740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–548: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
niact
3978. For the Secretary and Lovett (Eyes Only) from Douglas.
I. Subject your telecon message afternoon September 4.1
Have just finished a long conversation with Strang who has been in communication with Bevin and who transmitted to me the latter’s views. They are as follows:
1. It would have been preferable had we referred back to Moscow the question of the powers of the financial commission when the first signs of Sokolovsky’s departure from the Moscow agreements appeared at the meeting of the Military Governors on September 1.
2. (A) a. Since, however, we did not then during the early days of the discussion among the Military Governors follow this course;
b. Since the issue of the powers of the financial commission was referred to a committee and has not subsequently formally been submitted to the Military Governors for discussion;
c. Since it was agreed yesterday in Berlin that the transport committee should complete its work indicating the items in which there is agreement and the items on which there may be disagreement, and that this report was to be, when finished, submitted to the Military Governors for discussion; and
d. Since the next meeting of the Military Governors is to be held on Monday, the 6th, one day prior to the agreed date on which they are to submit the results of their discussions to their respective governments:
[Page 1127]Bevin feels that we should now await this report before making any representations in Moscow.
2. (B) It is Bevin’s strongly held opinion that even though discussion of all details implicit in the implementation of the Moscow directive may not have been completed by the 7th, the report of the Military Governors should, nevertheless, be made to their Governments on the agreed date.
2. (C) He thinks that meanwhile, between now and the 7th, it would be a mistake for us to walk out of any one of the committees that have been formed and to refuse to participate in their labors. It is too late, in his judgment, to take this action.
2. (D) Meanwhile, that is to say between now and the 8th, the Military Governors should so point up the discussions in Berlin that Sokolovsky’s position will be made unmistakably clear as to whether he accepts for implementation the two basic principles: Namely, first the powers of the financial commission over the Bank of Emission in regard to the continued issuance and circulation of currency in Berlin; and second, the lifting of transport restrictions. In this connection Robertson will be instructed to follow this course.
If this course is followed, even though discussion of many of the details will not have been completed, we will have a clear view of the fundamentals.
2. (E) The three governments, having received the report of the Military Governors, will then be in a position carefully, considerately and in an orderly fashion to take stock of the situation as it then exists and to arrive at a consolidated and united position. This, Bevin feels, may be crucial.
3. (A) Bevin is not clear that the Soviet are pressing for a break. He thinks the evidence is inconclusive on this point and not sufficient at the moment to justify a judgment one way or the other.
(B) Bevin feels, on the other hand, that we should not on our part try to maneuver deliberately for a break.
4. (A) Bevin is absolutely firm that the transport restrictions which have been imposed prior to June 18th must be lifted, and that we cannot agree to the implementation of any additional restrictions except those necessary, as outlined by Clay, to protect the Berlin currency position. In this regard, however, he thinks we should not be too rigid in the position we take covering inspection for the use of the military trains; that too much emphasis has been placed on the use of military trains and not enough on the critical question of the use of transport facilities for the purpose of supplying the city of Berlin. He feels, also that we should not be too rigid in providing the reasonable protections against the misuse of transportation facilities in such a way as to adversely affect the currency situation in Berlin.
[Page 1128](B) He is equally firm that the powers of the financial commission over the German Bank of Emission, in so far as the continued use and circulation of the Soviet mark in Berlin are concerned, must be adequate.
II. ReDeptel 3526, September 4.2
After reviewing Robertson’s report on Sokolovsky’s announcement of the forthcoming Soviet air maneuvers and Clay’s comments, the former of which carried a somewhat milder note than the latter, it is Strang’s view that official notice should be taken by HMG. This he feels, particularly because Sokolovsky went out of his way to inform us officially of the contemplated exercises of the Soviet Air Force.
Whether, however, this notice should be taken through representations in Berlin or Moscow, he is not so clear.
I pointed out to Strang that doubtless Sokolovsky was acting under instructions when he made his declaration to the three western Military Governors, and that, therefore, any representations which we make on the subject should properly be in Moscow and not in Berlin. Strang wants to consider the precise language which HMG may use in making their representations either in Berlin or Moscow.
On this point, Strang will give me further information this afternoon after having communicated with Bevin. Since it is now 3:30 in Moscow, it is doubtful, should Bevin conclude to communicate with the Soviet Government, that instructions could be received by Roberts in time to act today.3
III. In regard to going to the GA or SC in the event of a break, Strang indicated, tentatively, that after Bevin had seen the report of our conversation, reported in Embtel 3937, September 1,4 he will be able to give me a definitive answer. Probably, however, HMG will be prepared to agree with us that we should appeal to the SC.
IV. 1. I also discussed with Massigli at considerable length the substance of your telecon message of yesterday afternoon. He is putting the matter to his Government, and will have a reply at about 5:00 o’clock this afternoon after it has been discussed with Schuman.
Massigli’s tentative reaction was that it was probably too late to act in Moscow prior to the 7th.
2. I also discussed with Massigli the substance of Deptel 3526, September 4, and gave him the background information which he had not previously received. He will give me an answer on this question at [Page 1129] the same time that he gives me an answer on the substance of paragraph IV.–1. above.
3. On the subject of invoking the UN, while Massigli said that he was impressed with the argument that had been made at our meeting reported in Embtel 3937, September 1. he felt that his Government, before giving an answer, would want to know what course of action or alternative courses of action we are considering taking after our appeal to UN has been completed, and that his Government probably would not consider our commitment to take no step which might precipitate serious trouble without full consultation as a wholly satisfactory answer. I repeated again the arguments that had previously been made, and ended with the question which I have on many occasions put to Massigli: “If not the UN, what course of action should we take?” At any rate, Massigli said quite frankly that he thought this question was a good one.
Sent Department as 3978, repeated Paris for Caffery Eyes Only as 572; Berlin for Murphy and Clay Eyes Only as 486. Department please pass Moscow for Smith Eyes Only as 240.
- Ante, p. 1113.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In subsequent telegrams, Douglas and Caffery reported the British and French would not protest Soviet air maneuvers in the corridors to Berlin. The United States delivered its note in Moscow on September 5, and the Soviet Government replied September 7. The texts of the notes and related documentation are in file 740.00119 Control (Germany).↩
- Not printed; it reported tentative British and French agreement on the necessity of taking the Berlin question to the Security Council if the negotiations with the Russians broke down (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–148).↩