740.00119 EW/9–148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

3920. Deptel 3408, August 26,1 raises some questions.

1.
The question of reparations is much more than economic. It is a far-flung political question. I have always felt that reparations would be a nightmare, but the past is the past.

Political agreements have been made about reparations; among them is the IARA agreement. Under the level of industry for Bizonal area, commitments have been made to the Germans and justifiable expectations among IARA countries have developed. Implied obligations have been undertaken to France, which is not only an occupying power, but also a IARA country.

2.
At this particular moment, when the whole German question is the center of one of our most serious and critical issues bf foreign policy, a further protracted postponement of closing the book on reparations and thereby accentuating suspicions already mounting as to our intention to honor the obligations to which we are a party and the implied undertakings that we have entered into, might very seriously and adversely affect our ability to establish and maintain a united and solid front among the Western Powers.
3.
The dispatch of forty engineers, no matter how eminent, under the auspices of men no matter how distinguished, to review a problem which has already been reviewed many times, may have far-reaching effects. Such a review might affect, unfortunately, the achievement of [Page 801] the purposes—political as much as economic—we have in mind under the European Recovery Program.

I can well understand why, therefore, Hoffman is reluctant to inject himself into this essentially political complex.

4.
I will, of course, if you wish, talk with the Foreign Office which I know will be deeply disturbed by developments you have described, but I very much hope you will relieve me of doing so.

I cannot urge too strongly the importance of finally and conclusively disposing of this matter with the greatest possible speed. Further delay may not only have very unfortunate consequences in France and other countries, the former of which is, as you know, uneasy about the whole German problem. It may also be the cause of serious disturbances in Germany.

5.
Is there no mechanism we can employ which will bring this matter to a speedy close? For example can not the material in Washington be examined promptly and a very small group be sent (a) to Germany to examine with Clay availability of labor, raw materials and power etc for operation of any plant to determine whether it can actually, in context of all facts, be brought into production in 4¼ years, and (b) to Paris and London to obtain first hand view of political consequences?
Douglas
  1. Ante, p. 796.