840.20/12–2148
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense ( Forrestal )1
Subject: Base Rights for the United States in Return for Military Aid to Foreign Nations.
Since the submission on 2 August 1948 of their memorandum to you regarding Over-all Examination of United States requirements for Military Bases and Base Rights,2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given further consideration to this matter in the light of various international developments and of current emergency planning. They [Page 675] believe that the general trend of events makes it more important than ever that needed bases and base rights be obtained to the fullest extent that may be practicable and without avoidable delay.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also become increasingly aware of the inherent fact that lack of needed bases and base rights can, because of its limiting effect on the capabilities of our armed forces for both offensive and defensive operations, constitute an indirect but definite and possibly very great weakening of the National Military Establishment. Thus, it is apparent that the degree of success that may be had in negotiations for base rights can be a factor of perhaps momentous influence with respect to budgetary dividends in terms of expenditure effectiveness, in planning, in actual war strategy, and even on both the length and the outcome of war.
At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the diplomatic problems of negotiations for base rights are both difficult and time-consuming and that their complexities and obstacles have made it impossible to date to arrive at successful solution in many cases. But, since the military implications of the situation are so pronounced, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the suggestion that both success and speed might be served to an important extent by use in negotiations of two points:
First, that it would be a wholly logical extension of mutual military aid for the recipients to make our combat aid in war emergency more effective by granting appropriate base rights;
Second, that it would, accordingly, seem appropriate that normally the granting of military aid should be coupled with negotiations for the consideration of United States base rights requirements.
While there may be overriding political considerations which would make it impracticable to adopt the above suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that such a course is not without precedent and they believe that it has high potentialities in terms of its overall effect on our national security. If the principle of quid pro quo in the form of base concessions is favorably considered it would apply primarily to the members of Western Union and to those other countries who may become parties to the proposed North Atlantic Pact, since it is assumed that these countries will be the primary recipients of military aid and since they control many of the more important base rights that are required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that approval of this principle is in consonance with the broad principles approved by the President in NSC 14/1 (The Position of the United States with Respect to Providing Military Assistance to Nations of the Non-Soviet World)3 [Page 676] which states in part that countries participating in military assistance programs should be encouraged so far as consistent with the progressive stabilization of their economies to compensate the supplying nation for the military assistance which they receive whenever and to what extent feasible.
With the foregoing discussion in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the situation with respect to needed base rights and submit detailed recommendations regarding those applicable to their suggestion on advice from you that the second of the points listed above is accepted in principle.
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces