IO Files: US/S/703, also US/A/1165

Position Paper Prepared at the United States Mission to the United Nations1

secret

Creation of a United Nations Security Guard

problem

To determine what position the United States should take with reference to the proposal of Secretary General Lie that he recruit and organize a United Nations security guard.

recommendations

1.
That the United States support the establishment of a United Nations security guard on the following bases:
a.
That its functions be: (1) to accompany a UN mission at its request in order to guard its personnel, quarters and property and in order to perform such other closely related duties as the mission may direct, in the performance of its assigned tasks; and (2) to perform such other similar duties as the Secretary General may determine in accordance with the authority granted him under the Charter;
b.
That the force be limited initially to 300–500 men, supplied with light arms, recruited as individuals and not as national contingents, on the same basis as the rest of the Secretariat and that the existing UN Guard be incorporated in it;
c.
That the force be financed as part of the regular budget of the UN.
2.
That the force be recruited by the Secretary General as part of the regular United Nations staff, pursuant to a special resolution of the [Page 30] next session of the General Assembly, and under a budget authorization.
3.
That it be made clear that such a force is entirely separate from the provision of armed forces under Article 43 and, for the present at least, from the creation of any special force for the policing of Jerusalem.
4.
That the Secretary General be informed that the United States is prepared to support action along the above lines at the next General Assembly, if the Secretary General, after consultation with other Members, considers there is substantial support for the proposal and decides to present such a recommendation to the Assembly.

background facts

1.
The Secretary General’s proposal was originally broached in a luncheon conversation with Secretary Marshall and Senator Austin on May 25, 1948. In a letter to Senator Austin on May 27 (Tab A)2 the Secretary indicated some important advantages to the idea. Senator Austin also supports the general concept of a small force under the Secretary General, but believes it undesirable to permit its use by the Security Council for enforcement purposes (Tab B).
The proposal, as elaborated somewhat in a speech by the Secretary General at Harvard on June 103 and as set out in a memorandum from him to certain officials of other Governments (Tab C), apparently envisages a force of from 1,000 to 5,000 men (1,200 has been specifically mentioned), to be recruited largely, if not entirely, from the smaller countries. The force would be under the direction of the Secretary General but subject to use by the other organs. It would be given light weapons and mobile equipment and would be based near UN Headquarters. It would be financed from a special budget and would cost approximately six million dollars if kept in the United States for training, or eight million dollars if foreign travel of a substantial portion were involved.
The following have been indicated as illustrative functions to provide armed guards for UN missions and property; to guard the polls in plebiscites; to maintain order in a small UN trust territory; to exercise control and police functions in the implementation of provisional measures under Article 40, and perhaps to execute a Security Council decision for the prevention of a breach of peace in a localized situation.
2.
The Secretary General recently sent 51 members of the regular UN staff (principally from the UN security guard and a majority [Page 31] of them US citizens) to serve as guards assigned to the Palestine Mediator and to perform such other duties as he may direct. Pursuant to a request from the Mediator, the Secretary General has been working on plans for the recruitment of a 1,000 man force from the three truce countries to implement the expected agreement for the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The United States expressed its agreement and stated that, since it can neither send U.S. forces nor itself recruit U.S. citizens for such a purpose, recruitment should be undertaken by the Secretary General.
3.
At the present time about 175 U.S. military personnel are attached to UN missions in Palestine, the Balkans, Kashmir and Indonesia.
4.
To assist in maintaining order during the Saar plebiscite in 1925 [1935], a force of 3,300 men was supplied by the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden pursuant to a decision of the League of Nations Council and operated under the authority of the Plebiscite Commission. This appears to be the only significant case under the League in which armed forces were used.

discussion

1. General. The proposal is basically sound and would have a number of advantages:

a.
Detachments from such a guard accompanying UN missions to arease of dispute would increase the effectiveness of those missions. Such a detachment would be able to furnish a considerable degree of real protection to the property, personnel and employees of the mission and to persons with whom the mission was called upon to deal. It could perform other services for the mission which would greatly facilitate the latter’s operations, including assistance on the problem of communication facilities. The presence of a small guard could be expected to have an important psychological effect on the members of the mission, and on the persons with whom the mission was called upon to deal. In most places where UN missions operate, the people do not understand the UN. To these people the guard would represent the determination of the United Nations to carry out its mission for the preservation of peace. It is believed that the symbolic effect of such guards would be out of all proportion to the actual capabilities of the detachment.
b.
The establishment of such a guard would likewise have a desirable psychological effect generally in demonstrating a determination of the Member Governments in making a beginning toward equipping the United Nations with force. It would be an earnest of their intention to make the United Nations effective. It would contribute to implementing the mandate in the Senate Resolution for additional steps to strengthen the United Nations.4
c.
General support might be expected in the General Assembly for such a proposal, provided the force were to be recruited on as wide a geographic basis as possible and the functions of the Secretary General so defined as to allay fears of misuse or of invasion of the Security Council’s authority. Under such conditions, USSR support might well be forthcoming since they have recently been endeavoring to have Russian soldiers included in the Palestine Guard.
d.
Together with, or apart from, any affirmative steps taken by the United States prior to or at the Assembly toward the implementation of Article 43, U.S. support of a UN guard would help counteract the expected Soviet attempt to place on United States shoulders the blame for preventing the United Nations from becoming effective in the security field.5

The principal specific aspects to be considered are: (a) the functions of the guard; (b) the method of its establishment; (c) its size, recruitment and cost; and (d) its relation to Article 43 forces and to the proposed Jerusalem Guard.

[Here follows discussion of the four subjects mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph.]

  1. This paper was approved by the Department of State in telegram 523 to New York, August 11, not printed (501.BB/8–1148). The general position of the Department of State on this question was outlined to the Secretary of Defense by the Secretary of State in a letter of August 4 which Secretary Marshall indicated was being sent primarily for information only, since the matter was considered not to involve substantial military interest (IO Files, Doc. US (P)/A.C.1/10).
  2. Tabs (A–D) are not printed.
  3. Address delivered by Mr. Trygve Lie to the Harvard Alumni Association. Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 10, 1948.
  4. A reference to the so-called “Vandenberg Resolution” (S.J. Res. 239, June 11, 1948); for text, see footnote 7, p. 25.
  5. For documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 311 ff.