740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1548: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
51. I attended a meeting at Frankfurt of the three military governors today.1 This was an informal meeting presided by Koenig to [Page 397] discuss the reply of the Ministers-President to the three proposals made to them 30 June regarding political structure, Land boundaries and occupational statute.2 General Koenig presumed that each military governor had now received a new directive from his government and inquired whether the directives had enough in common to enable military governors come to agreement so that there could be a meeting with the Ministers-President. He said that obviously the replies of the Ministers-President are far away from London decision.
Koenig discussed the question of constitution stating that the Germans have indicated that they don’t want to assume responsibility for dismemberment of Germany and wish to substitute certain words which would be less compromising, thus “parliamentary council” instead of “constitutional assembly”, “basic law” instead of “constitution”, “executive organizations” instead of “government”. It is clear, he said, that Germans would rather have a German administration than a government. This assumption leads to consideration of a third proposal regarding occupational statute. He inquired whether military governors could consider a form of occupational statute different from that proposed in London and thus arrive at a solution of the administration question. Within this responsibility military governors could then leave to Germans those necessary agencies after further discussion with the Ministers-President, develop some form of German administration directed either by military governors or Ministers President, and perhaps grant authority for a Parliamentary Council. The latter in Koenig’s opinion seems to be an interesting agency which could itself eventually draft a constitution. The foregoing said Koenig ties in proposals 1 and 3. He added that the Germans do not seem to have made any comments on proposal 3 but rather to have submitted a new form of occupational statute which we could not accept but it could be studied. As to proposal 2 land boundaries Koenig said that this was not an offer to the Germans but a requirement. The German answer was not satisfactory. Koenig said that he could understand Germans’ request for more time but that Germans should not be allowed to refuse by simply suggesting changes in southwestern Germany. If Germans prefer status quo in Bavaria and elsewhere they should say so. Koenig also said that London proposals provide that Constitutional Assembly would not be established until boundary question has been settled.
General Robertson said that he would discuss the broad issues. (1) In view of the general international situation is it imperative that we press ahead with plans for western Germany and not let them slip into indecision. The question of provocation is past history. The question now is not to demonstrate weakness. (2) These German counter-proposals [Page 398] do two things (a) they mark certain departures from the London decisions and (b) they disappoint each of the military governors but for reasons that may be different in each case. Robertson stated his conclusions to the effect that military governors should work on German proposals with the object of bringing them back into the framework of London decisions. If military governors fail to do this then they must remit questions back to their governments but Robertson expressed hope that new intergovernmental decisions could be avoided because if that happened military governors would be delayed for another 6 or 9 months. Robertson agreed with Koenig that Germans fear to take responsibility for splitting Germany. He said that we want Germans to be responsible for conduct of affairs in western Germany which is all of Germany that is now available. Under present counter-proposals while Germans accept authority they do not want to accept the incident responsibility. Military governors must insist that they do so. Koenig, however, had not made it clear to what extent German counter-proposals regarding government Structure pleased or displeased the French. Instead of bringing matter closer to the London decisions Robertson said Koenig’s suggestions tend to take them farther away. Robertson suggested that we try to find a name for the Parliamentary Council which gives the effect we want and to do the same with the word “constitution”. Robertson doubted that it was intended at London to have a constitution developed which would not be changeable when Germany as a whole is available but would that happen it is obvious that the Russians would insist on changes in the constitution. Robertson stated the desire to see prepared constitution embodying federal principles which could not be changed without our permission.
Regarding the basic law Robertson said that the proposals eliminate the idea that it should be approved by popular vote. That however is a point on which we must insist, otherwise the Germans will not be undertaking the responsibility desired.
As to boundaries Robertson said quite frankly the UK is not particularly interested in changes but as the UK has undertaken this obligation it will live up to it but that he felt that his French and US colleagues should take the initiative on this point.
As to the occupation statute Robertson said that the Germans have clearly stepped out of their province and that he did not see the possibility of changing the statute as desired by them.
To this Koenig stated that in his opinion only one thing is necessary and that is an occupational statute and that a constitution is not necessary.
In turn General Clay said that military governors evidently had failed to make clear to the Germans those things we could negotiate and those things which we cannot negotiate. Koenig raised the question [Page 399] of Land boundaries, he said that the US would accept that although not attaching much importance to it, but Clay added to say to Germans that we give them an occupational statute but not a constitution would lead to further proposals by Germans and under circumstances Germans would probably wish to revert to the form of the London proposals.
Clay suggested that military governors should meet with Ministers President and explain more clearly to them the decisions reached by our governments at London. After providing more adequate explanation military governors should ask for review by the Ministers President of their counter-proposals before military governors refer matter back to governments. Clay emphasized that he was not suggesting a new government conference. If Ministers President agree military governors should allow them more time for further study. Under this arrangement our experts would put entire matter in writing showing where German counter-proposals disagree with London proposals. This is obviously necessary to enable military governments themselves to arrive at agreement. Clay added that the London proposals were made as a whole and that military governors would not be authorized to consider the waiving of any one item without possibly affecting the London proposals in their entirety. He emphasized that in his opinion military governors have not sufficiently informed the Germans regarding the spirit and text of the London proposals.
Koenig stated the fear that the fault is perhaps not that of the military governors but lies in the London proposals themselves. He said that in his opinion the Germans will never agree to forming a government for western Germany; He said that he himself as a Frenchman under similar circumstances would agree to form a government for France but never for western France. He doubts that the military governors will ever be able to persuade the Germans differently.
Koenig then suggested that it might be best to arrange for a team of advisers to deal with the Ministers President at this stage as it might be unpleasant to have them refuse in a meeting with military governors or to be able to charge military governors with exerting pressure on them.
Robertson suggested that it would be the duty of the committee of experts to demonstrate the differences and to suggest how they can be overcome and brought back within the framework of London. He pointed out that there are two kinds of differences: (1) Direct divergence from the London proposals such as that relating to the ratification of the constitution by popular front; military governors would decide to insist on such an item or refer matter back to governments. (2) Regarding titles given to Constitutional Assembly and government body created by it, here it is necessary to take account of anxiety of Ministers President over question of splitting up Germany.
[Page 400]If we were prepared to agree, said Robertson, that there would be a preamble to constitution which showed very clearly that responsibility for splitting Germany is not that of Germans, this might take care of Ministers President anxiety. The other questions whether military governors can consider a change of names of these items without departing from London.
Koenig then stated French view that the formation by the Germans of a constitutional government would be a right arising only from the authority granted them by the occupational statute and that therefore if the Germans reject the idea of a constitution there is nothing left but to offer them an occupation statute. Whether we like it or not, he said, we cannot avoid connecting proposals No. 1 and No. 3.
Robertson said (1) it was essential that military governors should not agree among themselves to impose upon the Germans the details of a constitutional form; (2) military governors must insist that the Germans assume the responsibilities outlined by the London proposals; and (3) if Koenig’s idea is accepted military governors would in effect be tearing up London proposals.
Clay pointed out that London did not specify what name should be given to the political structure for western Germany. In his opinion military governors should explain to Germans that they have the choice between the continuance of the status quo or a constitution and an occupational statute.
Koenig again insisted that the Germans will never agree to a constitution for western Germany. In that connection Robertson and Clay emphasized that Paragraph 6 of TRI/13 does not specify the name of the governmental structure but merely refers to “a governmental structure of federal type best adapted to the eventual reestablishment of German unity at present disrupted”.
It was finally agreed that a committee of experts representing the three military governors would immediately begin an examination of the German counter-proposals and prepare a statement of the differences between such counter-proposals and the London decisions. The purpose would be to effect an arrangement of the German counter-proposals with those of London by insistence on those points which must be accepted in toto or by suggesting alternatives and changes which would not alter the character of the London proposals. This study would be ready for the military governors in Berlin and be considered by the latter at 9 a. m. July 19. Liaison officers will advise Ministers President immediately of this plan and inform them that military governors will meet with them some time next week for a further discussion.
Sent Department 51, repeated London 16, Paris 20.
- Those present at this meeting were as follows: U.S.—General Clay, Major General Hays, and Ambassador Murphy; U.K.—General Robertson and General Brownjohn; France—General Koenig and General Noiret. The minutes of this meeting, document TRIG/M(48) 2, are included in CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 119, File—TRIG/M(48) Documents.↩
- Under reference here are the documents identified in the editorial note, p. 380.↩