711.60C/3–2648: Telegram

The Ambassador in Polamd ( Griffis ) to the Secretary of State

confidential

454. In my many recent talks with Foreign Minister Modzelewski and this week during conference with Wierblowski, newly appointed Secretary General Foreign Office, I have been repeatedly asked to put on paper the ideas which I have been continually urging on the [Page 361] Poles regarding their vituperative attitude towards the US coupled with a complete attitude of “there is nothing we can do about it. It is all in the hands of the US and Russia”.

Will you advise me if the Department would have any objections to my sending the following letter to Wierblowski with a copy to Modzelewski? Have no special pride of authorship. Glad to receive suggestions or changes if letter may be sent at all.

Regarding my cables 272 February 231 and 343 March 7.2 I do not wish to be over-insistent on this matter but it seems reasonable that I should put on paper this policy already many times discussed. I firmly believe that Polish Government is not acting under Russian directive in this matter and that my proposed suggestions show no sign of US weakness. But the Poles have a responsibility in this matter which they are consistently refusing to accept, a policy I believe inspired by general fear of Kremlin. If the Department decides to give me an answer such as the answer to my cable 272 February 23 or should the Department hold the same viewpoint implied in its lack of answer to my cable 343 March 7, I shall, of course, be quite content having expressed my own personal opinion to the Department. Proposed letter follows:

“In our talks the other morning regarding Polish-American relations, you asked me to put on paper the almost elementary and perhaps oversimplified ideas which I expressed to you and which I have been for many months expressing to your fellow ministers in the Polish Government. You will realize, of course, that these comments are presented as my own viewpoint and not as the Ambassador of the US.

“I have already transmitted to you a copy of the note of the American Government to the Polish Government dated September 30, 1947 and called your specific attention to the paragraph reading as follows:

‘In this connection, the Polish Government is undoubtedly aware that the US Government has made repeated proposals for negotiation of a treaty with the UK, France, and the USSR which would guarantee the security of Europe against the revival of militarism in Germany for a period of 40 years. The US proposal, which was put forward more than a year ago and is still open, has been accepted as a basis for agreement by the UK and by France but not by the USSR. This proposal is indisputable evidence of the determination of the people and the Government of the US that Germany shall never again be a dominant military power in Europe.’3

“During the almost a year during which I have been thinking exclusively of the relations between your good country and mine, it has become thoroughly defined that the three great fears of Poland are:

  • “(1) The possible menace to Poland of future German military power;
  • “(2) The loss to Poland of what is popularly known as the recovered territory; and
  • “(3) The splitting of Europe into two divisions with the result that Poland’s hopes of trade development would be seriously retarded.

“It has seemed to me for many months that the following facts have been self-evident.

  • “(1) If accepted by USSR, the treaty agreement offered by the US, England and France would result in complete protection of Poland against possible future German aggression.
  • “(2) The settlement of the border questions being part and parcel of the German settlement should and in my personal belief would be concluded to the satisfaction of the Polish Government as a natural concomitant of any negotiations which had at their base the treaty offer.
  • “(3) Any sensible man, trade entity or nation should realize that the end of strife in Europe and even a short period of peaceful trade would bring far more profit and prosperity to eastern Europe, including Poland, than any possible reparations that might be wrung out of a moribund Germany.

“All of this has led to my repeated representation to the ministers of your government that Poland and its associated Slavic states have been continually negligent in their duties toward world peace by their constant attacks and vituperations against the US while they completely ignore the almost elemental fact of how a lasting peace can be secured should the efforts of Poland or the united efforts of the Slavic nations succeed in convincing their neighbor Russia as to the course which might so profitably be pursued.”4

Griffis
  1. Ante, p. 341.
  2. Ante, p. 354.
  3. For the text of the note quoted here, see Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1947, p. 741.
  4. In telegram 210, April 6, to Warsaw, the Department replied as follows:

    “Top Level consideration given your proposed letter to Polish officials. In view of recent developments in Berlin and elsewhere Dept feels that proposed action might be misinterpreted and in any event not now opportune.” (711.60C/3–2648)