711.51/12–1648: Telegram
The Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
RepSec 2. Eyes Only for the Secretary and Lovett from Harriman. Since my return I have become increasingly concerned over the need for accelerating the coordination of our policies, and objectives negotiations with Western European governments, particularly, the French. There are seven or eight different subjects being currently discussed or negotiated by different groups in London, Paris, Washington, Germany and elsewhere. These include a series of subjects regarding Germany (control of Ruhr, reparations, prohibited or limited industries, occupation statute, fusion agreement and German Government) and, concurrently, ECA aid including use of counterparts, rearmament of Western Union and North Atlantic Pact.
In the case of France, this process of separate and partially uncoordinated negotiations produces particularly unfortunate results in that it permits very sensitive issues such as reparations and control and ownership of Ruhr industries to be debated and presented to the French public outside of the framework of the over-all economic, political and military measures which, in fact, more basically affect French security. In spite of the fact that we are taking and are proposing to take so many extraordinary actions favorable to France’s economic well-being and security, these are all overshadowed by unrealistic fears engendered by our alleged objectives in Germany considered apart from these over-all concepts.
Our policies and negotiations should be concerted in such a way that an over-all program can be presented to the French Government and people. Any French government will find it difficult to agree upon a reasonable solution of German problems except in the setting of the whole. Although I recognize that there must be separate negotiations on these intricate matters, yet as issues develop, we should, I believe, find some method of bringing them together to present them to the appropriate French ministers in a concerted approach. We must find a way to make it possible for the French Government in turn to present [Page 568] to the French people the extremely favorable over-all nature of our cooperation with their aims and aspirations.
Failure to solve this problem will tend to cause increasing difficulties in our relations with France and the French people and to prevent the growth of a true understanding here of our objectives.
While I was in Washington, I discussed the need for concerted action on our part and I appreciate that you and others concerned have been dealing with the problem. However, since my return I feel an even greater sense of urgency as a result of what has transpired hi Paris, London and Germany; hence this message.
I have confidence in our basic policies. We have seen favorable progress in Europe during the past eighteen months resulting therefrom. We can dissipate the full value of our actions if we do not find a way to concert and bring into focus the various components that make up our policies in the political, economic and security fields.
I suggest you show this message to Forrestal and Hoffman and consider whether it might be of interest to the President.
I have discussed this message with Ambassador Caffery who agrees with the line of reasoning contained therein.