Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch to Mr. John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly¹

New York, October 5, 1948.

Dear Foster: The newspapers have kept the American public pretty well posted about atomic energy. I have received nothing from the Department which has added anything to my information.

Today I received an undated document marked “secret” which referred to something on the French radio this morning in which they spoke of the necessity for debunking the Soviet maneuver in “simplest phraseology possible and that full emphasis be placed upon crux matter, all too often veiled by need for technical and semitechnical explanations in Committee meetings.” Then it went on to tell what should fee done and what should be said here.²

The last paragraph reads “Secretary has seen foregoing and concurs. He tells me he has been urging such counterpropaganda reaction especially by Baruch.³ Time is important.”

For the life of me I cannot see why Austin, Osborn and Arneson are not ready to do exactly what they said they want done here. They should do it on the scene and on the same level from which the propaganda is sent forth.

The American newspapers, especially in all the editorials, know just exactly what is taking place and they have defended the American position in a very logical and simple manner. For instance, here is one from the Herald Tribune today.

The jitters of the French, which may or may not be their own ideas and might be stimulated by other countries, are exactly what I had to meet in the Atomic Energy Commission. This was overcome by stating exactly where we would stand, if we had to stand alone, by arguments which were presented daily to the Commission showing the hollowness of the various contentions against the majority proposals, and constantly keeping the press and radio advised.

I spent most of my time talking with members of the delegations and showing up the various Soviet counterproposals. That is what ought to be done now. If we haven’t sufficient men over there, let them get them.

I would like to call your attention again to the resolution of the General Assembly, passed January 24, 1946, in London which reads:

“Section V. Terms of Reference of the Commission

“The Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

• “(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
• “(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
• “(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
• “(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means, to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

“The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken …”

The move by Vishinsky in which he suggested outlawing the bomb simultaneously with the setting up of a committee of inspection is absurd on its face, because if we outlaw the bomb, that settles that. But it will take great patience and time to set up the control and inspection. And, don’t forget that one of the important parts was the setting up of punishment, swift, sure and condign, of a violator. The Soviet proposals are only another form of the pious Kellogg-Briand pacts. The thing has to be done in a package and done with effective safeguards and by stages. The only thing that stands in the way of the over-running of Europe today is the atom bomb. When once we outlaw that, there is nothing to stop the Russian advance.

I do not see why, if we outlaw the bomb, we should not outlaw war itself, but you could not do that until you set up inspection, control and punishment to see that no one broke the agreement.

And, as I once told you, until America makes up its mind what it wants in peace and makes some global peace suggestions, it seems to me we will be on the defense continually, with our opponents choosing a field here, there and every where.

Sincerely yours,

Bernie

P.S. After this letter was written, word came through that the UN had voted to continue discussions on atomic energy⁴ which confirms my previous doubts as to what was the intended objective of any statement solicited from me and of efforts to deal with the situation in Paris through any but on-the-spot means.

1. Dulles transmitted copies of this letter to Austin and Osborn on October 12. Austin’s copy, obtained from the files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, bears the following marginal comment by the Senator: “This mysterious message coincides with, the dispatch from Osborn and Arneson to Lovett sent without my approval or knowledge.” Reference is presumably to telegram Martel 29, October 4, mentioned in footnote 1, p. 447.
2. Document not identified.
3. Regarding Marshall’s correspondence with Baruch on this subject, see telegram Telmar 38, p. 447.
4. Reference is presumably to the proceedings of the First Committee’s subcommittee on atomic energy, appointed October, 7. Although that body did not actually “vote to continue discussions on atomic energy” prior to receipt by Dulles of this letter, including its postscript, the United States, and other nations supporting the majority position on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, did support in the subcommittee the “supplementary resolution” proposed by New Zealand on October 7 (A/C.1/314; for text, see footnote 3, p. 454. The substance of that resolution was incorporated into the draft approved by the subcommittee on October 12. For the report of the subcommittee, A/C.1/333, October 15, see GA (III/1), First Committee, Annexes, pp. 16–20.