Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)27
Memorandum for Use in Presenting to the President the Problem of Military Assistance to the Chinese National Armies
The recent deterioration in the military position of the Chinese Nationalist armies confronts us with the very serious issue of whether or not and to what extent we should afford further military assistance to the Chinese armies. Although incompetence of the Chinese high [Page 853] command under Chiang Kai-shek and a lowering of troop morale account in very large measure for reverses, a shortage of ammunition is also an important factor.
Prior to the end of the war we undertook to train and equip 39 Chinese divisions. The training of these divisions was discontinued on V–J Day, but American equipment including rifles was supplied. The extent to which the Chinese have lost this equipment is not known, but there are known to be a considerable number of Chinese divisions dependent upon American ammunition, the supply of which is running low.
Since V–J Day military lend-lease to China has approximated $700 million. We have transported Chinese troops and we have supplied them with equipment and ammunition. Furthermore, we have abandoned to the Chinese National armies ammunition dumps in the neighborhood of Tientsin and Tsingtao containing some 7,000 tons of munitions. We have withdrawn objection to the issuance of export permits for the shipment of military supplies to China. We are now in the process of turning over to the Chinese some 130 million rounds of 7.92 ammunition as surplus property for the “Generalissimo” rifles used by Chinese troops. We are further implementing the 8⅓ Air Group Program by supplying China with transport planes and spare parts for all types of planes with other military and civil end-use equipment supplied under this program.
Further military assistance to Chinese armies raises very grave issues. Quite apart from the reaction of the Chinese Communists to such assistance there is known to be a large and articulate body of Chinese opinion opposed to American military support for the present Chinese Government. The reaction of the USSR to American military assistance to the Chinese Government is also a critical question. There is the additional question of whether, in view of the demonstrated incompetence of the Chinese National army command, military assistance from us will in fact enable the Chinese armies to defeat the Chinese Communists or even to maintain an effective defense.
American military assistance which would enable the National armies to defeat the Chinese Communist armies would have to be on a very large scale and would lead to our direct participation in the civil war. We would probably have to take over direction of Chinese military operations and administration and remain in China for an indefinite period, thereby undertaking a strategic commitment in China inconsistent with JCS 1769/1,28 which examines the problem [Page 854] of United States assistance to other countries from the standpoint of “urgency of need and importance to the national security of the United States” and places “China very low on the list of countries which should be given such assistance”.
On the other hand, the fact that we have trained and equipped a considerable number of Chinese divisions and the further fact that these divisions are now dependent upon the supply of American ammunition places us in a position of some responsibility for the continued effectiveness of those divisions. We could probably arrange to supply on reasonable terms these Chinese divisions with American ammunition. There is believed to be considerable surplus ammunition now in the Philippines. Limited assistance of this kind could be given without bringing us directly into the civil war and probably without arousing widespread Chinese resentment or provoking the USSR to take counter measures with regard to the Chinese Communists. These, of course, are calculated risks which we take.
It is recommended that we take prompt measures to build up China’s reserves of American ammunition; that this be done in a manner to avoid publicity in so far as possible; that we as a Government stay in the background as much as possible and endeavor to direct the Chinese Government towards private purchase of ammunition if practical. In taking this action we should have clearly in mind that our objective is prevention of the collapse of the Chinese National armies. It is not believed to be good or feasible American policy to commit ourselves to a program of giving military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in the very substantial quantity and quality that would be required to eliminate Chinese Communist opposition in China. In the final analysis the Chinese themselves must find a more fundamental solution to the problem.
In view of (1) the administrative inefficiencies of the Chinese themselves; (2) the magnitude of the task of dominating China; (3) the easily-aroused Chinese resentment at foreign interference; (4) the lack of industrial development and material resources in China; and (5) the inability of the Russians to give the material assistance necessary to make China a going concern, it is our considered opinion that a USSR-dominated China is not a danger of sufficient immediacy or probability to warrant committing ourselves to the far-reaching consequences which would ensue from our direct and large-scale involvement in the Chinese civil war on the side of the Chinese National Government.