IO Files: US(P)/A/M(Chr)/15
Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Hotel d’Iéna, Paris, October 14, 1948
[Here follow a list of persons (32) present and discussion of various subjects.]
3. Review of Developments and Trends in Committees
A) committee 1
Turning first to atomic energy, Mr. Osborn explained that a subcommittee, constituted to consider the various proposals submitted in the course of the general debate on atomic energy in Committee 1, had met for five days and found no compromise possible. It had agreed to submit three different resolutions to the main Committee. The first was the Canadian resolution, which followed the position of the US in every detail. The second was a resolution submitted by India, which actually combined the Syrian and Australian proposals, [Page 468] which Indian resolution was unacceptable to the US. The third was the Soviet resolution.1
In his view, the most important aspect of the work of the sub-committee was the discovery that, although it had originally been thought that the USSR had actually offered a compromise in the field of the control of atomic energy, it had turned out to be a shrewd maneuver which would have meant that the Atomic Energy Commission would return to work under two conditions: (1) the US would have to agree to the simultaneous conclusion of two conventions, one on prohibition and one on control of atomic energy; and (2) the Atomic Energy Commission would resume work on the basis of the Soviet interpretation of the January 24, 1946 Assembly resolution. This latter point meant to the USSR that the idea of stages which had been included by the Assembly in that resolution was simply set forth as a method of study for the Atomic Energy Commission and not, as the US interpreted the resolution, as a stage-by-stage transition to a system of control. Mr. Osborn explained that the Soviet position would mean that the US would have to destroy its atomic weapons and that then there would be a period of from six months to a year during which the actual system would be setup, at the end of which time the USSR might indicate its disagreement with the entire system. In other words, in his view, the Soviet proposal was nothing more than a move which would force the US to cease negotiations on atomic energy, since the US offer to give up its atomic weapons was based on the establishment of an effective, enforceable control system. The Soviet position would have called for a resolution to the contrary effect by the General Assembly. He believed it was important to maintain a firm uncompromising position on this matter in line with the Canadian resolution.
Mr. Blaisdell explained that the other subject which had been considered by Committee 1 was the Soviet proposal on disarmament. The general debate had been concluded at noon yesterday, and a sub-committee had been established to work over the various resolutions which had been submitted to the Committee.2 This meant that Committee 1 would take up Palestine on Friday.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- For information regarding the work of the subcommittee and the proposals under its consideration, see editorial note, p. 473.↩
- Reference is to Subcommittee 12, established by the First Committee at its 160th Meeting, October 13, for the purpose of examining the various proposed draft resolutions on disarmament before the First Committee and recommending an appropriate text to the Committee, Subcommittee 12 discussed procedure at its 1st Meeting, October 14 and considered the Soviet proposal, A/658 (for text, see telegram Delga 117, September 25, p. 431), at its 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Meetings, October 15, 16, and 21. The summary records of the meetings of the subcommittee are not published, but for its terms of reference, membership, and an account of its work, see its report to the First Committee, document A/C.1/356/Rev. 1, November 2, GA (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, pp. 34–39.↩