711. 60C/2–2348: Telegram
The Ambassador in Poland (Griffis) to the Secretary of State
272. Following Foreign Minister Modzelewski’s return from Prague,1 had long conference with him Saturday which opened with usual rehash of all American-Polish disagreements and mutual recriminations. Upon this protest of the use of Mikolajczyk’s charges on the VOUSA I replied that I had warned him for many months that the US did not propose to accept with equanimity the constant vicious attacks of the Polish press and once more suggested that the always hoped-for good will between the two countries could be better fostered if attacks on both sides were completely discontinued. Modzelewski responded with astonishing suggestion that the Polish Government would see to it that their attacks would be immediately discontinued if the US would make an official pronouncement favoring the Polish position on the western border question. He reiterated all the old Polish position that this border had been settled at Potsdam and that the British had concurred in it through the Cadogan statement.2
I stated to the Foreign Minister that such an arrangement was of course impossible, as the Polish border question was inextricably woven into the general solution of the entire problem on which the Council of Foreign Ministers, (CFM) was engaged in London in [Page 342] December.3 I reiterated what I had told him many times before that my personal and official belief was that the question of the western borders could always be promptly and favorably settled when, as and if the problems of the German treaty and the relations between USSR and the three other great powers were resolved.
Modzelewski stated again that Poland was desperately anxious to trade with all countries both east and west as evidenced by its many trade negotiations but could not divest itself of its two great fears, the first regarding its western borders and the second the bogie of the remilitarization of Germany. He stated that Poland had had no voice in international discussions since Potsdam. To this I replied that the entire Polish policy together with its political and economic activities seemed to indicate to the world that Russia spoke with authority for Poland. I told him of my personal belief that Poland was fast becoming the economic keystone between eastern and western Europe and that Poland was negligent in not more forcefully attempting to influence the Russian policy which had prevented American and CFM attempts to settle the European problems. I stated strongly my belief on the question of reparations and that a peaceful Europe would result in more profits and more favorable economic developments for all European countries east and west in a very short period than any possible reparations which would accrue over a long period. With this he emphatically agreed.
Modzelewski stated “Poland’s position is so precarious that if one fingernail of the US is hurt as a result of the present impasse, Poland will be completely destroyed”. He stated that he would go to any lengths to break the impasse and felt that unquestionably a loan [plan?], which involved the successful revival of the American suggestions of a 40-year 4-power German demilitarization agreement with a consequent settlement of the border question would be the consummation most to be wished.
Out of all this discussion developed the possibility of Modzelewski presenting a plan to the USSR with the backing of his Govt looking toward the solution of the present stalemate. What influence such a presentation by Modzelewski in Moscow would have I do not know, but it appears to me that if he made such proposals as originating in Poland there is always a chance that progress might be made and if failure resulted the approach might at least prove to have smoked out the USSR in the mind of the Poles and disclosed to them the USSR had not been acting in good faith.
I believe that Modzelewski was speaking extempore and the theme developed jointly as the discussion proceeded. From his emotion it [Page 343] appeared to me as if he were speaking as a true Pole and that for the moment he had shaken the hand of the Kremlin from his shoulder and had shed his Communist uniform.
However, there are some indications (Embtel 166, February 3,4 paragraph 2) that he is on his way out and it may be that his tendency occasionally to place Poland above the party in his thinking is one of the reasons.
Poles are not popular in Poland today.
Conversely, it is possible that I willingly stepped into a carefully preconceived Moscow dictated plan.
There may be many valid reasons in your mind why such a plan should not be attempted; on the other hand, if you see any possibilities in it, you might advise me of a proposed broad general approach to be suggested to Modzelewski even at the risk of over-simplification. My discussions in the matter can at all times be regarded as personal and unofficial and probably should be.
- Modzelewski had, of course, attended the Praha Conference of Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Polish Foreign Ministers, February 17–18.↩
- The reference here is presumably to the note of November 2, 1944, from British Permanent Under Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan to the Foreign Minister of the Polish Government in Exile; the text of the note is printed in Poland, Germany and European Peace, p. 105.↩
- For documentation on the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London, November 25–December 12, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, pp. 676 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩