Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1448: Telegram

The United States Military Governor for Germany (Clay) to the Department of the Army ¹

secret

[Berlin,] November 13, 1948.

CC–6717. The French representative here, the French Government, and French press are making much ado about our recently announced plan for Ruhr coal and steel properties. This plan makes no change in Allied Control and is entirely within the framework of the London agreement. French objections were based largely on the clause stating it was US/UK military government policy to leave the question of future ownership to be resolved by the Germans with provision, however, that such ownership could not revert to the former Nazi owners.

The French reaction must be regarded in part as an effort to establish public opinion prior to the Ruhr Conference now commencing in London, and parallels their actions in this respect which occurred during the London Conference of last spring in which the French Government had so influenced its own public opinion as to make acceptance of the London agreement politically difficult. The French are particularly referring to the “fait accompli” which would imply that this program had been placed into execution without permitting the French to express their views.

The following will indicate the extent to which the French were informed and the various opportunities that they were given to express their views.

1. On August 23, the Bipartite Board transmitted to them a copy of the “trustee plan” and requested the comments of the French and Benelux as soon as possible.²

2. On September 20, a follow-up letter³ was dispatched to the French restating the urgency of issuing the plan and indicating that, inasmuch as it was important to implement the plan before October 1, we would appreciate their comments within a week.

3. Under date of 23 September, the French military governor transmitted his comments³ and asked for an exchange of information between experts.

4. A meeting with the Benelux representatives and the French military governor with the Bipartite Board was arranged on October 7 to further hear the point of view of the French and Benelux. The French and Benelux requested a further meeting in approximately one week, at which time they would transmit the final views of their government.⁴

5. On October 8, the Bipartite Board dispatched another letter to General Koenig,³ commenting on the points raised in his letter of September 23 and upon the French position as stated in the meeting of October 7.

6. The final meeting of the French and Benelux with the Bipartite Board as requested by them was held on October 18. At this meeting the French presented a paper objecting to the inclusion in the “trustee plan” of a statement that the question of socialization should be left to a future German Government.⁵

7. On October 19, a letter³ was written by the Bipartite Board to General Koenig informing him that it was the understanding of the Bipartite Board that the matter raised in his paper as presented at the meeting of October 8 had been taken up by the French at governmental level and that, therefore, further discussion between the military governors would appear to be called for.

8. On November 9 Bipartite Board informed General Koenig that after careful consideration of the representations made by French Government, US and UK Governments had decided that they were unable to modify the statement concerning the final settlement of ownership. The Board enclosed for General Koenig’s advance information copy of law number 75 together with copy of explanatory speech which was to be made [by] the chairman at several meetings to be held with the Germans on November 10.

It is our understanding that their protests were considered by both the US and UK Governments prior to the implementation of the program. The full story is not known here as to the action at governmental level. Nevertheless, it is clear that the French were fully advised and were given every opportunity to express their views.

The restoration of sound management in the Ruhr steel and coal properties is essential to further progress and our reorganizational steps to this end are sound and cannot be construed in any way as failing to comply strictly with the London agreement.

We are today experiencing work stoppage in Germany which reflects a political unrest in Germany which may be expected to continue unless further political and economic responsibility is given to German representatives. What will happen to the Ruhr is of transcendental importance to the Germans. They have become accustomed to the thought of international control as envisaged in the London agreement. If we go beyond this, I think we may expect a rapid growth of political unrest in the Ruhr area which will be fomented by the Communists into work stoppages and strikes which will interfere seriously with both German and European recovery. We must remember that we are no longer dealing with an inarticulate people and that forty million Germans have their eyes and ears on the Ruhr Conference now under way in London. In almost every constructive move, we are confronted with French opposition which plays into Communist hands, thus, either retarding the constructive move or destroying much of its value. If in fact we have determined economic recovery in Germany to be essential to European recovery, then we must implement our program vigorously and determinedly, depending upon the disarmament controls agreed at London to prevent German recovery again being directed into war purposes.

[

Clay

]

1. The source text was transmitted in telegram 2741, November 14, from Berlin, not printed.
2. Neither the communication of August 23 nor the draft coal, iron and steel reorganization plan is printed. Regarding the plan as ultimately promulgated as Military Government Law No. 75, November 10, see the editorial note, p. 465.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. For a report on the meeting under reference here, see telegram 2474, October 9, from Berlin, p. 456.
3. Not printed.
5. For a report on the meeting of October 18, see telegram 2537, October 19, from Berlin, p. 458.
3. Not printed.