IO Files

Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d’Iéna, Paris, October 21, 1948, 9:15 a. m.

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[Here follow a list of persons (34) present and discussion of various subjects.]

I. Disarmament

Mr. Osborn explained that agreement on the text of a draft disarmament resolution had been delayed because of the negotiations on atomic energy. The United States had been attempting to find an acceptable formula in consultation with the British, French, and Belgian representatives.

He noted that M. Rolin of Belgium had some ideas on publishing information on armaments as a preliminary measure.1 He stated that the United States could not accept a simple reporting system which would include atomic energy, unless there were an accompanying system of control and verification. Nevertheless, the Belgian proposal held a good deal of popular appeal. A resolution had been worked out under which the Belgian proposal for a preliminary filing of advance information would be included in the plan for additional safeguards. The Delegation had before it a French draft resolution (US(P)/A/C.1/151)2 which he believed was as good as anything which could be worked out in the time available. Our policy required a generally fixed position within which it had been necessary to work out an acceptable text.

The Secretary asked for the comments of the Delegation on the draft resolution. Admiral Hewitt said that, from the military point of view, it seemed to embody all the prerequisites to disarmament which were of special importance. In this connection, he called particular attention to the following clauses of the preamble of the resolution: “Affirms that this aim can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which improvement will permit the organization of peace in an atmosphere of renewed confidence;

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Believing that international confidence cannot be restored without the co-operation of all states in a system of security, including the international control of atomic energy

Believes that the indispensable prerequisite of regulation of conventional armaments is exact knowledge of their state in the various countries, and that to this end, detailed reports must be received, verified and published by an international control organization;”.

Mr. Gross inquired what the meaning of the word “stage” was in the second paragraph of the operative part of the resolution, which stated in part, “requests the Security Council to develop through the Commission for Conventional Armaments as a stage in its system of safeguards a plan for the receipt verification and publication … of information on armaments …” Mr. Osborn explained that it meant that a plan to receive such information would be a part of the total work program of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. He noted that the Commission for Conventional Armaments was now working on this particular item as part of its overall planning. This clause was simply an instruction to the Commission for Conventional Armaments to include in the safeguards not only the results of inspection and control but a preliminary stage of information which would be used as a basis for determining the reduction of armaments. Ambassador Austin commented that the difficulty was that “stage” had gotten a conventional meaning in connection with atomic energy. Mr. Osborn pointed out that it had the same meaning in this case in that the first stage was to obtain armaments information and then plan reduction.

Mr. Dulles referred to Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the resolution and said that he disliked somewhat the phrase “progressive reduction of armaments.” As a matter of fact, it was actually necessary to build up armaments in some cases because of a great unbalance or vacuum of power, which needed to be filled up by power. He pointed out that the Charter speaks of “reduction of armaments,” and he wondered whether that phrase might not be used. Mr. Osborn said he would try to have this phrase changed in Paragraph 1 but thought that in Paragraph 2 the reference to “the reduction to be required to each nation” would probably have to remain.

Discussion disclosed that this language in the second paragraph was not satisfactory. Mr. Sandifer suggested the possibility of using the word “level” but the Secretary pointed out that this might be interpreted to mean even armaments.

Mr. Blaisdell referred back to the preamble and suggested that the phrase “regulation of armaments” should be used instead of the phrase “limitation of armaments” in the statement in the preamble which read [Page 491] “declares that the limitation of armaments is a fundamental aim of the United Nations”. Mr. Osborn thought this could be done.

Turning back again to the language in the second paragraph of the operative text of the resolution, Mrs. Roosevelt suggested the use of the words “balance of armaments”. Mr. Dulles wondered just what was meant by the existing language “reduction to be required of each nation”. Mr. Jessup thought this language met the Soviet propaganda line, but Mr. Dulles thought the implication should be turned the other way in our favor by referring to a balance, and by showing the Soviet unbalance of power. Mr. Jessup pointed out that all these things took place only after disarmament was accomplished. These clauses for reduction would be operative only after several prerequisites were worked out.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that, nevertheless, the United States will necessarily be building up its armaments. Under these circumstances, how could the phrase “reduction of armaments” be reconciled with the actual situation? Mr. Osborn said the present draft was important because the French could not get away with anything less with their own people. Mr. Dulles said he thought the French should be frankly told that if they wanted this kind of resolution they are going to have a hard time getting arms for themselves from the United States. He thought it was most undesirable to have anything that suggested reduction of armaments for each nation as the desideratum. Ambassador Austin thought it would be preferable to have a perfectly frank statement in paragraph 2 and suggested it might read “to determine the military establishment to be permitted to each nation.” Mr. Osborn suggested alternatively, the phrase “balance to be permitted each nation”. Ambassador Austin commented that this idea might not be so popular but it was the truth. The Secretary noted that two years ago we were afraid to use the word reduction because of the fear of getting off on an emotional bent and subsequently disappointing ourselves. He agreed with Mr. Dulles that the French position was inconsistent, and that they could not eat their cake and have it too. He thought we should tell the French our feeling on this matter quite frankly; that was the key to the situation.

The Secretary asked the Delegation if it agreed to the language “to determine the proper balance of armaments to be permitted to each nation”. Mr. Jessup thought this language would have an unfortunate effect since it assumed we are embarking on disarmament of each nation to achieve a balance. Mrs. Roosevelt noted that the present language, “reduction to be required”, gave the propaganda value, and did not actually say such reduction would be required of each nation but just where it was needed, and would therefore not foreclose other nations from building up their armaments.

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[Here follows additional discussion of the language of draft resolution US(P)A/C.1/151, at the conclusion of which Frederick Osborn, the United States representative to Subcommittee 12, was authorized to proceed with negotiations within the limitations of the draft as altered by the Delegation. The Delegation then turned to consideration of other subjects.]

  1. For text of the operative portion of the Belgian draft resolution introduced October 23, A/C.1/SC.12/2, see footnote 1, p. 469.
  2. US(P)A/C.1/151, not printed, was a revision of French draft resolution A/C.1/325, October 13, the operative portion of which is printed in footnote 1, p. 469. US(P)A/C.1/151 was virtually the same as the draft contained in document A/C.1/SC.12/1, infra, except that the penultimate introductory clause of the latter did not appear in US(P)A/C.1/151, and the last introductory clause quoted by Admiral Hewitt below did not appear in A/C.1/SC.12/1.