Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–448

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretary of State With the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France¹

[Translation]

top secret

Paris, September 20, 1948.

Present

France	United Kingdom	United States
Mr. Schuman	Mr. Bevin	General Marshall
Mr. Chauvel	Mr. McNeil	Mr. Douglas
Mr. Couve de Murville	Sir Oliver Harvey	Mr. Caffery
Mr. Alphand	Sir William Strang	Mr. Foster Dulles
Mr. Clappier	Mr. Tomkins	Mr. Bohlen
Mr. de Bourbon-Busset

Mr. Andronikof, Interpreter

Mr. Schuman: We are meeting at Mr. Bevin’s request, and the French Government is very happy that this meeting is taking place. It makes it possible for us to study the questions to be placed on the agenda of the United Nations, as well to study other problems which can more easily be settled by direct discussion between the three Governments. I believe that Mr. Bevin would like to suggest the order in which these questions might be considered.

Mr. Bevin: In the light of events in Berlin, my Government believes it necessary to reach a decision on the various questions before us: the reply to be addressed to the Soviet Union, and the consequences of a break with the Soviet Union at Berlin. While we know our opinions regarding this reply, since each of the steps which we may be led to take is vital, we must study together all the aspects of the matter in order to reach the same conclusions.

Mr. Schuman: That is my Government’s opinion also.

Mr. Bevin: It is obvious that the note² prepared in London means a break and that the question is to be referred to the United Nations. Consequently we must decide if we are going to send a written statement or proceed once more to oral discussions. I have already spoken with Mr. Marshall about this,³ and we must settle this question definitely. But other questions arise. After consulting the Military Governors, should we attach to this note a statement of our own terms? Up to now, as a matter of fact, we have merely replied to the Soviet Government. We have attempted to elucidate and interpret Stalin’s words. Shouldn’t we now state what we consider our minimum requests. Moreover, the matter should be referred to the United Nations not on the basis of the discussions at Moscow but on the basis of our clearly defined attitude and requests. Therefore should we limit ourselves simply to the note prepared at London? Also, in referring the matter to the United Nations, should we bring it first before the Security Council or before the Assembly? My Government believes that it would be better to refer it directly to the Assembly in order that a resolution may be drawn up, addressed to the Security Council and requesting it to take action. On the other hand, the United States Government would prefer to refer the matter first to the Council and then to the Assembly. On this question of procedure, I am authorized by my Government to discuss the matter with my colleagues and to concur in a decision reached by common agreement. Therefore we must study carefully what our general attitude should be in connection with the settlement of the problem that is finally adopted. For example, as far as the “air ferry” is concerned: in case of a break, what additional obstacles would be created by the Soviets? What would be the effects on the population of Berlin? What currency difficulties would arise? We would have to know how we could even bring western currency into Berlin. Likewise, we will have to take into account the time factor: how much time would be required to set up a Government of Western Germany? Consequently I propose that in two or three days our three Governments draw up a general outline of the situation. But I would like to assure Mr. Schuman and Mr. Marshall that we do not suggest a program which will require as much time as a Council of Foreign Ministers. It is not a question of our reconsidering our principles or our determination, but of closely reviewing all the elements in the case, since we desire to establish the methods for our action, in order not to improvise any more, as we have done in the past.

Mr. Schuman: Mr. Bevin has just described the program as a whole. I would like to limit myself, to begin with, to the first question: what answer are we going to send to Mr. Molotov. For I believe that we are all in agreement that we must reply. It would not, in fact, be sufficient, merely to take cognizance of the break; we must take into account the impression it would make on public opinion and on the United Nations. A person unfamiliar with all the negotiations should be able to understand the situation. We must state clearly the basis of the problem and avoid disagreement, in order to make it thoroughly understood that we are not willing to make any concessions on vital questions which, up to the present time, have produced only negative replies from the Soviets. The decision to be taken is a very serious one: not only because of its consequences in Berlin and elsewhere, but also as far as opinion within the United Nations is concerned. It is essential that this opinion be favorable when the question is brought up. Therefore we must consider carefully and as rapidly as possible the reply which we must send to Moscow. I do not intend, any more than my colleagues do, to cause delays in this matter, which would make us lose not only time, but also authority and prestige. We must act in such a way that every honest person can say: it is not your fault if there has been a break. I propose that we take up the other questions after we have reached a decision on this question.

Mr. Marshall: In a message which I received in Washington before my departure, Mr. Bevin had already stated these questions, adding that it would be desirable to have a meeting of the principal negotiators, and not only the Ministers, but also the Military Governors as well as Ambassadors Douglas and Smith. We agree to reviewing all the facts rapidly and also, as you suggest, to working out together the first step in our procedure. We definitely believe (and this has been our opinion from the beginning) that our note should commend itself to the United Nations and to world opinion. But in addition to this aspect, we have attempted to see the situation clearly, and we have kept up to date a “white paper” which could be published immediately, as well as an official statement to the press.⁴ However, the essential thing is the note. My Government considers that there are certain basic principles on which it would be fatal to give way. Therefore let us realize fully the importance of the conditions under which the question is referred to the United Nations. I think it would be advisable for us to meet again tomorrow for an exchange of views after having considered what has already been said this evening.

Mr. Bevin: I would agree that we should meet again tomorrow. However, my Government earnestly desires that our report be studied carefully and thoroughly. In fact, while the London draft interprets correctly, for example, legal rights, it does not set forth in concrete terms either the settlement which we are considering or the steps which we would take if our requests are met. In this connection there are two fundamental questions: the blockade and currency. If they are not dealt with in a manner sufficiently clear and precise, I fear further delays.

Mr. Marshall: In accordance with Mr. Schumann suggestion, I propose that tomorrow morning we discuss what our note shall be, and then how we shall refer the matter to the United Nations, and finally, that we decide on the order in which we will study the questions presented by Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Bevin: Does that mean that we will send the note first, and that we will study the consequences afterwards?

Mr. Marshall: Not at all. I propose that we study tomorrow the character which this note should assume, and the procedure for referring the subject to the United Nations, as well as the other factors of which you have spoken.

Messrs Schuman and Bevin express their agreement.

It is then decided to appoint a drafting committee which will work on the note in the light of the exchange of views which has just taken place and in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief.

1. The meeting took place at Schuman’s office at the Quai d’Orsay. These minutes were apparently prepared by the French Delegation. Bevin and Marshall were in Paris attending the General Assembly of the United Nations.
2. The reference here is to the note under preparation in London by representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France following the failure of the negotiations in Berlin. For the text of the note as delivered to the Soviet Embassies in Washington September 26, and in Paris and London, September 27, see p. 1185.
3. Bevin and Marshall had discussed the next step to be taken by the three Western powers before the meeting at the Quai d’Orsay. A brief summary of their discussion was transmitted in telegram 4926, September 20, from Paris, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–2048).
4. The “White Paper” under reference here is the Department of State publication The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions 1948 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948). The publication was released to the press on September 26. For the text of the statement referred to here and issued to the press on September 26, see the circular telegram of September 26, p. 1185.