Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

USPolAd Germany Files: Box 119: File—MGMP/M Documents

Minutes of a Meeting Between the Military Governors and the Ministers President of the Western Zones of Occupation of Germany, Frankfurt, July 20, 1948, 3 p. m.

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[Frankfurt, July 20, 1948.]

MGMP/M(48) 2

Present

• General Robertson (Chairman)
• General Koenig
• General Clay

Also Present

United Kingdom	France	United States
Mr. Steel	Ambassador [Tarbé] de St. Hardouin	Ambassador Murphy
Mr. Chaputde Saintonge		Dr. Litchfield
	Genera] Noiret
	M. Seydoux
	M. [Lefebvre] de Laboulaye

Ministers President Present

UK Zone	French Zone	US Zone
Hr. Arnold	Hr. Altmeier	Dr. Ehard
Hr. Kopf	Hr. Wohleb	Hr. Stock
Hr. Luedemann	Dr. Bock	Dr. Maier
Hr. Brauer		Hr. Kaisen

Also present: Herren Pfeiffer, Brill and Appelt

General Robertson, in the chair, opened the meeting with the following statement:¹

“Gentlemen,

“On behalf of my two colleagues and myself I wish to make some general observations before we enter into the detail of the work with which this meeting is concerned.

“In the first place, we feel that we owe you an apology for the shortness of the notice given to you in regard to this meeting. As you probably know, we met among ourselves yesterday in Berlin to discuss these questions. When we came to fixing a date for our meeting with you we found that some of us had certain engagements in the near future which could not be changed and we had to choose between asking you at very short notice to meet us today, or alternatively postponing our meeting for rather longer than seemed desirable to us. We are much impressed by the importance of moving forward rapidly in these matters and we believe that we have your support in that regard.

“When we met you on 1st July we presented you with certain proposals² and we asked you for your observations upon them. We have now received your observations³ and we have studied them very carefully. Before, however, we deal with your observations at all, it is my duty to explain to you the origin and character of the proposals which we put forward because we feel that in some respects these things have not been clearly understood by you.

“The proposals which we laid before you were the result of instructions which we had received from our Governments, and those instructions were based upon governmental decisions reached in consequence of the conversations held earlier in London. We want you to understand that the decisions arising from the London conversations were themselves the result of long and very careful deliberations between the representatives of our three Governments. It follows from this that any attempt to depart from those decisions may create difficulties. Moreover, the decisions form a whole; an alteration in one part actually can upset not only that part but also the whole.

“Another very important feature of the London decisions which I would wish to emphasize is this. Our Governments in arriving at their decisions accepted the desirability of entrusting to German political organisms a wider degree of political authority than they possess in the three Zones at present. However, they were motivated not merely by a desire to hand over authority but much more importantly by a desire to obtain acceptance by the Germans of responsibility within the scope of the authority awarded to them. This is a principle which we wish you to keep very clearly in mind. We are prepared to hand over a large degree of authority only on the condition that within the scope of that authority responsibility is also accepted.

“We are not asking you to accept responsibility for matters which you are unable to control. We are not, for example, asking you to accept responsibility for the present unhappy division of your country, which is something that we regret as much as you do. We are not asking you to accept responsibility for those matters in regard to which we have reserved the powers and authority to ourselves. We are, on the other hand, asking that the German people in our Zones should accept responsibility for the direction of their own affairs through their chosen representatives within the limit set by the powers entrusted to them under our proposals and by the circumstances which exist in Germany today.

I have already told you that the proposals which we placed in front of you are based upon governmental decisions and governmental instructions to ourselves. Now your observations—which indeed can be regarded to some extent as counter-proposals—show in various instances divergences from these governmental decisions. Some of these divergences are of a minor order but several of them are of major importance. As Military Governors we have no authority at the moment to agree to divergences, particularly those of a major character from our instructions. Before we can do that we should have to make reference to our Governments. That is something which we may be prepared to do. We do not however wish to do it until it is quite clear that such reference is necessary and until we have carefully examined each point of divergence so as to be able to assess accurately its intention and its importance.

“Our object today is to point out to you where major divergences exist between the proposals which we placed before you and the observations, or counter-proposals, which you have put forward. We propose to do that now. When we have done it we think that it may be well to have a short adjournment so that you can discuss what we have said among yourselves. Then we should suggest that we meet again later this evening in case you would like to ask us some questions or obtain further clarification of the comments which we have made.

“Incidentally, in the letter which you addressed to us you have already told us that you would like to make some further oral explanations yourselves in addition to the written observations with which you have provided us. This second session of our meeting will provide you with an opportunity for doing so. We think that it will be helpful to you to have had our observations first before you make your own comments.

“Even at this second session this evening we shall not ask you to give us your final view. Indeed, I should like to emphasize that it is in no way our intention today to present you with any kind of ultimatum. It is our idea that after the conclusion of this second session we should disperse for an interval of a few days so that you may discuss these matters between yourselves and also with others whom you may wish to consult. Then we shall meet again and at that meeting we shall want to know your final answer on each point. We shall then be able to make up our own minds whether, within the framework of our instructions, we are able to meet you on those matters to which you still attach importance, or whether we must refer to our Governments to find out whether they are prepared to concede certain matters to which you are attached but which we cannot accept under our present instructions.

“In telling you that we are bound to refer to our Governments for agreement to any divergence from the London decisions I would say that the extent to which such reference will cause delays or difficulties is bound to be determined by the nature and the number of these divergences. That is one reason why we cannot deal with each point in isolation. One must see the picture as a whole. The greater the extent to which we can reconcile your views with our own instructions at this and at our next meeting, the easier will it be for our Governments to givers prompt authority to proceed.”

General Koenig continued the meeting by reading the following statement on constitutional development:

“Comment to German Reply Regarding Document I

“General Robertson has just informed you that the Commanders-in-Chief would be obliged to go back to their Governments if the basis on which you intend to establish a German political organization differs too widely from the documents which were handed to you on July 1, as a consequence of the agreement concluded between our three Governments in London.

“It is my special task to point out to you the principal items of Appendix 1 to your letter of July 10, upon which my colleagues and myself consider it impossible to deviate from the London recommendations without referring to our Governments.

“The London agreement provided that a constituent assembly would be convened in view of establishing a constitution. If we do not stress the importance of the name which you wish to confer upon the assembly nor of the one which will be given to the future structure, we on the other hand consider that the expression “basic law” that you suggest carries too different a meaning from the one our Governments intended to convey by the word “Constitution” that they used.

“It being well understood that each one of you is entirely at liberty to make individually to his own Landtag such recommendations as he deems suitable as regards” methods of election to the assembly entrusted with the drafting of the constitution, it remains obvious that the decision upon that question lies with each of the Landtage.

“I have also to point out that the question of the elections to any such body provided for by the constitution belongs to the competence of the assembly insofar as it does not belong to the competence of the participating states.

“Furthermore, the competence of the assembly is exclusive as regards the determination of the date for the holding of elections to such bodies as are provided for by the constitution and for the definition of the respective functions of each one of those organs whether parliamentary or executive which will be set up—providing the principles such as the federal structure of Germany for instance which have been previously outlined to you are respected.

“I will now broach a major question. Our Governments have deemed it necessary that the political organizations which will be set up be ratified by the people of each state. A procedure that would fail to provide for the ratification of the decisions of the assembly by the people of the different states, would remove the element of responsibility which is necessarily linked with the authority our Governments are ready to entrust to you, as well as to the future German governmental organs.”

General Robertson then commented on territorial reorganization as follows: (Document II)

“The Ministers-President must state clearly whether they have any changes to propose to Land boundaries and, if so, they must set forth those changes. It should also be understood that the order and the procedure which were established in this connection by the agreements made in London must be followed.

“We wish you to appreciate that this question of Land boundaries is one of great importance to us. We feel that the present is an appropriate time to deal with it, and we are ready to do so. However, it would be much more difficult for us to deal with it later on. It has, for example, reactions with regard to our own zonal boundaries. We do not feel that we should be willing to deal with the subject again at a later date prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

“Moreover, the fixing of Land boundaries is important in relation to the constitution itself. We believe that we should recommend to our Governments that the boundaries which were recognized during the drafting of this constitution should remain unchanged, at least until a peace treaty is signed.”

General Clay made the following comments with regard to the question of the occupation statute: (Document III)

“At our last meeting with you we advised you of the general principles to be contained in the occupation statute and asked that you submit to us your observations on these principles. We have now received your observations and we wish to assure you that they will receive detailed consideration.

“Under the terms of the London Conference, the basic principles of the occupation statute are to be given to the assembly which prepares the constitution or ‘basic law’. Prior to placing these basic principles before the assembly, we shall be very glad indeed to advise you of the results of our consideration of your proposals and to obtain your further comment.

“We cannot here and now agree to promulgate the occupation statute in full prior to the meeting of the assembly and its draft of the constitution, as to do so would be to deviate from the agreement reached in London.

“You will realize that the preparation in detail of the occupation statute is a difficult legal task. Moreover, we would expect to receive from the assembly its observations on the principles of the occupation statute prior to its final drafting.

“As we proceed with the drafting of the occupation statute and prior to its publication, we shall be glad to have our liaison officers keep you advised as it progresses and also the constituent assembly. Thus we—I mean by this we, you, ourselves and the constituent assembly—will be able to be familiar with the general context of the occupation statute as it advances to completion.

“When we have received and have announced our approval for the submission of the constitutional paper to the states, we will be prepared to publish simultaneously the occupation statute which will incorporate the principles to which we have agreed so that the people of the states may fully understand that the acceptance of the constitutional paper is within the framework of an occupation statute.”

General Robertson then explained that the Military Governors had completed their outline on the extent to which the Coblenz resolutions departed from the London agreement and indicated that the Military Governors proposed a short adjournment during which the Ministers-President could consider these statements and return later in the day to ask further questions.

Minister-President Stock (serving as temporary chairman for Ministers-President) indicated that they also agreed that an adjournment would be in order.

Senate-President Kaisen interrupted by saying he thought the Military Governors should understand that all the Ministers-President were extremely anxious to speed the work in the development of western political organization. He added that it would be very helpful to the Ministers-President if they could have an unequivocal answer as to which of the points in the Coblenz decisions the Military Governors would consider it impossible to change, and which, on the other hand, could be made acceptable.

General Robertson said this was a very difficult question to answer because the London agreements must be considered as a whole. He indicated that while it was true that some points were more important than others, it was equally true that any one of the deviations outlined in the preceding statements would necessitate a reference to the three Governments for decision. He added that “we don’t today say that any one is inalterable, but we do say that the more numerous and more profound the divergencies, the greater the probable delay”.

Buergermeister Brauer indicated that he would like to simplify Senator-President Kaisen’s point. He said it would simplify matters if the Military Governors could say on which points specified changes could be accepted and on which points the Military Governors had no authority to authorize changes. For example, he said, the question of a popular referendum on the constitution is one on which the London decisions are inalterable.

General Robertson replied to this specific question by saying it was quite certain that this was an issue which the Military Governors could not compromise and which would need to go to governmental level for decision.

Buergermeister Brauer said that his second question related to the terms “constitution”, “basic law”, and “provisional constitution”. He expressed the opinion that perhaps “provisional constitution” would come closest to that which the Military Governors desired.

General Clay said that while he had no instructions from his Government on this issue, he felt that it would attach great importance to this problem. He said that if this issue were isolated, it would not be a problem but if combined with other deviations from the London agreements which would lessen the broad popular base of the constitution, he felt convinced it would give the US Government grave concern.

The meeting reconvened and General Robertson turned the floor over to Minister-President Stock to speak on behalf of the Ministers-President. Minister-President Stock said they would prefer to refrain from comments on Documents I, II and III as originally given them by the Military Governors on 1 July and from any further comments regarding the Coblenz decisions. He emphasized that their desire was to go forward and not to explain or justify past actions. He said that the Ministers-President agreed with the Military Governors as to the desirability of creating a political framework within the London agreements and which would at the same time feed a stable political situation in western Germany which would be based upon federal organization of the several Laender. He further requested a protocol of both this and previous meetings between the Ministers-President and the Military Governors. He closed by saying that the Ministers-President proposed to go to Niederwald Castle⁴ tonight to meet on these subjects and would be prepared to discuss the matter with the liaison officers on Wednesday.

General Robertson said that the Military Governors welcomed the Ministers-President desire to proceed with dispatch, that the liaison officers would be available, and that they would bring with them a record of what was said in the course of today’s meeting. He said that the Military Governors were anxious that this should not be regarded as a formal protocol and certainly opposed to have it circulated outside.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the Military Governors and the Ministers-President would take place in the afternoon of Monday, 26 July 1948.

1. General Robertson’s opening statement and the subsequent statements read by Generals Koenig, Robertson, and Clay were circulated separately as document MGMP/P(48)6, July 20, and Appendices “A”, “B”, and “C” thereto (CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 119, File—MGMP/P Documents).
2. See the editorial note, p. 380.
3. See the letter of the Ministers President, July 10, p. 385.
4. Near Ruedesheim, Hesse.