893.00 Manchuria/6–1947: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 19—2:45 p.m.]
1345. President Chiang asked me to call on him late this afternoon. He began by stating that the Manchurian situation was extremely serious. It would be impossible to maintain it much longer. The Communists, aided by Russia, had been growing stronger. The fighting at Ssupingchieh had been especially bloody. The fall of that city which he anticipated would mean the loss of Changchun and Kirin. He said that because of your assistance in transporting troops to Manchuria and in many other matters he felt profoundly grateful and felt that this problem should be reported to you at once. He also sought your advice as to future policy. He had hesitated to distress me by admitting this danger and indeed had hoped that it might be averted. He himself had only fully realized its gravity 3 days earlier. A decision as to all of Manchuria must be made in a very few days. The loss of the cities mentioned would involve that of Mukden, and others. It has been impossible to reach an understanding with Russia over Dairen. Russia has insisted that the municipal officers sent there must cooperate with the puppet regime already established there, and refuses to permit national troops to be landed there—all in violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty.71
The only way to gain Chinese rights there would be by armed force. The Communists are constantly gaining in numbers and equipment. Their losses in manpower are quickly replaced. Chinese losses cannot be filled and equipment has been steadily reduced. Their tactics bear a striking resemblance to those used by Russia against Germany. The loss of Manchuria would threaten North China and the danger would spread all over the country. He wished to have all of this reported as promptly as possible to you, and requested that he be informed as soon as a reply is received. At the conclusion of his statement he asked for my opinion. I replied that it might be that the time had come for him to take emergency measures such as organizing a small but carefully selected group to work with himself, men respected by all and able to take responsibility as well as to form a team; to reduce expenditures by at least temporarily discontinuing all measures not needed for the emergency period; to make an announcement to the people that if the Communist Party finally refused the latest peace proposals the people of the country should hold them responsible; if they wished to preserve the democratic way of life as to be effected soon [Page 192] under constitutional government they should all work together to save the nation from the threatened danger; to this end all should work for the common purpose and contribute what they could of service or wealth; the Govt should, respecting civic liberties, carry out the most immediate reforms with the courage and ruthless impartiality required by the crisis and in all such ways win back popular support or ask to be relieved of the task; that I had always believed that such a revolutionary program would attract the thinking people, especially students and other supposed Leftists; that he should allocate responsibility (for instance military affairs) with a minimum of red tape, and himself tour the country making speeches and arousing the populace to rally to the new movement; that with the people behind him he need not fear the Communist military strength nor their other activities, and should continue to keep the door wide open for a resumption of peace negotiations; that hopelessness and defeatism were paralyzing those who wanted to do something for the nation but under some such determined, progressive leadership they could be inspired to new hope and effort; and finally that I felt sure such a program would win abundant sympathy in America and elsewhere over the world. At the end, he said that he had been thinking along very much the same lines.
- Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; for text, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 300.↩