Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

811.3393/6–2047

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

Washington, 20 June 1947.

Subject: Naval Activities Affecting China.

1. Information has been received that there has recently been discussion among Embassy personnel in Nanking concerning withdrawing naval forces, activities and agencies from China in the near future.

2. The Nationalist position in China is deteriorating, with increased momentum, in the political, economic, financial and military fields. The withdrawal of naval forces, other than those at Tientsin already scheduled for evacuation as soon as material and equipment can be shipped or disposed of, might well have the following consequences:

(a) Premature withdrawal would contribute materially to the precipitation of an even more adverse situation in China.

(b) If such a situation did develop and involved mob action against foreign nationals, such action might be made the occasion for the entry of Russian pacification and protection forces to such points as Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Shanghai. Such a Russian entry could be justified by the U. S. S. R., in the absence of U. S. forces, because of the large number of Russian nationals in China requiring protection—particularly if Russian nationals were the main object of such hostile demonstration.

(c) Such a Russian entry into North China would enhance the Russian position in East Asia and would facilitate permanent occupation or domination of selected positions in Korea, Manchuria and other provinces of China.

(d) If U. S. forces were withdrawn and such withdrawal seriously weakened the position of the Nationalist Government, the lives and property of U. S. citizens in China might be jeopardized. In this connection the British have indicated concern over possible civil disturbances in China which may endanger lives and property of British nationals, and have inquired as to what plan the U. S. Government had under consideration for protection of U. S. nationals in similar circumstances and whether such plan included mutual assistance to British.

(e) It does not appear at this time likely that the Communists can overthrow the Nationalist Government and assume central national authority. Nevertheless, further withdrawal on our part may facilitate breakdown of the Nationalist Government into two or more regional governments. This could result in the passing of Manchuria and additional areas in North China to Communistic control. In such an eventuality the final control of the Shantung province might well depend on the mere presence or absence of the U. S. naval forces in Tsingtao.

(f) Our forces in China are numerically inadequate for extensive operations. However, their presence has a far-reaching effect. Their withdrawal would lend encouragement to Russian expansion and even more seriously would be interpreted by other nations as willingness to capitulate in the face of Communist penetration. Further, it would indicate to China that our long standing friendship and support was in process of being terminated.

3. The mere discussion or creation of uncertainty concerning continuance of naval activities in China tends to weaken our support of China.

4. It is recommended that the following points be agreed upon as a firm basis for further planning:

(a) Delivery of vessels to China under Public Law 512 to be completed as heretofore planned.

(b) A joint Military Advisory Group to be formed when legislation permits. Meanwhile, naval personnel sent to China to form the Naval Advisory Group to continue training Chinese crews for ships to be delivered under Public Law 512, and under ComNavWesPac to facilitate delivery and activation of those ships.

(c) Naval activities at Tsingtao to be continued for service in connection with (a) and (b) and in support of forces afloat. This includes a Marine security unit of about 3500.

(d) The naval forces in the Western Pacific to be maintained at the strength considered necessary by the Chief of Naval Operations. They now consist of one cruiser division, one and one-half squadrons of destroyers, and supporting auxiliary ships, augmented at times by visits of carriers and support ships. Their normal base is Tsingtao.

(e) Naval logistic and administrative units to be maintained at Shanghai. They include port facilities, mail supplies, communications, weather central and minor associated services.

(f) Naval activities in Nanking to continue to include the Naval Attaché, the Embassy executive office, and a small number of naval advisory group personnel.

(g) Dependents of naval personnel to be permitted to remain in China for the present.

5. It is further recommended that decision be reached on the training of Chinese Marines. Admiral Cooke has been informed that the Generalissimo has directed the formation of a Chinese Marine Corps with a strength of two regiments. It is expected that the Navy will be asked to provide Marine Corps instructors at Tsingtao. This would require a number of instructors (initially about six officers and twenty-five enlisted). The proposal might, if acceded to, lead to further requests involving increased numbers, and might also lead to requests for equipment. However, such a training task can be assumed if it is desired to give support to the Nationalist Government in that manner.

Forrestal