Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Position Paper Approved by the Executive Committee on
Regulation of Armaments1
top secret
[Washington,] April 9, 1948.
RAC D–30/1a
United States Policy in the United Nations for the
International Control of Atomic Energy
the problem
1. To determine a United States position in respect of (a) the continuance of
the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, (b) whether or not
that Commission should now render a Third Report, (c) the general tone of
that Report.
facts bearing on the problem
(See Appendix A)
discussion
(See Appendix B)
conclusions
2. Soviet opposition to the essential elements of an effective system of
international control as supported by the majority of the Commission in its
First and Second Reports derives not merely from specific disagreement with
the essential elements themselves but is an expression of the overall Soviet
policy of obstruction of the aims and principles of the non-Soviet
nations.
3. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect to obtain Soviet acceptance of the
essential bases for an effective system of international control except as a
major reversal of fundamental Soviet policy may occur. Thus, the impasse
resulting from Soviet refusal to accept the majority-supported proposals for
control of atomic energy is such as to be beyond the competence of the U.N.
Atomic Energy Commission to resolve.
4. This fact should be brought to the attention of the world through a Third
Report of the UNAEC which will expose the
unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept the obligations of membership in
a world
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community required for
effective international control and the complete inadequacy of the Soviet
counter proposals.
5. The existence of the impasse precludes any useful purpose being served by
continuing negotiations in the UNAEC. The
record of the USSR in the UNAEC and the
course of USSR relations with the rest of the world in the past two years
does not warrant the degree of mutual confidence necessary to permit
effective negotiation in the UNAEC on
those strategic and political details of the majority plan which would still
require elaboration before a draft treaty could be submitted. To continue
discussions in the AEC under these
circumstances would be prejudicial to U.S. security and would give the
peoples of the world a false idea of the prospects for international
control.
6. In order to focus world opinion on the situation created by Soviet
intransigeance, the Third Report of the UNAEC should inter alia
- (a)
- recognize that the present impasse is beyond UNAEC competence to resolve;
- (b)
- recommend that until such time as the General Assembly finds that
this situation no longer exists, or until such time as the sponsors
of the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946 who are the
permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission (Canada China,
France, USSR, UK and US) find through prior consultation that there
exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic
energy and so report to the General Assembly, negotiations in the
AEC should be suspended;
- (c)
- recommend that the existing impasse, documented by the First
Second and Third Reports, should be considered by the Security
Council and by the General Assembly at its next regular session; the
report should be drafted with this objective in vie
7. The United States Representatives on the AEC should be authorized to explain to other delegations that
this is the present United States position and intention subject to change
only in the light of overriding developments in international relations
which would make reconsideration desirable.
recommendations
It is recommended:
- (a)
- that the above conclusion be approved, and
- (b)
- that upon approval of this paper by the Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Chairman of the USAEC, it be forwarded to USUN as guidance.
[Page 325]
Appendix A
Facts Bearing on the Problem
8. u.s. policy with respect to the international
control of atomic energy
(a) Three-Nation Agreed Declaration
The policy of the United States Government with respect to the
international control of atomic energy was given its first public
expression in the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration issued on November,
15, 1945, by the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers
of the United Kingdom and Canada.2 This Declaration, which resulted from
conversations initiated by the United States, stated: “In order to
attain the most effective means of entirely eliminating the use of
atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for
industrial and humanitarian purposes, we are of the opinion that at the
earliest practicable date a Commission should be set up under the United
Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the
Organization.” The Declaration recommended that the Commission make
specific proposals with regard to the following phases of the
problem:
- “(a) For extending between all
nations the exchange of basic scientific Information for
peaceful ends.
- “(b) For control of atomic energy
to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful
purposes.
- “(c) For the elimination from
national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
- “(d) For effective safeguards by
way of inspection and other means to protect complying
states against the hazards of violations and
evasions.”
(b) The General
Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946
The proposals in the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration were discussed at
the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, December 16
to 26, 1945, and agreement was reached on a draft resolution to be
presented to the First General Assembly of the United Nations.3 This
resolution, which France and China joined the other Powers in
sponsoring, was adopted by the General Assembly on January 24,
1946.4 It created a Commission
composed of one representative
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from each of the States represented on the Security Council and from
Canada, when it was not one of such States. The resolution directed the
Commission to “proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all
phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time
with respect to them as it finds possible.” In addition, the resolution
incorporated verbatim in the Commission’s terms of reference that
portion of the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration quoted above which called
for specific proposals on four separate aspects of the problem. The
resolution also contained the following sentence which was derived
directly from the Declaration: “The work of the Commission should
proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which
will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage
is undertaken.”
(c) The Baruch
Proposals
At the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in
New York City on June 14, 1946, the United States Representative, Mr.
Baruch, made the following proposals on behalf of the United States for
achieving international control of atomic energy:
“The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic
Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of
the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw
material and including—
- “1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy
activities potentially dangerous to world security.
- “2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other
atomic activities.
- “3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic
energy.
- “4. Research and development responsibilities of an
affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the
forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to
comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic
energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the
world’s leader in the field of atomic knowledge and
development and thus supplement its legal authority with the
great power inherent in possession of leadership in
knowledge.
“When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including-the
renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put
into effective operation and condign punishments set up for
violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as
international crimes, we propose that—
- “1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
- “2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the
terms of the treaty, and
- “3. The Authority shall be in possession of full
information as to the know-how for the production of atomic
energy.”5
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9. position of the majority and minority of the
united nations atomic energy commission
- (a)
- The First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission was approved on December 31, 1946, by a majority of
10 Members with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. The
Second Report was approved September 11, 1947, again by a
majority of 10 Members, the Soviet Union opposing and Poland
abstaining. Because of the change in membership of the
Commission, a total of 13 nations participated in the majorities
approving both reports. The Introductions to the Second Report
contains this important statement: “The majority of the
Commission concludes that the specific proposals of this Report
which define the functions and powers of an international
agency, taken together with the General Findings and
Recommendations of the First Report, provide the essential basis
for the establishment of an effective system of control to
ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes and
to protect complying states against the hazards of violations
and evasions.” (See First Report, General Findings and
Recommendations, pages 17 to 22, and introduction to Second
Report, pages 1 to 2 for statement of essential elements of the
majority position.)
- (b)
- The Soviet Union, which dissented from the First and Second
Reports, on June 19, 1946 proposed as a first step in
fulfillment of the-Commission’s terms of reference the adoption
of a convention which would prohibit the use, production and
storing of atomic weapons and would require destruction of such
weapons, “whether in a finished or unfinished condition,” within
a period of 3 months from its effective date.6 On February 28, 1947, the Representative
of the Soviet Union introduced in the Security Council 12
proposed amendments to the General Findings and Recommendations
contained in the Commission’s First Report,7 and on
June 17 [11], 1947, he submitted a number
of proposals for the control of atomic energy based upon
international inspection and national management of atomic
facilities.8 These proposals made little
contribution to the matter at hand, as most of their features
had already been discussed and rejected by the majority in the
First Report.
- (c)
- Prolonged discussion of the Soviet proposals in the Atomic
Energy Commission has failed to resolve fundamental points of
disagreement between the majority and the minority on the
following aspects of the problem:
- (1)
-
Ownership of Source Material:
This Government and the majority of the Atomic Energy
Commission have insisted that there can be no assurance
of security under any system of atomic energy control
unless the international agency has unqualified
ownership of all source material after it is mined. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, considers that periodic
inspection of mining facilities is sufficient. In the
Soviet view source material should be left in national
hands.
- (2)
-
Ownership, Management, and Operation
of Dangerous Facilities: This Government and
the majority considers that the international agency
must have the sole responsibility for dangerous
facilities through ownership, management, and
operation—dangerous, that is, to international security.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, considers that
dangerous facilities should be left in national hands
and be inspected from time to time.
- (3)
-
Research: The majority declare
that positive research and developmental
responsibilities for all dangerous activity should be
assigned exclusively to the international agency and
that atomic research on non-dangerous activities may be
carried on in national States subject to licensing by
the international agency. While the Soviet Union agrees
in principle that the international agency would itself
conduct research and development activities, the Soviet
Union would permit national research and development of
a dangerous character to be carried on by national
States. In addition, the Soviet Union would make no
provision for the control of national research or
development activities of a non-dangerous
character.
- (4)
-
Inspection: While it is generally
agreed that there should be some system of international
inspection, the majority have concluded that there must
be comprehensive inspection, particularly in unreported
areas where clandestine activities might be carried on.
The minority considers that inspection should be limited
to those atomic facilities reported by States;
inspection as to clandestine or unreported facilities is
virtually ignored.
- (5)
-
Elimination of Atomic Weapons from
National Armaments: While it is generally
agreed that atomic weapons must be eliminated from
national armaments, the majority have concluded that
such elimination should come at that stage in the
development of the international control system which
would clearly signify to the world that the safeguards
then in operation provided security for all
participating States The Soviet Union, on the other
hand, has insisted that atomic weapons be destroyed at
once and that international control including safeguards
should be worked out and established later.
- (6)
-
Enforcement: It is generally
agreed that violators of the atomic treaty should be
punished. The majority, however, consider that
punishment of treaty violations must be swift and
certain, and that there must be no procedure, including
the “veto”, which would protect a violator of the atomic
treaty from the consequences of violation. The Soviet
Union insists, however, that all questions of
enforcement must
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come within the established competence of the
Security Council and that all decisions on enforcement
must be made in conformity with the rule of
unanimity.
- (d)
- In the Introduction to the Commission’s Second Report, the
majority of the Commission have stated the following conclusion
regarding the Soviet proposals:
“Twenty-three committee meetings have been devoted to the
consideration of the views of the Soviet Union, put
forward either as amendments and additions to the First
Report or as separate proposals submitted on 11 June.
The discussion on the Soviet Union amendments, which is
summarized in part III of this Report, has not led the
Commission to revise the General Findings and
Recommendations of the First Report. The discussion on
the Soviet Union proposal of 11 June, which is
summarized in part IV, has led to the conclusion that
‘these proposals as they now stand and the explanations
given thereon do not provide an adequate basis for the
development by the Committee of specific proposals for
an effective system of international control of atomic
energy’. It is evident, therefore, that these
discussions have not led to a reconciliation of the
views of the Soviet Union with those of the majority of
the Commission on major points of principle.”
10. present status of negotiations in the united
nations atomic energy commission
- (a)
- At the present time, the Working Committee of the Atomic
Energy Commission is continuing its consideration of the Soviet
Union’s proposals of June 11, 1946. The discussion is currently
concerned with certain questions relating to the Soviet position
submitted by the Representative of the United Kingdom on August
11, 1946, and the Soviet Representative’s answers thereto.9
- (b)
- Committee 2 has commenced consideration of the problem of
organizational structure of the proposed international agency
(Item
[Page 330]
A, 3(a) of the Commission’s “Summary of
Principal Subjects”, Annex A of this Appendix.10) To date, the Committee has
confined its attention to the subject of the agency’s board of
directors. No additional items of work are presently
scheduled.
11. prospective work of the united nations atomic
energy commission
- (a)
- The General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, which
established the Atomic Energy Commission “to deal with the
problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other
related matters,” directed the Commission in Section 5 to
“proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of
the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time
with respect to them as it finds possible.” The Resolution also
stated that the work of the, Commission “should proceed by
separate stages the successful completion of each of which will
develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next
stage is undertaken.”
- (b)
- On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly approved
unanimously a; Resolution on “Principles Governing the General
Regulation and Reduction of Armaments”, which, in Section 3,
urged “the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy
Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in Section 5
of the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946,” and
recommended “that the Security Council expedite consideration of
the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the
Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that
Commission, and: also that the Security Council expedite
consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the
creation of an international system of control and inspection,
these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all
other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass
destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent
necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.”11
- (c)
- The letter of transmittal to the Security Council covering the
First Report of the Commission stated that the Commission would
proceed to the further study of certain topics noted in Part I
of the Report and other matters contained in its terms of
reference “with a view to making the specific proposals set
forth in the Resolution of the General Assembly of January 24,
1946 and reaffirmed in the Resolution of the General Assembly of
December 14, 1946.” The additional topics were listed in Part I
as follows: “The detailed powers, characteristics, and functions
of the international control agency for
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which the need is expressed in the ‘First
Report on Safeguards Required to Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy
Only for Peaceful Purposes’, including such matters as
organization, financing, and staffing; the relationships between
the agency, the various organs of the United Nations, and the
participating States; powers of the agency in matters of
research, development, and planning; the provisions for
transition to the full operation of the international system of
control; and other, specific matters which should be included in
the international treaty or convention establishling control
over atomic energy.”
- (d)
- On March 10, 1947, the Security Council adopted a Resolution
transmitting to the Commission the record of its consideration
of the Commission’s First Report and urging the Commission “in
accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January
and 14 December 1946, to continue its inquiry into all phases of
the problem of international control of atomic energy and to
develop as promptly as possible the specific proposals called
for by Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24
January 1946 and by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14
December 1946 and in due course to prepare and submit to the
Security Council a draft treaty or treaties or convention or
conventions incorporating its ultimate proposals; …”12
- (e)
- The letter of transmittal accompanying the Second Report
signed by the Canadian Representative stated:
“In continuing its task the Commission intends to proceed
with the study of the topics noted in the Introduction
to the Report and other matters within its terms of
reference, with a view to making the specific proposals
required by the resolutions of the General Assembly of
24 January and of 14 December 1946 and to preparing for
submission to the Security Council, in due course, a
draft treaty or convention incorporating its ultimate
proposals.”
- (f)
- The Introduction to the Commission’s Second Report stated that
the Commission, in drafting the specific proposals set forth
therein, had been guided by the “Summary of Principal Subjects”
included in Part I of the Report. (See Annex A to this
Appendix.) The Introduction went on to say:
“In addition to the functions and powers of the
international agency, there are other important matters
listed for discussion. These are the organization and
administration of the agency, geographical location of
dangerous activities and stockpiling, financial and
budgetary organization, prohibitions and enforcement,
and the stages of transition from the present situation
to a system of international control. These are subjects
which, in the opinion of the majority of the Commission,
for the most part, can be discussed effectively only in
the
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framework
of conclusions reached with regard to the functions and
powers of the international agency. Further work of the
Commission on these matters will be based on the
specific proposals of this Report and on the First
Report.
“It is evident that, until unanimous agreement is reached
on the functions and powers of the international agency,
there will be limitations on the extent to which
proposals on other topics in the Summary of Principal
Subjects can be worked out in detail. Clearly, much
remains to be done before the final terms of a treaty or
convention can be drafted. The Commission intends to
proceed with the remaining topics in the summary and, at
the same time, will continue its endeavors to clarify
and resolve, where possible, the existing points of
disagreement.”
12. u.s. position with respect to the atomic energy
commission’s future work
- (a)
- The U.S. joined with the majority of the Commission Members in
approving the statements in the First and Second Reports, referred
to above, relating to the prospective work of the Commission.
- (b)
- The Secretaries of State, War and Navy, on September 11, 1947,
took the following decision: “B. It was also the sense of the
discussions that the United States should take no initiative at this
juncture in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in the
Security Council or in the General Assembly to terminate
negotiations looking toward international control of atomic
energy”.
- (c)
- In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on
September 17, 1947, Secretary Marshall stated:
“Since the United States realizes fully the consequences of
failure to attain effective international control we shall
continue our efforts in the Atomic Energy Commission to
carry forward our work along the lines of the majority
views. We must state frankly, however, that in the absence
of unanimous agreement on the essential functions and powers
which the majority has concluded must be given to the
international agency, there will necessarily be, limitations
on the extent to which, the remaining aspects of the problem
can be worked out in detail. If the minority persists in
refusing to join with the majority, the Atomic Energy
‘Commission may soon be faced with the conclusion that it is
unable to complete the task assigned it under its terms of
reference laid down in the General Assembly Resolution of
January 24, 1946.”13
- (d)
- On December 9, 1947, the Executive Committee on the Regulation of
Armaments agreed:
“2. U.S. Role in Committee 1 of the UNAEC
1. Action:
The Committee Agreed that when the
AEC resumes its meetings
the U.S. by its activities in Committee 1 should
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focus public
attention on the inadequacy of the Soviet proposals and on
the wide divergencies separating the majority and the
minority on the elements of an international control
system.
“3. Work of Committee 2 of UNAEC
1. Action:
The Committee Agreed that the
organization and staffing paper (RAC D–20/17)14 prepared in USUN should be studied by the Executive
Committee prior to a decision by this Government as to the
scope of the discussion in Committee 2. In the meantime the
present informal method of developing proposals on
“Organizational Structure” (item A–3(a)) should be
continued, it being understood
- (a)
- that this would not lead to discussion by the Atomic
Energy Commission of the other matters on the subject
list and
- (b)
- that nothing would be reported to Committee 2 which
would occasion a reservation on the part of any of the
majority group.
It was further understood that Mr. Osborn might at a later
date reopen with the Executive Committee the question of the
discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission of the balance of
the topics on the subject list.”
Appendix B
Discussion
suspension of work of atomic energy commission
13. Had there been an early meeting of minds on any point between the
Soviets and the majority, or had the course of Western-Soviet relations
in the last two years developed any cause for mutual confidence, it
would have been possible before now for the United States to have
entertained some definite proposals for negotiating a phasing plan, or
even a plan for strategic location of dangerous activities. The task has
now been rendered practically impossible as the disagreement has
crystallized and as Soviet-U.S. relations have deteriorated across the
board.
14. In the course of nearly two years of negotiation and study the
Governments of a majority of the Commission have agreed on the
principles essential to any fully effective system of international
control of atomic energy. The Commission has been unable to secure the
agreements of the Soviet Union to even the essential elements of such a
system. The Commission has not found any willingness on the part of the
Soviet Union to accept the nature and extent of participation in the
world community required of all nations in this field by the First and
Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. In this situation no
useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the
Commission level. The failure to achieve agreement on the international
control of atomic energy arises from a situation that is beyond the
competence of the Commission.
[Page 334]
a third report of atomic energy commission
15. A Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security
Council written in simple, brief, and understandable terms, and
encompassing the entire work of the Atomic Energy Commission, would be
extremely useful to the majority in debating the atomic energy question
in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.
16. The report should contain a conclusion along the lines set forth in
paragraph 14 above and should recommend that until such time as the
General “Assembly finds that the situation referred to in paragraph. 14
no longer exists, or until such time as the sponsors of the General
Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946 who are the permanent members of
the Atomic Energy Commission (Canada, China, France, U.S.S.R., United
Kingdom and United States) find, through prior consultation, that there
exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic
energy, negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission should be
suspended.
security council, and general assembly
consideration
17. The Security Council and the General Assembly should consider the
question of atomic energy, because
- (a)
- The agreement of 13 states which are or have been members of
the Atomic Energy Commission to the First and Second Reports of
the Commission constitutes the most advanced step toward the
establishment of a strong international organization yet made.
Security Council and General Assembly approval of the First and
Second Reports of AEQ therefore, are of greatest
importance.
- (b)
- Security Council and General Assembly debate would constitute
one of the best means of making the American people and all the
other members of the United Nations understand clearly the
nature of the problem of control and the extreme gravity to the
world of Soviet resistance to an effective system of
control.
- (c)
- The Atomic Energy Commission is a creature of the General
Assembly. After United Nations Atomic Energy Commission’s two
years unsuccessful attempt to obtain Soviet agreement it is
entirely appropriate for the General Assembly to consider the
matter again. Furthermore, the recommendation in paragraph 16,
being in effect a modification of the Commission’s terms of
reference contained in the General Assembly Resolution of
January 24, 1946, the General Assembly, itself must approve it
before it can go into effect.
- (d)
- Failure to submit the majority proposals to the examination of
the next regular General Assembly would give credence to a
Soviet charge that we were unwilling to put our case before
world opinion; it would put in question the sincerity of the
United States and the other nations of the majority; and it
would favor Soviet delaying tactics, through another year of
debate.
18. Subject to developments of overriding importance with respect, to the
General Assembly, the United States goal in the Assembly debate
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should be to get on record by
as large a majority as possible approval for the majority reports, and
rejection of the Soviet Union proposals.
19. The Third Report should recommend to the Security Council that it
transmit the Third Report along with the two previous reports of the
Commission, to the next regular session of the General Assembly as a
matter of special concern.
