711.61/5–2148
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Tinder Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | The French Ambassador |
| The Under Secretary | |
| Mr. Achilles, WE |
The Ambassador, who was leaving for Paris this evening, called to inquire about three matters: the Smith–Molotov–Wallace–Stalin communications, the Vandenberg Resolution, and Germany.
In response to his query as to the present status of US–USSR relations in the light of the recent interchanges, I told the Ambassador that our various public statements made the situation perfectly clear and that we considered the matter closed with the Secretary’s statement of May 19.1 I said our purpose had been solely to make clear to the Soviet Government that we had no aggressive intentions but that [Page 271] we intended resolutely to follow our present policies. In response to his question as to whether further conversations would have been held in Moscow had the Soviet Government not taken the matter to the radio, I replied that we had a number of bilateral questions to discuss with the Russians but that we had no thought of discussing multilateral questions other than in the appropriate forums, such as the United Nations, the CFM or the Control Council in Berlin.
I said that the Vandenberg resolution was literally in the lap of Congress and that we could not plan further steps at least until we have seen what the House Foreign Affairs Committee had in mind. The Ambassador inquired whether any further legislation on this subject was contemplated before the next session and I replied that it was not. He intimated that there was a feeling of disappointment in France that we were not acting more quickly in support of the Brussels Treaty countries. I reminded him that there was no basis for any disappointment on the part of his government in as much as we had repeatedly made clear the necessity for the Brussels Treaty countries to formulate, develop and begin carrying out their own plans for their integrated defense before seeking our help. I told him that in my conversations on the Hill I had encountered a growing feeling of exasperation that we were being called upon to do everything for Europe, not only to spend more than 15 billions to aid in its recovery, but to rearm Europe as well as ourselves. I added that the two worst things that could happen in this country, from the European point of view, would be for us to run into a period of deficit financing which would cause immediate abandonment of ERP or for us to become so disgusted that we would revert to isolationism. I reiterated that the best thing the Europeans could do from the point of view of American public opinion would be to push forward energetically on both recovery and defense in order to show that they were relying primarily on their own efforts rather than on help from us. He asked whether it was correct to assume that, aside from some possible discussions, there would be no concrete developments in U.S. support for Western Europe for at least eight months. I said that there was insufficient time left in the present session for anything beyond the Vandenberg resolution but that Congress might recess rather than adjourn and that, should a military emergency arise, Congress would naturally be reconvened at once.
On Germany I said I had just come from a teletype conversation with Douglas which had been badly garbled but which indicated that eleventh hour demands by the French were threatening all the good work accomplished in the London talks. I said we could hardly look with pleasure on such a result being caused by French theoretical demands. The Ambassador said that he knew that two notes had been [Page 272] presented to Ambassador Caffery and Harvey in Paris yesterday but did not know what they contained. He thought one related to the German talks and the other to the general security problem. I said that one thing which was having an increasingly exasperating effect in Congress was our having to pay 1,200,000,000 dollars for the support of British and French troops in Germany as well as our own and for the German civilian population. That money could better be spent in assisting the British and French recovery. The sooner German industry could be increased from its present 40% production rate the letter it would be. The German burden must be taken off our backs and the Germans made self-supporting. We were determined that Germany should not again become a menace but felt that if it did not become self-supporting it would become a cesspool into which all the evil of Europe could flow and which the Russians could easily take over. Surely the French did not want that. Bonnet indicated a measure of agreement but referred to French psychological difficulties and their need for reassurance on security in general. He intimated that French worries over Germany were not unrelated to disappointment over lack of progress on American support for the Brussels Treaty. I said we were aware of the French psychological problem but that they would do well to bear American psychology in mind as well.