IO Files: US(P)A/A/M(Chr)/20

Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Paris, Hotel d’Iéna, October 21, 1948, 9:15 a.m.

secret

[Here follow list of persons (34) present and discussion of another item on the Delegation’s agenda.]

2. Mexican Resolution on Appeal to the Great Powers

Mr. Dulles said that he had prepared a substitute statement for use in Committee 1 in the place of the paper before the Delegation. He felt the other paper (US(P)/A/C.1/153)1 rather suggested that the Committee undertake some redrafting to make it acceptable. He thought that if the Mexican resolution were treated as a serious directive we would get involved in an interminable wrangle. He was, accordingly, suggesting this alternative. He then read his own draft statement2 to the Delegation. It made the following points: The United States views the proposed resolution sympathetically and accepts the underlying principle that while certain powers have the right of initiation on the peace terms, this right should be used fairly. These great powers had both the right and the responsibility, which if not properly exercised made these matters a legitimate concern for other states. The United States did not intend to discuss the resolution as if it were a technical directive. Such discussion might lead to nothing at all. The United States recognized the need for early conclusion of the peace treaties and pledged itself to renew the efforts sought by the resolution for swift conclusion of the peace treaties.

Mr. Cohen said he liked Mr. Dulles’ statement very much but wanted to make two observations: it might produce discussion which, if started, would be difficult to stop. The resolution referred to agreements between three rather than five Powers. The most important question was whether there should be any comment on the last portion of the operative section of the draft putting forward the views of the Latin American governments whose invitation to the peace conferences the United States had consistently supported. For example, because of obligations to the Latin American states, the United States had felt obliged at the 1946 Moscow Conference to make a proposal that all states in the war be invited to the Peace Conferences. This [Page 94] was simply an attempt to work out accommodations of this view, to which the United States had no objection. He thought there was some danger that people might suspect that this country was behind this particular part of the resolution. For that reason, he wondered whether it would help reduce debate if we merely suggested that there should be drafting changes made. Certainly on the question of participation in the Peace Conferences it should be frankly admitted that this was the view which the United States endorsed.

The Secretary said he did not quite understand Mr. Cohen’s point. Mr. Cohen said his idea was that Mr. Dulles might add his two thoughts to his statement. Mr. Dulles said that if we once got into the question of drafting changes it would be like opening up Pandora’s Box, as to who was entitled to participate and all the matters through which the United States had gone at Moscow. Mr. Cohen said his purpose was to avoid just that. If the resolution remained as it was, it was his feeling that just such a discussion would start. If the United States said nothing it was all right but discussions might start if no way was found to omit this paragraph. Mr. Dulles agreed it would be desirable if Paragraph 4 could be omitted altogether. He was rather hopeless as to this because he did not think agreement could be gotten on the deletion of the last paragraph, which he regarded as a drive on the part of certain states to get into peace-making. It was, he thought, better to say this was a pious resolution and the United States agreed with it in principle and let it go at that.

Mr. Thorp said that, since this was simply an appeal to the Great Powers, he did not think the United States should vote for it itself. Mr. Dulles said that it was his idea that he should abstain on the vote as it was primarily an appeal to ourselves. Mr. Cohen thought it would be very good if discussion could be avoided altogether. Mr. Dulles said he would make a statement along the lines of that he had read to the Delegation initially, then, if discussion developed, the question of the deletion of the fourth paragraph could be considered.

Mr. Bohlen called attention to the fifth Whereas clause which he pointed out would bring up the Japanese Peace Treaty. This clause supported the Soviet thesis for drafting the Japanese Peace Treaty. There were also a number of inaccuracies in the resolution, for example, the reference to the second Moscow Conference when there was no such conference. The whole idea, he pointed out, was quite contradictory to the statement made by the Secretary in his opening speech. He liked Mr. Dulles’ speech very much but would like to see the inaccuracies in the resolution corrected. It was agreed that the best way to handle this matter would be to take up the individual parts in a private conversation with Padilla Nervo. It was further agreed that Mr. Dulles’ draft should be used in the debate.

  1. Supra.
  2. Not found in Department of State files; but see infra.