Office of the Historian

740.00119 Council/4–2848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
London, April 28, 1948—3 p. m.

1794. For the Secretary’s and Lovett’s, Eyes Only from Douglas.

1. Discussed at lunch yesterday the Berlin situation. Strang and Robertson for the British, Clay, Murphy and myself for the US were present (Deptel 1423, April 221).

2. British have no objections to a clear statement of our position and our rights. They have, however, doubts on the following points:

(a)
Whether the statement of the position should be communicated in a formal note; or
(b)
by oral representations through diplomatic channels in Moscow.

They interpret the last sentence of the suggested note to mean that we are prepared to go to war, or at least commit organized acts of war in the event that the Soviet do not, by their actions, recognize our asserted rights. They wonder whether first, this is precisely what we mean; and secondly, whether it is a wise position for us to take. On their part they would not be willing to add the scorpion’s sting to the assertion of our rights.

3. As to the British position, it can be summarized as follows:

(a)
If the Soviet commit organized military acts of war (as distinct from a series of incidents) against them and US, they would go to war.
(b)
If the Soviets, by employing additional annoying tactics and resorting to additional measures aimed at further restricting our communications with Berlin, the British would be prepared to use force for the purpose of preserving communications, depending upon the nature and character of the measures taken by the Soviet. For example, [Page 900] the British would be prepared to use fighter escorts to protect communication by air with Berlin. They believe that while this might lead to a series of incidents, this would not precipitate war. On the other hand, should a situation arise in which they would have to use substantial force to prevent the Soviet from effectively carrying out some non-military action aimed at making it impossible for us to remain in Berlin, they would want to think two or three times.
(c)
The British are not prepared to take the categorical position that under all circumstances and in all events, they will fight to maintain a position in Berlin.

Briefly, the above means British will go to war in event clear organized act of war is committed against them by Soviet. They probably would not commit organized act of war against Soviet to preserve position in Berlin.

4. This statement of British is informal. Will talk with Bevin and will discuss privately with British and French this afternoon (not an agenda item).

5. We interpret the last paragraph in the suggested note to the Soviet to mean that we will fight to maintain the rights which we assert. Would appreciate your advice as to whether this interpretation is correct.2

Douglas
  1. Ante, p. 896.↩

  2. In telegram 1555, April 30, to London, Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett replied to Ambassador Douglas’ query as follows:

    “Last sentence of draft note means that we intend to stay in Berlin and that we will resist force with force. It does not spell out the point at which force would be used. We feel that this is neither necessary nor advisable at this time. We will not, however, initiate the application of force.

    “We do not believe that the interpretation which British have placed on this sentence is warranted.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–2848)

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