IO Files: SD/A/C.6/62

Position Paper Prepared, in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

confidential

Implementation of the Headquarters Agreement Report of the Secretary-General

the problem

The Secretary-General is submitting a report on the implementation of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations. Should the United States concur in approving the report?

recommendation

Insofar as one can anticipate what will be included in the report of the Secretary-General it is recommended that the United States delegation concur in approving the report.

comment

The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Headquarters Agreement will apparently not issue in time to permit [Page 68] its examination prior to the General Assembly session.1 Judging from the section on the Headquarters Agreement which is contained in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, the report on the Headquarters Agreement will be largely expositiory and will contain only commendation for the manner in which the United States has cooperated in the implementation of the Agreement. The report will, therefore, probably deserve the full approval of the United States.

Possible attacks on the United States with respect to matters arising out of the implementation of the Agreement are not unlikely. The character which such attacks are likely to assume and the replies which our delegation should make are set forth in the attached paper.

Annex A

discussion

The Headquarters Agreement

After careful and extensive negotiations, the “Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the headquarters of the United Nations” was signed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary-General of the UN on June 26, 1947. In a Joint Resolution (P.L. 357, 80th Congress), signed by the President of the United States on August 4, 1947, Congress approved the Agreement (with the reservations noted in Section 6 of the Resolution) and authorized the President to bring the Agreement into effect. The Agreement was brought into effect on November 21, 1947 by an exchange of notes between the U.S. Representative to the United Nations and the Secretary-General.

By an interim agreement negotiated pursuant to the authority of Section 20 of the Headquarters Agreement and Section 5 of P.L. 357, 80th Congress, and signed by Representative Austin and Secretary-General Lie on December 18, 1947, the relevant provisions of the Headquarters Agreement were made applicable to the temporary headquarters of the United Nations at Lake Success and Flushing Meadows, New York, and such other land and buildings occupied by the United Nations as may be defined from time to time by agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America, after consultation with the proper state and local authorities.

implementation

[Here follow brief references to Sections 4 and 6 of the Headquarters Agreement, concerning conditions for the establishment of [Page 69] radio facilities and a postal service at the United Nations, and regarding which separate position papers had been prepared, not printed.]

Sections 11–14 (Transit to and from the headquarters)

a. Entry into the United States

Section 11 provides that the federal, state and local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to the transit to and from the headquarters district of five categories of individuals who come to the United States in connection with UN activities. Section 13 adds that laws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the entry of aliens shall not be applied in such a manner as to interfere with the privileges granted by Section 11. When visas are required they shall be granted without charge and as promptly as possible.

These sections are in daily operation. Individuals coming to the United Nations headquarters are issued visas promptly and free of charge. The United States Government has been alert to take the action necessary to prevent delays. Detailed procedures for facilitating and expediting the travel of individuals connected with the UN have been developed in cooperation with the UN Secretariat and have been operating very effectively. Delays have been rare, far less than might have been expected in view of the many cases handled by scattered consulates abroad.

It may be expected that the United States will be attacked for delay in the issuance of visas in the following cases:

(1)
The representatives to the Human Rights Commission of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Governments experienced a delay in getting a visa because they refused to fill out the application questionnaire required of all Soviet citizens coming to the United States. The questionnaire was substantially identical to that required of United States officials who travel to Russia. The delay, evoked protests from the governments involved, and subjected the United States to attack at the sessions of the Human Rights Commission. It is the position of the United States that the delay was largely due to the refusal by the delegates to fill out a reasonable questionnaire. In any event the delegates received their visas, and the controversy over the questionnaire has been the subject of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Government. There have been no similar delays in the months that have elapsed since that incident.
(2)
The Polish representative to the committee might raise the question of Mieczyslaw Wionczek, formerly in the United States as an official of the Polish Government, who was accredited as a correspondent to the United Nations. In that case, while the Department was [Page 70] prepared to issue him a visa valid only for the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity, an unlimited visa could he issued only with the authorization of the Attorney General, since, apart from the Headquarters Agreement, the individual was inadmissible under the immigration laws. The time consumed in seeking such, authorization accounts in large measure for the delay. Wionczek finally agreed to return to the United States again as an official of the Polish Government, on a diplomatic visa which was promptly issued. Had the individual been willing to accept this visa in the first instance, there would have been no delay at all.
(3)
The Belgian Delegation and the United Nations Secretariat have informally protested the delay of many months in issuing a 3(7) visa to Serge Wojewodski, a stateless person of Russian origin, the husband of a member of the United Nations Secretariat who is a Belgian national. At this writing, the visa has not yet been issued.

The United States Embassy in Brussels has indicated that in February, when Wojewodski applied for a visa, he was asked for background information, particularly as to his activities in Germany where he had been residing from 1922 to 1947. According to the Embassy, that question apparently embarrassed the applicant and he stated that he did not care to press his application. Later he returned, but it was not until June 18 that he submitted a partial statement as to his sojourn in Germany. Subsequent investigation of intelligence sources in Germany revealed that he had “worked for the Nazis as a radio monitor from 1940–1945 making 450 RM monthly. Only reason did not join NSDAP [Nazi Party] was he was not permitted to although subject felt they were right in their beliefs”.

This information has been made available informally to the United Nations and it may be that the United Nations will not press the case, and thus avoid embarrassment for all concerned. Under a resolution of the General Assembly, Nazis may not be employed by the Secretariat, but assuming that Wojewodski was a Nazi, there is no evidence that his wife was. Nevertheless, the United Nations may not wish to insist on the admission to the United States of a former Nazi. If the United Nations should press the case, the fact that the individual is a Nazi is not an adequate basis under the Headquarters Agreement for refusing a visa to a member of the family of a United Nations official. (On the evidence available it probably could not be said that his exclusion is necessary to safeguard the security of the United States within the meaning of Section 6 of Public Law 357. The case is further complicated by the fact that Mrs. Wojewodski, a Secretariat employee, has applied for a change of her status to that of an immigrant. It is feared that if Wojewodski is permitted to come here as a 3(7) nonimmigrant and his wife then achieves immigrant status, the United [Page 71] States will, as a practical matter, have the husband on its hands permanently. If she should achieve immigrant status before the husband gets here, there will arise an interesting question as to whether a resident of the United States employed by the Secretariat is entitled to bring her husband into the United States on a 3(7) visa.)

If the case comes up for discussion the United States Delegation should explain that most of the delay was due to the failure of the applicant to fill out a reasonable visa application and supply pertinent information which the United States is entitled to ask in view of Section 6 of Public Law 357 which reserves to the United States the right to take steps to safeguard its security. When Wojewodski’s curriculum vitae proved incomplete it was reasonable in the circumstances to take time to investigate further. Finally, the United States Delegation should note that the rights accorded by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement are conferred on the United Nations. If the United Nations decides not to press its request for a visa in a particular case, no one else has standing to complain. If the United Nations, on the basis of the facts known, decides that it wishes to insist on Wojewodski’s entry, the United States will, of course, live up to its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement.

b. Accreditation of Press Representatives

Section 11(3) provides for transit to or from the headquarters district of “representatives of the press, or radio, film or other information agencies, who have been accredited by the United Nations (or by such a specialized agency) in its discretion after consultation with the United States.” On January 12, 194–8 officials of the Secretariat met with representatives of the United States Government to evolve a procedure for this consultation. Under this procedure applications for accreditation are transmitted by the Secretariat to the Mission in New York which forwards copies to appropriate offices of the Department. The comments of the Department with regard to the accreditation are communicated to the Secretariat through the Mission within 14 days. (The details of the consultation procedure are set forth in the background papers attached).2 The procedure has operated smoothly and effectively, and to date more than 230 applications have been the subject of consultation between the United Nations and the United States.

A question has arisen from the desire of the United Nations to accredit as representatives of “other information agencies” individuals who represent non-governmental organizations. It is the view of the Department that, read in their context, the words “other information agencies” refer to “agencies” in the nature of newspapers, radio, television, [Page 72] etc., but a non-governmental organization as such would not qualify. To merit accreditation under the Headquarters Agreement, a representative of an organization would have to show that he represents a publication regularly issued by the organization, and devoting a substantial amount of coverage to UN activities. At this writing, the question has not been settled, and will probably be the subject of discussion between Secretariat officials and representatives of the Department in the near future.

c. Travel by American Nationals on UN Business

It is not unlikely that the United States will be attacked for delaying or refusing passports to American nationals employed by the Secretariat who were ordered abroad on official business.

Even apart from the Headquarters Agreement, it is clear that the Charter of the United Nations obligates the United States not to impede the travel abroad on official business of Secretariat officials. The obligation of the United States, however, is to permit the travel of such individuals. It is not obliged to issue to all such individuals the protection of an American passport. Under existing law the Department may waive the requirement of a passport, and permit the individual to leave the United States and to return without such documentation. The country of destination, under the Charter of the United Nations, would also be required to admit the Secretariat official whether or not he had an American passport. If the individual is traveling to a country which is not a Member of the United Nations, it is still probable that he would be admitted without an American passport, especially if the United Nations issues him a Laissez-Passer. (Since the United States will have waived the requirement of a passport for re-entry into the United States, there is no danger that if that country admits the individual, it will later be unable to send him back to the United States.) Moreover, it may well be argued that the obligations of the United States are met when it permits the individual to leave; any obstacles to travel which he might meet because he had no passport would be imposed not by this country but by those to which he must travel. In any event, there would have to be a positive showing that without such passport the individual can not perform his official duties, before the United States might be required to issue him one.

The United States Delegation might point out that while one such official (Ursula Wassermann) was refused a passport, she was permitted to travel on a United Nations Laissez-Passer. The refusal of the United States to accord her the protection of a national passport did not impinge on her status as an international civil servant and in no way interfered with the operations of the United Nations.

[Page 73]

In view of the admitted obligation under the Charter, it has not been necessary to discuss the question of travel with reference to the Headquarters Agreement. The requirements of the Agreement might become crucial, however, if the Department should refuse to permit the travel of individuals who do not come within the Charter provisions. Thus, for example, American correspondents accredited to the United Nations, or representatives of American non-governmental organizations, may, in individual instances, be unable to obtain a passport to go abroad. Whether the United States must allow them, for example, to travel to Paris for the General Assembly would depend on whether they are covered by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement. There is uncertainty and disagreement as to whether the Agreement, and particularly Section 11, was intended to apply to American nationals. (Ultimately, if the United States and the United Nations disagree on this question, it may have to be submitted for arbitration pursuant to Section 21 of the Agreement.) For present purposes, it is hoped that the question will not arise and that, whether as a matter of legal obligation or Departmental policy, all individuals in these categories will be permitted to travel to the General Assembly. (The Legal Adviser has recently recommended that, in order to avoid the difficult legal question, the Department should generally permit American correspondents accredited by the United Nations to go to the General Assembly in Paris.)

Section 15

By this Section, the United States granted full diplomatic privileges, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, to every person designated by a Member as its principal resident representative to the United Nations or as a resident representative with the rank of Ambassador or minister plenipotentiary, and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon between the Secretary General, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Member concerned. In implementation of this Section, procedures have been developed whereby the Secretary General receives lists of the persons covered and transmits them to the United States. Individuals accepted by the United States for listing received, under arrangements made with the appropriate American authorities, exemptions from certain excise taxes (e.g. luxuries, telegraph, cable, telephone and radio communications, transportation, insurance, etc.) as well as taxes on gasoline, hotel taxes, sales taxes, and certain customs duties. The cooperation of American authorities in this respect has been excellent, and will undoubtedly be the subject of commendation in the Secretary General’s report.

[Page 74]

Problems are, however, arising under Section 15, some of which may possibly be raised at the sessions of the Sixth Committee. At this writing, the Department may be about to refuse diplomatic privileges to two individuals presented for listing by Member governments. Diego Suarez Costa was appointed Counselor of the Colombian Delegation, but the Protocol Division of the Department has refused to list him because the alien has been a resident of the United States for many years, and in the opinion of the Protocol Division he does not possess the necessary qualifications, does not in fact do the work of a member of the Delegation, and is not, therefore, a bona fide appointee. Similar action is contemplated in the case of Julio Pocaterra who has been Consul General of Venezuela in New York and was also added as Minister ad honorem of the Venezuelan Delegation. The Protocol Division has indicated that it would be willing to list the individual only if he ceased to be Consul General and became an active rather than an ad honorem member of the delegation.

These cases may raise claims that the United States is not living up to Section 15. That Section, however, requires privileges and immunities only for “such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon by the Secretary General, the Government of the United States and the government of the Member concerned.” While that may mean primarily “agreement” as to the categories or classifications of individuals entitled to privileges and immunities, the language of the Section might also seem to permit the United States to refuse to agree to the listing of a particular member of the staff. In any event, it is always free to challenge the bona fides of a claim to privileges, and that will be the basis of our action if the United States actually refuses to list either of these individuals.

Section 6 of the Joint Resolution (Public Law 357, 80th Congress)3

Section 6 of the Joint Resolution approving the Headquarters Agreement provides:

“Nothing in the agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity, as to be defined and fixed in a supplementary agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Nations in pursuance of Section 13(3) (e) [sic]4 of the agreement, and such areas as it is reasonably necessary to traverse in transit between the same and foreign countries …”

[Page 75]

In the exchange of notes which brought the Agreement into effect, Representative Austin specifically stated that the United States approved the Agreement subject to the provisions of Public Law 357. At sessions of the Sixth Committee, Mr. Fahy, the former Legal Adviser, made it clear that Section 6 must be considered as part of the Agreement, that the Headquarters Agreement was approved by Congress only subject to the reservation in Section 6, and that if this section is not accepted, the Agreement is not in effect. Nevertheless the United Nations has carefully avoided giving recognition to Section 6, and the matter will undoubtedly be the subject of continued controversy. The position of the United States Delegation, however, is clear. The requirements of Section 6 apply to the entire Agreement and must be given recognition accordingly.

(a) The “headquarters district and its immediate vicinity”.

A current problem related to Section 6 has been the subject of preliminary negotiation between the United States and the United Nations. Section 13(e) recognizes the right of the United States to limit individuals to the headquarters district and “its immediate vicinity”. Section 6 of the Joint Resolution [sic] approving the Headquarters Agreement specifies that “the Headquarters District and its immediate vicinity” is to be “defined and fixed in a supplementary agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Nations.”

Exploratory discussions between USUN and Secretariat officials indicate a reluctance by the United Nations to enter into such a supplemental agreement. In part, that reluctance is based on a refusal to take action which would indicate a recognition of the Section 6 reservation. In addition, while the United Nations consented to the provision in Section 13(e) recognizing the right of the United States to impose the limitation, the United Nations is not anxious to be a party to such limitations or to participate in any way in imposing them. The Secretariat is particularly unwilling to appear to approve the imposition of such restrictions before the United States adheres to the General Convention. Secretariat officials point out that, as provided in the Headquarters Agreement, the Agreement and the General Convention were intended to be read together as complementary instructions. When in 1947 Congress failed to complete action on the General Convention, the United Nations accepted the Headquarters Agreement alone because of its importance for immediate operation and because it was expected that Congress would ratify the Convention shortly thereafter. In fact, however, the Agreement read by itself does not give a full picture of the rights and status of the United Nations. Specifically, it is the opinion of the Secretariat that the General Convention, by providing for immunity “from immigration restrictions”, [Page 76] would prevent the United States from limiting to the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity members of delegations and Secretariat officials. Until the United States, by adhering to the Convention, agrees not to impose these limitations on individuals in these categories, the United Nations considers it premature to enter into the supplemental agreement to define the area.

It may be that the Secretariat fears that the negotiation of the supplemental agreement is a prelude to steps by the United States towards confining many individuals, including Secretariat officials, to this area. Such fears stem perhaps from the unhappy fuss resulting from unfortunate and unwarranted statements by certain officers of the Visa Division before a Senate sub-committee to the effect that the United Nations is being used as a cloak for hundreds of subversives. (See the final section of this paper.) In fact, however, even apart from the General Convention, under existing law their fears are unfounded. It is true that under the Headquarters Agreement, apparently, only members of delegations entitled to diplomatic privileges under Section 15 could not be confined to the limited area. However, the International Organizations Immunities Act, Public Law 291, 79th Congress, provides that with regard to the laws regulating entry into and departure from the United States, Member representatives to international organizations and officers and employees of such organizations shall be treated like officers and employees of foreign governments. The Department has been acting on the assumption that this provision would prevent the impositon of limitations to the headquarters district and vicinity on individuals covered by the Immunities Act.

In view of the attitude of the United Nations in this matter, the Department will probably proceed to define the area unilaterally, so that limitations may be imposed, if necessary, pending ratification by Congress of the General Convention and the subsequent negotiation of the supplemental agreement. Officials of the Secretariat are aware, of course, that since there will be no such agreement in effect when Congress considers the General Convention, it is not unlikely that Congress might itself wish to determine what area shall be included as the “headquarters district and inmmediate vicinity”. Since the question has been raised, Congress may also see fit to note that nothing in the Convention shall abridge the right of the United States to limit to this area all categories of individuals including Secretariat officials.

These considerations and speculations are set forth for the information of the Delegation. It is hoped that the question of limitations to the headquarters area will not arise at the General Assembly, and indeed it is to avoid that possibility that the Department has not formally raised the question with the Secretariat after informal discussions [Page 77] disclosed that no agreement would be forthcoming. If the question should arise, however, the delegation should indicate that the United States may find it necessary to define the area tentatively, pending a supplemental agreement. The delegation may assure the United Nations that there is no present intention to begin limiting large numbers of individuals to this area, that under our existing law it is not likely that Secretariat officials and members of the delegations would be so limited, and that there is no present intention on the part of the Government of the United States to seek modification of the law in this respect. The delegation should be careful, however, to avoid committing the United States to the view that the General Convention would prevent the United States from limiting Secretariat officials to this area.

(b) The Security of the United States.

Section 6 quoted above provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as in any way abridging the right of the United States to safeguard its own security. To date there has been no occasion for the United States to invoke this provision. No attempt has been made to exclude or deport any individual connected with the United Nations, or to take any other steps which might affect the operations of the United Nations.

Related to this section is the recent stir caused by the testimony of two officers of the Visa Division before a Senate sub-committee, in which they alleged that hundreds of subversives are in the United States because of some connection with the United Nations. This testimony received widespread publicity, and caused considerable resentment among the members of the United Nations Secretariat. It also gained attention in the newspapers of Eastern European countries, and it may be expected, therefore, that the question might arise in some way at the next session of the Assembly.

The United States Delegation should point out that the testimony of the Visa Division officers did not represent an official view of any part of the Department; that it was immediately repudiated in statements to the press by the Secretary of State; that it was denied by testimony before the same sub-committee by the Chief of the Visa Division, as well as by ranking officers of the Department; [that the matter was finally buried by an unequivocal report by three citizens who were called in by the Secretary of State to make a thorough investigation of the matter.]5

The United States Delegation might point out that while the incident was unfortunate, it has resulted in clearing the air and removing suspicions and misapprehensions on the part of some people in the [Page 78] United States. Also, the Delegation should note that the United States is a democratic country which must allow the free expression of individual opinions, and which provides for appropriate Congressional investigation of governmental operations as a basis for intelligent legislation. It should also be emphasized that the entire incident was a local and internal affair within the United States Government, and that the United Nations and its members must not allow themselves to be disturbed by what might be said about the United Nations by individual American citizens. Nothing that was said or done in connection with this incident in any way interfered with the operations of the United Nations, and the attitude of the United States Government in the handling of the entire affair reaffirms the full intentions of this Government to fulfill in every way its obligations under the Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.

  1. It was issued on September 8, 1948 as United Nations document A/627.
  2. Not attached.
  3. The reference is to section 6 of Section 2 of Annex 2 of the Headquarters Agreement itself (61 Stat. 767).
  4. Brackets are in the source text; this should read “Section 13(e)”; the error is in the text of the joint resolution itself.
  5. Brackets appear in the source text.