Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/6–448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent

London, June 4, 1948—8 p. m.

2479. For Lovett from Douglas.

1. Bevin talked with me this morning about the German situation and our policy and program there. He said that his government was thoroughly prepared to accept the recommendations, and that final and formal acceptance would probably be taken on them on Monday.

2. He also stated that in the event the French do not go along with US, his government is prepared to proceed with US in the bizonal area. He added, however, that what we planned to do might prove to be more provocative than we now thought, and that certain of his colleagues were a little uneasy lest, having decided to proceed without France should the French fail to agree to the recommendations, and having decided to proceed with US, Britain might find herself alone. He suggested that this uneasiness could be allayed if we could give him some assurance that the policies of our respective two governments be harmonized and identical in the event that the Soviet might attempt to aggravate the difficulties of our position in Berlin and throughout Germany either by the use of force, which Bevin thought unlikely, or by a variety of other devices including inspired strikes.

3. I explained to him the significance of our statement that the American troops would be held in Germany until the peace of Europe is secured. This, of course, Bevin completely understood.

4. Bevin made it very clear that there was no suggestion in what he said of modifying HMG’s determination to go through with the program in western Germany. He was merely indicating a certain uneasiness lest the firmness of the executive branch of our government might not be reflected by Congressional action should this become necessary.

5. I think I suspect that the uneasiness to which Bevin refers was inspired by the news of the action of the Appropriation Committee in reducing the appropriations for European recovery.

6. In view of the foregoing, while, of course, we cannot make a commitment which is binding upon the Congress, I suggest that I be authorized to tell Bevin that in the event the Soviet move more vigorously that we think, in any event US and UK policy will be formulated in concert with each other.

7. Although paragraph III of the report to governments entitled “Talks on Germany”¹ implies the type of assurance which would be helpful, it can be invoked only in the case all three governments accept the recommendations which have been submitted to them.²

Douglas

1. Ante, p. 309.
2. Telegram 2106, June 5, to London, not printed, stated that the Department accepted paragraph in of the Report of the London Conference as applying to consultation between the U.S. and the U.K. in the event that the two governments find it necessary to implement the London program without French approval (740.00119 Council/6–448). In telegram 2530, June 8, from London, not printed, Ambassador Douglas reported that he communicated the Department’s view to Bevin. Bevin told Douglas that the assurance would allay uneasiness among a few of his colleagues (740.00119 Council/6–848).