811.3393/6–2047
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)
Dear Mr. Secretary: The receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum of June 20, 1947 on the subject, “Naval Activities Affecting China”.
At our conference on February 20, 1947 we reached general agreement as to the desired strength, subject to review after six months, of the United States Marine forces in China. General agreement was also reached as to the desirable extent of fleet deployment in Chinese waters.
The various points raised in numbered paragraph 4 of your memorandum are agreed, except as sub-paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) are modified by comment herein.
The State Department feels that it would be unwise at this time for the Chinese Government to divert any of its depleted financial or military resources to developing a new military arm in the form of a Marine Corps. For this reason, and in view of the considerations [Page 971] mentioned in paragraph 5 of your memorandum, it is recommended that this Government refuse training or other support for the proposed Chinese Marine Corps in the immediate future. When conditions in China become more stable, the organization of a Chinese Marine Corps under the Naval Advisory Group, or the amphibious training of some Army units, would appear to be a normal activity tending toward establishment of a balanced Chinese military force.
The discussion which you mention as having taken place among Embassy personnel in Nanking concerning future activities of the Navy in China was, in all probability, a discussion in the Embassy Executive Office as a result of a request from this Department for comment on a list of properties which the Navy Department had requested the Department of State to acquire for the use of the West Pacific Fleet. In the opinion of this Department, it is desirable from a political point of view that the number of United States armed forces ashore in China should be maintained at the minimum compatible with United States interests, and that every effort be made to avoid the appearance of maintaining permanent United States military garrisons in that country. With these considerations in mind it is felt that it would be desirable for the Navy Department to review the shore activities at Shanghai mentioned in paragraph 4(e) of your memorandum, as well as similar activities at Tsingtao, with a view to transferring them so far as practicable to floating units.
With the passing of extraterritoriality, it does not appear appropriate or desirable that United States armed forces be maintained ashore in China on a permanent basis for the avowed purpose of protecting American interests there. This Government must look to the Chinese authorities to assume this responsibility. Our naval forces afloat in Chinese waters should be able to deal with emergency situations imperiling Americans residing at seaports. It would be manifestly impractical to maintain armed forces at inland points for the protection of American lives. When danger threatens, those Americans should, as in the past, be advised to withdraw from interior points to seaports.
While the situation in China is getting rapidly no better, it appears too unstable at this time to warrant final decisions on the major points you raise. Before considering the above views as a firm basis for future planning, I suggest we await General Wedemeyer’s report,58 expected about September 15.
Faithfully yours,
- Dated September 19, Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 764.↩