740.00119 Council/6–1148: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
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1341. Personal for Saltzman and Hickerson. It is still too early to gauge German reactions to the communiqué of the London conference.1 [Page 329] Our agencies are sampling public opinion and a number of German leaders have made preliminary comments about which I have telegraphed you. The reception is decidedly mixed and the Germans are obviously badgered by the conflicting desire to have their own government and fear that the London recommendation contemplates a puppet German western state with the substantial loss of the control of the Ruhr and entailing a permanent split of Germany. There is also fear of eventual Soviet reaction.
I have had a number of discussions with General Clay on the subject. He has sent the following cable to General Draper, Under Secretary of the Army, which is repeated for your information:
“For your information, publication of long communiqué which was necessarily written to please French public opinion prior to our explanation of proposals to German leaders has resulted as we feared in unfavorable reaction and has made some German leaders upon whom we had counted to take public positions not too favorable to proposed evolution of government. As you know, our desires had been to give as little as possible to the public about political evolution until we had met with Minister Presidents so that initial publicity could come from Minister Presidents. This procedure, I am sure, would have resulted in an enthusiastic German reception. However, even now, we are unable to explain the really favorable details of the proposals since the resultant publicity might have unfortunate repercussions in France. Soviet propaganda meantime rolls forth unchecked on the popular tune of German unity. Until French Government has acted, our own propaganda machine can only emit rather feeble grunts.
I bring this to your attention for information since it is apparent that there is no other course of action open to us. Nevertheless, in our efforts to gain France, we have let loose political forces in Germany which might lead to a rejection of the constitution which, of course, would be a serious political blow to our objectives. I have every hope that our influence combined with Britain will be able to overcome the initial obstacles when we are able to really explain the details to the German leaders. Nevertheless, in making moves in political evolution, we must recognize that German public opinion does become of increasing importance in the political struggle for Germany, and that we cannot neglect the reaction of some seventy million Germans, if, in fact, we hope to secure a Germany in which extreme parties either of the left or of the right cannot flourish.
Frankly, I am worried as it is going to be difficult for political leaders forced to take positions based on the communiqué to change their position when we have given them more complete explanation. I wanted you to know this now, so that you would better understand some of the problems which are certain to arise in forming the Constituent Assembly and in attaining the constitution. I am not being critical in any sense of what we have done as I recognize fully the nature of the French problem. However, I do want to bring to the attention of the responsible authorities in Washington once again that we still have a German problem.
[Page 330]I think it might be helpful if you would informally discuss the general context of this radio with Mr. Lovett and others concerned in the State Department”.
Sent Department 1341, repeated London personal for Douglas 234; Paris personal for Caffery as 233; and Moscow personal for Smith as 213.