1)
- a final confirmation of the decision to refer the Berlin matter to the Security Council;
- (2)
- agreement on the text of final note to the Soviet Government and time of its dispatch; and
- (3)
- the release of communiqué and time of publication of final note.
Following the news of the publication by the Soviets of the Tass communiqué on the Moscow and Berlin discussions, which was received by the Delegation somewhat before 9 o’clock on Sunday morning, after consultation with the British and French it was agreed that the three Ministers would meet shortly before one o’clock. In talking with Mr. Couve de Murville about 11:30 a. m. he said he could make this engagement for Mr. Schuman who was temporarily absent at a High Mass at Notre Dame but would be back at the Quai d’Orsay between 12:15 and 12:30. Mr. Couve de Murville subsequently confirmed the arrangement.
The three Ministers met shortly before one o’clock at the Quai d’Orsay to consider the situation produced by the Soviet breach of the agreement to hold the conversations confidential. The three Ministers had an opportunity to study the Soviet note of September 252 and were unanimously of the opinion that in the light of the Soviet refusal contained in that note there was no purpose in attempting to continue discussions directly with the Soviet Government. There was no suggestion, direct or indirect, from any official present to the contrary. Mr. Schuman said that the French Government was prepared to agree with the United States that the matter should now be referred to the United Nations and specifically to the Security Council.
[Page 1185]Secretary Marshall, in order to clarify the point that the decision to go to the United Nations was the independent decision of the three Governments concerned and not merely to meet the wishes of the United States, stated that as the other Ministers were aware the United States Government has always felt that when the Moscow conversations came to an end that the only logical next step was reference to the United Nations but that nevertheless he would like to know if either of his colleagues had any suggestions for alternative courses of action. Both Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin replied that their Governments could see no other course of action except to refer it to the Security Council.
The discussion then turned to the desirability of the issuance of a communiqué immediately on the part of the Ministers announcing their decision. Secretary Marshall pointed out that so far nothing had come from the three Governments while the Soviet version of the breakdown was being spread all over the world by radio and press without opposition. He read in this connection a message just received from Mr. Lovett to that effect. He therefore urged that the Ministers should immediately issue a communiqué to the world in order to counteract this Soviet propaganda and inform their public opinions as to their position. Mr. Bevin at first had some objection to this course of action on the grounds that since the three Governments were agreed to dispatch a final note to the Soviet Government3 stating that the Soviet reply of September 25 was unsatisfactory and reviewing their basic position in these discussions it would perhaps be better to wait until the text of the note was finally agreed that afternoon, delivered and then make it public. Such a procedure he felt would put the main elements of the position of the three Western Powers before the public. He felt that the proposed short communiqué might convey the impression that we had acted in haste solely because of a Tass communiqué. The Secretary pointed out that to wait until the final note was ready would be to give Soviet propaganda several additional hours to blanket the world. Mr. Schuman agreed with the Secretary and Mr. Bevin also finally agreed and it was decided to issue the short communiqué at 3 p. m. Paris time.4
Drafting and Acceptance of Final Text of Note to the Soviet Government
The Drafting Committee met during the afternoon and agreed upon a final text of the note to be sent by the three Governments to the Soviet Government.
[Page 1186]At 9:30 p. m. the Ministers met and after a few minor drafting changes approved the final text of the note which in the last paragraph made it plain that the three Western Governments did not regard the continuance of negotiations possible in existing circumstances.
There was considerable discussion as to the time of delivery and release to the press of the agreed note because of the difference in time between the three capitals. It was finally decided that because of this difference of time the United States Government would deliver its note on Sunday, September 26, and the other two Governments would either deliver it on the twenty-sixth or, in view of the lateness of the hour, on the twenty-seventh, and that release would be made to the press at any time after delivery in the discretion of each Government. Because of the fears of Mr. Bevin of the effect of an ultimatum which might be produced by too quick a release after delivery it was decided after communication with Washington that the note would be delivered in Washington as soon as possible to 6:30 p. m. Washington time and given to the press but for release not before midnight Eastern Standard Time.
Throughout the discussion between the Ministers on Sunday at no time was there any suggestion from any of the three Ministers that negotiations should be continued in Moscow nor was there any division of opinion concerning the necessity of going forthwith to the United Nations or to presenting the case to the Security Council under Chapter VII as a threat to peace and security.