Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/171

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] September 3, 1948.

Regulation and Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces

U.S. Objectives in Connection With General Assembly Consideration

the problem

1. To set forth the objectives of the U.S. with respect to possible General Assembly, consideration of the question of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

facts bearing on the problem

See Appendix A.²

discussion

See Appendix B.

conclusions

2. For purposes of General Assembly discussion, the issue of regulation of conventional armaments should be cast in such a way as to show that it is but part of the broad problem of world security, is directly affected by the climate of international relationships, and depends for solution on the sincere cooperative efforts of all participants.

3. The U.S. objectives in the General Assembly with respect to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should be:

(a) To maintain this issue in its proper perspective of interrelationship with the problem of the international control of atomic energy and other factors involved in effective collective security.

(b) To prevent as far as possible the Soviet Union from successfully diverting attention from the vital issue of international control of atomic energy where the record of majority accomplishment and Soviet intransigence is so clearly established.

(c) To reaffirm and clarify, as far as conditions at the time seem to demand, established U.S. policy concerning the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces as set forth in the CCA Resolutions on Items I and II of its Plan of Work³ and as set forth by the Deputy U.S. Representative in CCA on August 2, 1948.⁴

[Here follows Appendix A, “Facts Bearing on the Problem,” consisting of an account of negotiations at the United Nations on regulation of conventional armaments from September 1946 to September 1948.]

Appendix B

discussion

1. It appears likely that the general problem of world security will play a prominent role in the forthcoming General Assembly.⁵

2. The issue of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces is but part of the problem of world security. Although the question of conventional armaments as such is not on the agenda of the third General Assembly, it is likely that it will be raised in connection with the question of the international control of atomic energy or some other security problem.

3. U.S. leadership in connection with the most important and pressing aspects of world security, namely the recovery and strengthening of war torn Europe and the international control of atomic energy, has been outstanding. In this latter field the U.S. first developed the essential basis for an international, control system which became the basis of the UNAEC control plan. A majority of UNAEC members, past and present, consider the plan unassailable, The U.S. considers it of the utmost importance that the UNAEC control plan be approved by the General Assembly.

4. It is anticipated that the Soviet Union will make every effort to divert the General Assembly from consideration of the substance of the UNAEC control plan. Prolonged debate of the conventional armaments question could easily overshadow the more fundamental issues of world security with possible jeopardy to U.S. objectives in the field of atomic energy.

5. U.S. tactics and strategy should therefore be so devised as to contribute to the maximum to the attainment of these objectives.^*

6. The United States, in dealing with specific questions which may arise concerning the work of the CCA, should refer for guidance to the CCA Resolution on Item II (Principles) and to the statements of the United States Representative to the CCA on this subject. The position adopted by the United States should not be made a defensive one, however but should reaffirm and clarify United States policy on the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

7. Such a position should succeed in preventing a diversion of the General Assembly discussions from the central issue of atomic energy. In addition it should provide an opportunity to reemphasize that the United States position on relationship of international confidence as stated in points two and three of the Resolution on principles is to implementation rather than to formulation of plans. United States determination to continue its effort in the CCA should be reaffirmed.

1. This document was approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments and was circulated in the Committee as RAC D–33/1a, September 3, 1948.
2. Not printed.
3. For text, see footnote 1, pp. 377–378.
4. For substance, see telegram 492 to New York, July 30, p. 373.
5. In telegram 1030 from New York, August 18 (not printed), Osborn reported that Soviet and Ukrainian speeches and statements at recent meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments indicated the probability of a Soviet offensive in the General Assembly on the whole problem of the armaments race (501.BB/8–1848).
6. Detailed discussion of probable Soviet strategy and tactics in the armaments field will be considered in another paper. [Footnote in the source text. The paper under reference is SD/A/C.1/184, September 13, not printed.]