Editorial Note

The report of the Interim Committee to the General Assembly on the problem of voting in the Security Council was submitted to the General Assembly in United Nations document A/578, July 15, 1918; for text, see GA (III/1), Suppl. No. 10, pages 1 ff.

The report consisted of four parts. Part I contained classification by categories of possible decisions of the Security Council and the criteria on which this classification was based: decisions which according to the Statute of the International Court of Justice were taken by an absolute majority of votes of six members of the Security Council, without distinction between permanent and non-permanent members; decisions which according to the Charter of the United Nations or the Court Statute were taken by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council, without distinction between permanent and non-permanent members; decisions which were of a procedural character [Page 235] within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Charter; and decisions which the Interim Committee recommended should be adopted by the vote of any seven members of the Security Council, whether the decisions were considered to be procedural or non-procedural.

Part II contained a list of 98 possible decisions of the Security Council (88 related to the Charter, 10 to the Statute of the International Court), with conclusions and comments as to the appropriate voting procedure applicable to each of them. This section made up the bulk of the report.

Part III dealt with the methods for implementation of the conclusions with regard to the items listed in Part II. Three principal methods were suggested: (1) implementation by means of interpretation of the Charter, (2) implementation on the basis of agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council, and (3) implementation on the basis of convoking a general conference to review the Charter.

Part IV of the report—“Conclusions”—read:

“A. The Interim Committee presents the following conclusions for the approval of the General Assembly:

“1. That the General Assembly

Recommend to the permanent members and the other members of the Security Council that they deem the following items in the list of possible decisions of the Security Council to be procedural: [36 items listed by number]; and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly.

“2. That the General Assembly

Recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they agree that the following items in the list of possible decisions of the Security Council should be adopted by the vote of any seven members, whether the decisions are considered procedural or nonprocedural: [21 items listed numerically]; and that steps be taken to make this agreement effective.

“3. That the General Assembly

Recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that:

(a)
Wherever possible, consultations should take place among them concerning important decisions to be taken by the Security Council;
(b)
They agree among themselves to consult with one another, wherever possible, before a vote is taken, if their unanimity is required to enable the Security Council to function effectively;
(c)
They agree that, if there is not unanimity, the minority of the permanent members, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of all the United Nations, would only exercise the veto when they consider the question of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole, and that they would explain on what grounds they consider this condition to be present;
(d)
They agree that they will not exercise their veto against a proposal simply because it does not go far enough to satisfy them;
(e)
They agree, for the purposes of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the-Charter, on a definition of a dispute, taking into account the proposal contained in the comment on item 22, part II, of the present report. [See GA (III/1), Suppl. No. 10, page 8.]

“4. That the General Assembly

Recommend to the Members of the United Nations that, in agreements conferring functions on the Security Council, such conditions of voting within this body be provided as would exclude the application of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members.

“B. Whereas the deficiencies observed in the present functioning of the Organization of the United Nations require due consideration,

“The Interim Committee recommends to the General Assembly to consider at its third regular session whether the time has come or not to call a general conference, as provided for in Article 109 of the Charter.”

For a discussion of the position adopted by the United States toward, this report, see infra, document SD/A/C.1/135, August 24, 1948.