811.30/12–648
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Sullivan)
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of December 61 in which you inquire whether this Department believes that there is sufficient likelihood of a surprise attack against concentrations of naval vessels in United States ports to warrant effecting now stringent precautionary measures.
As the intelligence available to the Secretary of State concerning world events is substantially the same as that which is available to the President and to the other National Security Council members, judgments involving an estimate of future developments affecting the National defense would seem to be properly ones for the National Security Council as a whole. With this explanation, I should like to set forth the following points which I believe are pertinent to your inquiry:
- 1.
- Attacks of the sort described in your letter would not likely be launched against concentrations of our naval vessels unless the Soviet Government had decided to start a third world war, and there is as yet no evidence that Soviet intentions run toward launching a sudden [Page 674] military attack on the Western nations at this time. It would not be in character with the tradition or mentality of the Soviet leaders to resort to such a measure unless they felt themselves either politically extremely weak, or militarily extremely strong. I would invite your attention, in this connection, to NSC 20/2 of August 25, 1948, “Factors Affecting the Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies”2 and despatch No. 315 of April 1, 1948, from the Embassy at Moscow, enclosing a report prepared by a joint intelligence group within that Mission.3
- 2.
- The events of the last few months and weeks do not appear to have changed anything in this situation, so far as evidences of Soviet intentions are concerned. However, it must be recognized that the Berlin situation is one which increases the risk of war, and accordingly the danger of sudden military developments. Furthermore, the wide attention and publicity being given to the project of a military alliance among Western countries may well increase Soviet nervousness and strengthen the arguments in Soviet councils of those, if there are any such, who favor preventive action before the military strength of the West can be further developed.
- 3.
- While generally improbable, it is not impossible that the Soviet Government should decide to take measures of the sort you have suggested. There is nothing entirely predictable, and nothing which can be completely excluded as a possibility, in the international behavior of a totalitarian regime.
Sincerely yours,