740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1448: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany ( Murphy ) to the Secretary of State
47. Personal for Saltzman and Hickerson. Deptel 1225, July 10,1 and mytel 1653 of July 9.2 Proposals made by Ministers President at Coblenz Conference. Mytel 1663 of July 12 transmits texts of letter written by Ministers President to Military Governors together with those supporting papers.3
First important point of difference between German viewpoint and London decisions, as we see it, is German desire to emphasize provisional [Page 394] nature of governmental arrangements to be made. They desire to avoid establishment of “constitutional assembly,” “constitution,” and “government.” In short, they have to avoid any step which to them seems to mean the establishment of a “state”. This hesitancy I believe, stems from their fear of being party to a formal splitting of their country. Closely analyzed, however, their counterproposals appear to give much of the substance of what was proposed at London, instead of “constitutional assembly” elected either by Landtage or by the people they proposed “parliamentary council” elected by the Landtage. This “parliamentary council” would draw up a document which the Germans prefer to carry as “basic law” rather than as “constitution.” But this document would be substantially a constitution which would delineate the structure of the government and regulate its powers and relationships to the Laender.
The second point of difference noted is that the Germans do not wish to submit this provisional “basic law” to popular vote. This appears to us to be one point on which we must insist upon the acceptance of the London decisions. We believe that it should be impressed upon the Germans that if they are going to go forward with an increasingly responsible governmental arrangement in the west it should rest firmly upon phases of popular consent and not upon mere approval by Landtage or even less upon mere approval by Ministers President. There is reason to believe that the political parties themselves do not approve of the Ministers President proposals in this respect and they could probably be persuaded that a popular referendum would in no wise disturb the provisional character of the document drafted.
Thirdly, the Germans suggest that the occupation statute should be promulgated before a constitution in order that the constitutional assembly (parliamentary council) should know what kind of government it can plan for. This point appears to us to be well taken and not seriously to clash with the intent of the London decisions.
The Ministers President do not wish at present to make proposals about changes in state boundaries. While this might be acceptable to the British and ourselves it would conflict with French views.
The draft occupation statute submitted by the Ministers President differs somewhat in phraseology and detail from that proposed by the London conference. Close study of this draft indicates that it might be substantially acceptable as a satisfactory basis for negotiation of a final occupation statute. The desire to omit any mention of the Ruhr authority, or of clause limiting the jurisdiction of MG courts and clause proposing an arbitration mechanism for settling disputes over interpretation of occupation statute are no doubt unacceptable, but there is reason to believe that a satisfactory decision on these points can be induced by negotiation. We have discussed this matter with General Clay and CAD and we have today proceeded to Frankfurt [Page 395] where this evening we will have a preliminary meeting with the Ministers President of the US zone. Tomorrow there is planned a conference of the three Military Governors followed by a conference of the three Military Governors and the 11 Ministers President although it is possible that the French Ministers President may not be present. While Clay’s first reaction has been that the counterproposals of the Ministers President should be flatly rejected and they should be informed that the proposals made to them as a result of the London meeting are governmental procedures which the Ministers President have no authority to modify, I hope that as a result of today’s meeting with the Ministers President of the US zone that there may be some relaxation in this position. Friedrich and Litchfield over the weekend contacted some of the Ministers President and are persuaded that they held the view that the proposals made to them on June 30 were in the nature of suggestions calling for an expression of their ideas. Friedrich states that this view was strengthened by the impression which the German Social Democrats who visited London last week obtained in their conversations with representatives of the British Labor Party. A reference in that connection is made particularly to a conversation which Mr. Bevin had with Heine. According to the German version when Heine outlined to Bevin German Ministers President counterproposals, Bevin expressed no objection saying in effect that they were interesting and deserved study. That, of course, was the preliminary reaction of Robertson and Steele.
I believe that it was not the intention of the Ministers President to reject the London proposals and this is confirmed by both Friedrich’s and Litchfield’s conversations.
With reference to the German desire to call the constitution a “basic law for the uniform administration of the occupation zones of Western Germany,” Germans pointed out that in so doing they follow French tradition. In 1875 French representatives under Prussian military occupation also declined to call the constitution then enacted in that name, using instead the title “organic law.” According to the same sources, Ministers President were under impression that French Government would not object to postponement of constitution and substitution of provisional program. (It was so reported at Coblenz by CDU Ministers President from French zone.) It also believed that some of the Ministers President understood that British Government would be ready to acquiesce in the changes they were suggesting.
There is also little doubt that the Berlin situation and the current tension between the western powers and the Soviet Union are exercising a profound effect on German thought. This was demonstrated by the urgent recommendations made by Berlin’s Mayor Frau Schroeder that the Coblenz conference avoid precipitate action relating to establishment Western German Government because it would have effect [Page 396] of splitting Berlin and provoking more drastic Soviet measures against Berlin population in western sectors.
It is hoped that with the current meetings at Frankfurt that the Military Governors may be able to adjust matters on a Military Government level and that their conversations with the Ministers President will enable them later to regulate their resolutions in closer harmony with the London proposals.
Sent Department, repeated London 13, Paris 16.
- Not printed. It noted that Murphy’s messages and press accounts indicated a reluctance on the part of certain German leaders to proceed with arrangements for the establishment of a full-scale government for Western Germany under an occupation statute. The Department was hesitant to move precipitately in a matter of long-range import and asked Murphy for his views. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1048).↩
- Not printed; it reported that preliminary information from the meeting of western Ministers President at Koblenz was not encouraging. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–948)↩
- The telegram under reference is not printed; for the letter of the Ministers President, see p. 385.↩