740.00119 Council/6–1848

The Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador ( Winiewicz )1

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 51/41/48 of June 18, 1948,2 protesting on behalf of your Government the recommendations resulting from the Six-Power talks on Germany, recently held in London, on the grounds that the participants were “not competent and not empowered to deal with these problems”. You stressed your Government’s opposition to many of the [Page 372] recommendations as being contrary to existing international agreements and your Government’s belief that all matters involving the future of Germany should be the exclusive concern of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I noted with particular interest your observation that “any possible difficulties in reconciling the positions within the Council cannot be insuperable, if all the Powers will abide by the Potsdam agreements”.

I need hardly remind you of my Government’s persistent efforts to achieve four-power agreement on Germany on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. I discussed this point in my note to you of September 30, 1947, in connection with the decision to revise the level of industry in the Anglo-American zone. The record clearly shows that the continuing efforts of my Government to achieve an equitable solution of the German problem in the Council of Foreign Ministers and in the Allied Control Council in Berlin have been fruitless largely as a result of the intransigent attitude of one of the occupying powers. The records of the Control Council as of March 1948 show that the Soviet representative has vetoed the agreed decisions of the other three powers in 69 instances—nearly three times the combined number of vetoes exercised by the other powers. As explained in my note under reference, it is because of the repeated failure over a period of three years to achieve four-power agreement that my Government “feels justified in pursuing objectives which have been commonly agreed and making arrangements for that purpose with any other occupying power willing to work toward the common end”.

My Government agrees with your Government that German resources ought to be used for the benefit of the general reconstruction of Europe rather than for the reconstruction of only a part of Europe. The United States has consistently endeavored to implement the clear understanding in the Potsdam Agreement that Germany, including the Soviet Zone, should be treated as an economic whole and it has consistently striven to create those conditions which would lead to the establishment of a democratic German state capable of assisting the reconstruction of all the devastated countries of Europe and yet not constituting a threat to the security of those nations. The assertion that the United States has sought to divide Germany or to divide Europe is without any foundation. The fact that its offer to assist the general European recovery has not been accepted by certain countries, including Poland, has of necessity limited the application of that recovery program to those countries which have accepted it. The apparent division of Germany today after three years of unsuccessful attempts to hold it together is greatly deplored by my Government. Here again the necessity to confine our joint program in Germany to Western Germany is not of our making and certainly not in accordance with our wishes. The fact that the efforts [Page 373] of the United States toward the rehabilitation of Europe now have to be concentrated on the program for Western Europe, including Western Germany, is a direct result of the failure of the other countries of Europe at the instigation of the Soviet Union to join in a common program looking toward the rehabilitation of all Europe.

With regard to the substance of the London recommendations I must point out that there was no attempt in these talks to cover all aspects of the German problem. Therefore, there is no basis for your protesting the fact that the problem of reparations was omitted in the recommendations of the conference, a conference which you have insisted had no right to discuss any matters relating to Germany.

I must take exception to your comments on the recommendations concerning security and your statement that the fundamental aim of removing Germany’s economic basis of aggression has been ignored. It should not be necessary for me to remind you that the United States has twice been engaged in major wars with Germany and that it is vitally interested in preventing a recurrence of German aggression. Security considerations, far from having been relegated to a secondary position, were constantly in mind throughout the London discussions as should be evident from the communiqué reporting the final recommendations. This problem has of course become more complicated as a result of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to join the other occupying powers in a long term treaty guaranteeing the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. The London recommendations on the Ruhr and on general security make specific provisions against the rebuilding of German economic power as a means to future aggression.

Your comments on the plan for the control of the Ruhr have, I believe, been answered in the general discussion above with respect to the division of Germany and of Europe. It should be observed that the program for the rehabilitation of Western Germany does not exclude that area from trade relations with Eastern Europe but, on the contrary, seeks to foster such trade in the common interest. If certain countries “who suffered most in consequence of German aggression” claim that their interests are not sufficiently taken into account by the program planned for Western Germany, their complaint should not be addressed to the United States Government but to the Government primarily responsible for preventing these countries from cooperating in the general recovery program for Europe. In the same way it seems to me that your protest against the failure to utilize quadripartite consultative machinery, should more appropriately be addressed to the occupying power responsible for the present deplorable division of Europe and Germany.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
Robert A. Lovett
  1. Following consultations between the British Foreign Office and the Department of State, a parallel British note was delivered to the Polish Embassy in London on July 6. Both the American and British notes were subsequently released to the press. The French Government addressed a separate note to the Polish Embassy in Paris on July 16.
  2. See footnote 2, p. 368.