893.00 Manchuria/6–2047: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 20—10:40 a.m.]
1356. In view of Generalissimo’s statement of his alleged intentions regarding Manchuria (Embtel 1345, June 19, 11 p.m.) Embassy submits following estimate of situation.
Fundamental weakness Govt military position Manchuria stems from (1) over-extended initial deployment and (2) incompetency of High Command, centered in General Tu Li-ming. Previous southward drives by Communist forces were contained by American-trained New First Army commanded by its wartime leader General Sun Li-jen. Presence of New First Army along Sungari River and American-trained New Sixth Army to its east offset for a time handicaps of faulty deployment and bungling leadership.
General Sun’s removal from command New First Army by General Tu Li-ming, however, followed by several military defeats, has materially decreased morale and fighting qualities these troops. This, in turn, is now reflected in entire command and is manifested most [Page 193] strikingly by familiar Chinese defeatist strategy of holding isolated towns behind walls and ditches.
Present dispersion Govt forces, which are now largely defense-minded, plays into hands of Communist strategy of isolating urban from rural areas. Furthermore, continuing interdiction or destruction of communications by Communists accelerates present overall economic deterioration.
In order to arrest, or at least slow down, present trend of affairs Manchuria, a decision for withdrawal of forces in central Manchuria for regrouping in Mukden area seems mandatory. General Tu Liming is believed incapable of conducting such a withdrawal and consequently it would seem necessary to replace him simultaneously with the taking of a decision to effect such a withdrawal.
The Generalissimo may be forced eventually to withdraw from all of Manchuria but Embassy believes that such action under present circumstances would be premature and highly undesirable. In the light of our position in southern Korea, the thus far unsuccessful Chinese efforts to reach agreement with the Russians vis-à-vis Dairen, and the manifest undesirability of unopposed Communist control in Manchuria, which will have repercussions throughout Asia, it is a matter of urgency that the Central Govt maintain a strong salient in southern Manchuria including at least the Mukden-Fushun area and the Fushun and Peiping [Penhsi?] collieries with the necessary rail communications thereto, at least from the port of Hulutao.
As indicated above, steps could be taken, under intelligent and aggressive leadership, to alleviate present situation. Hazards of partial withdrawal for regrouping on Mukden are considerable and it may be expected that all Peace Preservation Corps units and possibly half regular units would be lost. This would appear better course of action, however, than eventual total loss if present trend events continues unchecked. There is no guarantee that even south Manchuria salient can be held but immediate consolidation there is desirable even as a preliminary to total abandonment Manchuria.
It seems to Embassy as unlikely that Generalissimo has not considered that withdrawal from Kirin and Changchun is condition precedent to further withdrawal as it is that he only became aware of seriousness of Manchuria situation 3 days ago.
Although for the moment the spotlight is on Manchuria, general Govt military situation in north China is also precarious and stems to the same degree from the same cause, namely ineptitude of High Command.