Office of the Historian

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State 29

undated

Mr. Secretary: I have read the attached memorandum30 and discussed it with Mr. Vincent. As I understand it, the following points are made in the memorandum:

1.
Military assistance to China in the sense of supplying ammunition to the National Armies will not produce the result of eliminating the Communist organization and Armies by force. The sort of assistance which would be necessary to accomplish this result would require large scale American intervention in China, which would require our participation in the civil war and our taking over the direction of military operations and administration. This large scale intervention is not regarded as practicable or desirable. With this conclusion I concur.
2.
While supplying ammunition will not result in the defeat of the Chinese Communists, it will be of substantial help in preventing the Communists from administering defeats to the National forces. Furthermore, since the United States has armed some 39 Chinese divisions with American equipment, there is a moral obligation not to cut off these divisions from supply of ammunition suitable to their equipment. It may be stated more forcefully that there is a moral obligation to assist the Chinese Government in obtaining this ammunition. The fact that many elements in China feel that any help we may give the National Government supports the extreme reactionary wing of the Generalissimo’s supporters, is mentioned as a counterweight. Nevertheless, the conclusion stands that there is an obligation not to hinder and possibly to help in the procurement of ammunition.
3.
Action and possible action to meet the obligation mentioned in paragraph 2 above is as follows:
(a)
We are turning over some 130,000,000 rounds of 7.92 ammunition as surplus property, and we are supplying China with transport planes and spare parts for all types of planes and other supplies for the 8⅓ Air Group Program. This, however, will take care of only immediate needs and for a short time only.
(b)
We are investigating supplies of ammunition in the Philippines. These, as I understand it, are surplus to our needs and might he sold for small amounts as surplus to the Chinese. Although the amount of such ammunition which is available is unknown, it is estimated [Page 856] that this again will not be long range assistance but is of a more immediate and short range character.
(c)
In order to have a more stable supply of ammunition the Chinese will have to purchase in the United States. I am informed that possible manufacturers of the desired ammunition are almost entirely under contract with the United States Government. Therefore, I am told that the Government must either release the contractors from their obligation and permit them, as a matter of direct sale, to manufacture for and deliver to the Chinese, or the United States Government must have the ammunition manufactured for it and then itself sell the ammunition as surplus to the Chinese. This latter course produces obvious difficulties since currently produced material cannot, as a general rule, be regarded as surplus.

I understand that Mr. Vincent recommends, and I concur, that the ammunition in the Philippines, if investigations confirm present beliefs, be turned over to the Chinese Government as surplus. He also recommends that, if you and the President believe that the Chinese should be given access to current production in the United States, it be done if possible by having the United States Government release manufacturers from their obligation to it and permit them to enter into direct dealings with the Chinese Government. If this course is practicable, it seems to me preferable to having our own Government buy the ammunition and resell it.

Dean Acheson
  1. An attached note by the Secretary of State suggested that General Wedemeyer might read over this memorandum and the one supra “on which no decision has been made”. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was appointed on July 9 as Special Representative of President Truman to go to China on a fact-finding mission. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 635 ff.↩
  2. Supra.↩