CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 133: File—Ruhr Authority, Vol. I: Telegram

The United States Military Governor for Germany (Clay) to the Department of the Army 1


FMPC–1008. From FMP Frankfurt Germany from CINCEUR sgn Clay to Chief of Staff Dept of the Army CSCAD Wash DC. Have just seen London 4857 to State Department.2 I would like to make Military Government’s position Ruhr authority clear.

We are interested in only two principles both of which we believe basic.

The United States because of its large financial support of Germany now exercises through its Military Government the controlling voice in German Economy. If during the period of Military Government, it agrees to give to Ruhr authority powers which negate this control, then it has not only made it possible for others to control the German economy but it will also have sacrificed the position of financial and economic control that the Congress demanded.

Secondly, we feel certain that a division of responsibility for economic development in Germany either between US Military Government and a separate US Representative on Ruhr Authority or between Military Government and the Ruhr Authority during the period of Mil Govt would lead to endless friction, relaxed recovery, and also negate our present dominant position.

As matters now stand, US Military Government does control the German economy under policies laid down by our Government which is logical in view of our financial support but it seems unbelievable to me that we should either diminish this control or dilute it with divided responsibilities. Please bring to attention Under Secretary Draper.

  1. The text of this message was transmitted by Ambassador Murphy in his telegram 262, November 16, from Frankfurt, repeated to London for Douglas and to Paris for Caffery (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1648).
  2. Telegram 4857, Ruhrto 5, November 13, from London, not printed, reported that discussions with OMGUS officials in London revealed several differences with the draft instructions to the U.S. Delegation contained in instruction 459, November 10, to London (p. 465). OMGUS believed that the authorities responsible for German programming should deal directly with the OEEC without any obligation to clear coal, coke and steel figures with the IAR. OMGUS further believed that the IAR would serve two purposes, both principally applicable after the end of the control period of German occupation: (1) to insure the carrying out of OEEC programs by making allocations; (2) to stand by in case OEEC breaks down and fails to agree on programs. OMGUS strongly opposed the concept that the U.S. representatives on the IAR could be other than a member of the staff of the U.S. Military Government. OMGUS also recommended that as soon as a strong German provisional government was established, such a government should have the right to designate its own representative on the IAR. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1348)