740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1848: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
862. Clay’s reaction to that portion of ToRuhr 4 sent London as 4310,1 relating to US membership on Ruhr authority was expressed by him in a personal message to Department Army, which is quoted below:
“Regardless of recollection of Reber, Martin and Wisner, it was clearly understood that US representative on Ruhr authority would be responsible to Military Governor as long as latter is responsible for US expenditures in Germany. Murphy, Oppenheimer and I are all clear on this point. However, that is not important.
“For three and a half years, we have insisted that sound administration in Germany required a single US head in Germany to carry out US policy. Differences between departments are solved in Washington and not in Germany and the American organization in Germany is a single team responsible to a single head. Any variation from this is disastrous particularly as under fusion agreement, only US Military Government can exercise the final voice in financial and economic matters. Any weakening or division of his authority is therefore a weakening of the US position obtained in the fusion agreement at great cost. I must protest vigorously against such action in the Ruhr authority.
“At London an attempt was made to write certain OEEC and ECA responsibilities in the measure which reduced Military Government authority which were finally disapproved at Army insistence. This attempt is being renewed.
“With particular reference to State 1841.2 While I have not considered proposed action a personal reflection hitherto, I certainly so consider 1841 which implies an inability on my part to represent broad interests of US. If such is the case, I certainly do not belong here. I know of no instance in which Military Government has acted contrary [Page 509] to orders of its government. I have heard much of this broad interests theory which resolves itself into our refusal to place into effect certain measures desired by junior officials of State Department which were never approved by higher authority and sent to me as instructions. I repeat policy has to be resolved in Washington but it should be executed in Germany by one agency. Certainly State with its representation in Military Government secures full information to guide its policy.
“In my own case, I shall in all probability not be here when Ruhr authority is operating. Therefore, I can say in all earnestness that for three and a half years, effort after effort has been made to destroy the effectiveness of a single US administrative agency in Germany by adding additional agencies. It is obvious that this would be inefficient. It is of course desired by the European powers who recognize the weakness of division of authority. Why we even consider such proposals is completely incomprehensible to me and I am convinced it will prove so to the Congress appropriating the funds.
“I think this is a basic issue which the Department of the Army should do its utmost to obtain a sound solution. We learned the principle of undivided authority in actual war; it is even more essential in cold war.
“I may point out also that the press will most certainly interpret this action as reduction in authority of Military Government to meet French views and to clip wings of US representative responsible for German economy. In view of present improvement in German economy which I must emphasize has been achieved without physical ECA aid, this is difficult to understand.”
Sent London for Douglas Eyes Only 862, repeated Department [personal for Saltzman and Hickerson] 2767, Paris personal for Bohlen 940.