Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–1648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London , June 16, 1948—4 p. m.

2639. I. Chauvel flew to London evening fourteenth and met for hour and half with Strang, Massigli and myself to obtain for Bidault such observations regarding tripartite German agreement as Strang and I might make and which, as Chauvel explained, could be used by Bidault in the Chamber as a clear interpretative comment on agreement. It finally became evident that Chauvel wished at least to obtain three things: (1) Our consent that a démarche be made to Moscow; (2) An interpretation regarding the Ruhr control which would permit French participation in management control; and (3) A US–UK agreed statement which Bidault might use in the debate—the first two as replies to questions which the debate had brought out; the third as an interpretation of the last sentence of Deptel 2027 to Paris.¹

II. To the second we both stated that we could not agree to extension of Ruhr authority’s powers so as to provide international control of management. We pointed out the relationship of the authority’s power to the controls to be exercised by the Military Governors during the period of occupation and to the controls which the agreements provided for thereafter. (These were matters of which apparently Chauvel was in complete ignorance.)

Our answers to the first and third matters follow later in this cable. Strang suggested that it might be helpful if Chauvel would put in writing the particular points which he and Bidault had in mind.

III. Yesterday morning Chauvel and Massigli, after calling on Bevin, met with us for two hours and again for two hours in afternoon. They presented a paper which in translation read as follows:

[Here follows the text of a French paper offering an analysis, from the French point of view, of some of the salient features of the London Conference recommendations. The principal points of the analysis are reflected in later portions of the telegram printed here and the annotations thereto.]

IV. After reading and before commenting on the French paper, Chauvel asked three questions:

1. Could there be any change in timing of the plan?

I replied that we felt that the present schedule must be followed. Strang concurred.

2. Could there be a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers to consider the recommendation which had been made?

Strang stated that Bevin could not agree to this. I replied that I was sure my government felt the same way. We both stated reasons, which we have previously discussed, why this would be an imprudent act to take.

3. Would we agree to a formal note to the Soviet calling their attention to the plan after agreement had been reached by all parties, including the French, and the program had been initiated? He suggested the note might say that we would welcome Soviet participation.

Strang stated that in Bevin’s opinion this should not now be done, nor should it be done in the immediate future, for a tactical move of this kind would prove embarrassing and would probably be turned against us. The possibility, however, of making an approach to the Russians later could not be dismissed.

I asked Chauvel what purpose he thought such a note might serve. He replied in effect that the commitment to send one would be a gesture to the Socialists in France and would put the Soviet in the position where they would probably refuse. I then said that in view of the three years of frustration which the Soviet had caused, and in the light of their tactics, as evidenced about a variety of different matters, including currency reform, it was doubtful that the Soviet would refuse but instead would employ the maneuver to effect further confusion, further delay, and to spread the seeds of discord by propaganda. A maneuver on our part, which provided no promise of reward and held no expectations of progress, for the purpose of satisfying Socialist views in France, would, I thought, be damaging to a united front in the west.

Chauvel continued to ask several questions indicating an earnest desire to obtain US–UK approval of some plan to advise the Soviets about the program which would give a possible opening for the Soviets to participate later. Both Strang and I suggested that Bidault, during the debate, if he chose to do so, might refer to our past sincere endeavors to reach agreement with the Soviet, to the communiqué which made it clear that what we were proposing in regard to political organization was of such a character to permit participation by all German states, and that he might say something in the Chamber, of course at his option, not unlike the line taken by Secretary Marshall in his press conference and Mr. Bevin in his statement to the House of Commons.²

V. Chauvel then asked for comments on the paper which he had presented, and suggested that we give our approval to its language, particularly to Paragraph Three.³ By way of background so that you may understand our replies, the original language which Chauvel handed us used the word “negotiations” instead of “discussions”. Moreover, it contained the phrase “supplementary agreements” instead of “complementary arrangements” and was worded in other respects so as to imply, if not expressly to infer, that Paragraph Three would be construed as a supplementary agreement between the US, the UK and France.

I, therefore, told Chauvel that the London recommendations had been agreed to by five of the six powers, and that we could not, without the consent of the others, place our stamp of approval on any language of this character which Bidault might choose to make. To do so would indicate that we were parties to an extra-lateral arrangement with France. Moreover, it might be used at a later stage to commit us to reopen the question of control of the Ruhr, or even as an undertaking on our part otherwise to amend the agreements. This I said we could not do. I therefore told Bidault [ Chauvel?] that in his own language, in his own way, he could draw the conclusion from his knowledge of the agreements and of the nature of the action which they woud require for implementation, that subsequent discussions would naturally have to be had. We wanted, however, to avoid the infirmities of a veto. Within these limitations the sense of the language as modified, but not the language itself, Bidault could use with the reasonable expectancy that it would not be contradicted by the US. In all of this Strang agreed heartily.

As to Paragraph Two,⁴ I pointed out to Chauvel that the entire accord had been reached through candid exchange of views, and adjustment of the propositions of the respective governments, to the end that a reasonably satisfactory agreement would, it was hoped, emerge. No one government had been able to obtain everything that it wished. All had compromised their opinions in order that we might promptly get on with the task of reconstructing western Europe.

As regards Paragraph Four,⁵ Strang took the ball and indicated that the first sentence appeared to be an attempt on the part of Bidault to throw the entire responsibility on the US and UK. The last sentence of Paragraph Four conformed to our views.

As to Paragraph Five,⁶ I said that, as in all aspects of the paper, we could not agree to the language. This matter had been discussed at length around the conference table with all the delegates. If Bidault chose to do so, I said that he might refer to our policy of de-Nazification, decartelization and deconcentration and draw the conclusion that the three together would have an effect upon proprietary interests in the properties of the Ruhr. In this Strang agreed, though he pointed out that differences on this point existed between the French and US on the one hand and British on the other, and between the US on the one hand and the UK on the other.

As to Paragraph Six,⁷ both Strang and I said that the controls over management in the Ruhr must be construed in the light of the paper itself, particularly Paragraphs Nine and Ten, and provisions in the security paper, but that again we could not be placed in a position of approving any specific language which Bidault might use, with the qualification that the general sense of Paragraph Six was consistent with our understanding. Both Strang and I reiterated our view that we could not be party to anything which might be construed as an extra-lateral or supplemental agreement.

VI. Chauvel then inquired what we would do if France rejected the recommendations. Strang stated that, as Mr. Bevin had said yesterday morning, HMG had no alternative but to proceed in the bizonal area, and that it was his, Strang’s personal view that HMG would want to follow the program which had been laid down as closely as possible.

I said that if the French Government should reject the agreement, we would find it necessary to carry out plans in the bizonal area, but that I could not say whether they would parallel the lines of the London agreement or whether they would take a different line. If, however, we adhered to the general meaning of the London agreements, there would, necessarily, since France would not be a party to them, have to be modification regarding French representation on the Ruhr authority and possibly consultation with French on certain phases of security.

VII. Chauvel inquired whether the report might be published. Both Strang and I stated that we felt that no part or parts of the report, particularly those relating to political organization and security, should be published now without in advance obtaining the comments of the Military Governors, the advice of our governments, and the consent of the other powers which had agreed to the recommendations. We said, however, that if Bidault chose to do so, he might elaborate somewhat on the communiqué by using discreetly the substance of some of the annexes to the report provided they were not of a secret nature and provided they did not further undermine our position in Germany, anticipate the conversations between the Military Governors and the Ministers President, and further weaken our influence among Germans already, according to Robertson’s reports (confirmed by Clay) not unseriously impaired.

VIII. I told Chauvel that if, after three years of spectacular disunity among four powers, the three last great sanctuaries of freedom were now to present to the world a spectacle of their own disunity, the consequences throughout western Europe and in the western hemisphere might well be incalculable, thus damaging the interests of France and of all those, including my own country, who are attempting to preserve the traditional features of western civilization. Strang followed this up by saying that there was a powerful argument to be made by France for the agreements on their merits, that this argument could be reinforced by a statement of the consequences of rejection and that France, were she to disapprove now might find it difficult, if not impossible, to recover that which the present agreements offered to her.

IX. Chauvel appeared to have a very limited understanding of the agreements, and both Strang and I could not resist telling him that the facts as they existed, the agreements as they had been drawn, the communiqué as it had been drafted, could be used by Bidault to demolish every honest criticism that had so far appeared among the opponents and the doubters of the London recommendations.

X. Chauvel said that the answers which he had received from us would enable Bidault and the French Government to put at rest the rumors that had been circulating in the Cabinet and among members of the Chamber that the US and UK were willing to reopen the negotiations, were prepared to accept now amendments to them involving control of management of the Ruhr, increased French control over the Ruhr authority, and postponement of the application of the plan.

Sent Department as 2639; repeated USPolAd Berlin for Murphy and Clay as 206; Paris for Caffery as 287; Brussels for Kirk as 100; Moscow for Smith as 100.

Douglas

1. June 9, p. 324.
2. Regarding the statements made by Secretary of State Marshall and Foreign Secretary Bevin on June 9, see the editorial note, p. 324.
3. Paragraph 3 of the French paper cited the need for inter-governmental discussions to work out complementary arrangements required to apply the Conference recommendations.
4. Paragraph 2 of the French paper emphasized the compromise nature of the Conference recommendations.
5. Paragraph 4 of the French paper observed that the Americans and British had not considered referring the Conference recommendations to a meeting of Foreign Ministers and insisted that the German program be carried out within prescribed time limits.
6. Paragraph 5 of the French paper summarized those aspects of the Ruhr agreements aimed at preventing pro-Nazis from resuming control of mines and industries.
7. Paragraph 6 of the French paper summarized the international control aspects of the Ruhr agreements.