811.30/12–648
The Secretary of the Navy (Sullivan) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The uncertainties engendered by the existing world situation are such as to cause concern over the possibility of another “Pearl Harbor”.
The Navy has unavoidable normal peace time concentrations of Reserve and Active Fleet vessels in the Reserve Fleet Berthing Areas and at the main “home port” operating bases which are vulnerable to surprise attack.
The types of attack on these concentrations of our naval vessels considered to be within present Soviet capabilities are:
- (a)
- Surprise air attack by long-range bombers from land bases—The Reserve Berthing Areas in the Bremerton–Tacoma Area are estimated to be within range of Soviet long-range bombers operating from fields which it is estimated the Soviets have the capability of developing in the East Cape Area of Siberia. In the Bremerton–Tacoma Reserve Berthing Areas are 5 battleships, 6 carriers, 14 cruisers and 28 escort carriers berthed in close proximity.
- (b)
- Sabotage in inactivated vessels or in industrial facilities required for their reactivation—There is considered to be, under peace time operating conditions, the possibility of sabotage at all Reserve Fleet concentrations, and, to a lesser extent, in Active Fleet units.
- (c)
- Surprise submarine attack—Concentrations of major units of the Active Fleet at their normal “home port” anchorages are considered to present worth while targets which are vulnerable to submarine attack, especially so to attack by midget submarines specially designed for that purpose.
The measures now being taken by the responsible Fleet Commanders to safeguard our ships provide security watches capable of meeting anticipated emergencies, and guarding against sabotage and surprise attack to a limited extent. It is impossible to extend the scope of these measures to guard effectively against surprise attack without disrupting normal Fleet upkeep and training routine and causing public alarm.
[Page 673]To guard effectively our concentrations of naval vessels against surprise attack would require the continuous maintenance of an air early warning and fighter interceptor alert; and the protection of our harbors by air and surface patrols, netting, mining, installing and operating Harbor Entrance Control Posts and underwater detection devices. To insure against sabotage all visiting to naval vessels and to those naval activities whose facilities are required for the rapid reactivation of the Reserve Fleet should be prohibited.
The serious impact of the implementation of such stringent measures as those outlined above upon the public peace of mind and upon the capabilities of the Naval Establishment to maintain essential training and upkeep schedules within the limitations of a peace time budget are obvious.
The Navy Department would appreciate greatly advice as to whether the State Department believes that there is sufficient likelihood of surprise attack, under the existing international conditions, to warrant effecting now the stringent measures outlined above to effectively guard our Fleets against such an attack, regardless of the consequent public alarm.
Sincerely yours,