740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1747: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
priority
10. As indicated in our Tfgcg 560, December 31 to CINCAFPAC,7 General Brown8 on same day conferred with [Mrs. Rhee], Kim Koo9 and two others at Rhee’s house and pointed out that certain parts of Rhee’s message were inflammatory and unsuitable for release, that it was the duty of Korean leaders to restrain and not incite the people, [Page 599] and that Rhee’s pretensions that the President, Secretary of State and General MacArthur10 supported his views could not be published as they were untrue, such views being quite a[t] variance with the fixed policy of the US. The Korean conferees made it plain that if disturbances occurred in the south, it would bring the conditions of Korea to the world’s attention and hasten Korean independence. General Brown reached the conclusion that although those Koreans did not want open revolt which might get beyond their control, they did not mind uprisings that would keep Korea in the international spotlight and were not averse to the sacrifice of some life in the process.
The publication on January 11 of our reply to Chistiakov, which extreme rightists say sells them down the river, seems to have been one precipitant of Rhee’s plans, an account of which talk given by General Hodge in paragraph 10 of his ZGCG 40 to General MacArthur of January 13. On the 15th, following a meeting of representatives of Rhee’s and Kim Koo’s henchmen, some 30 rightist organizations issued a manifesto complaining about the delay of the Allies in settling the Korean questions and calling on them to cancel the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow agreement and set up a provisional government immediately as the “only way to save Koreans from the conditions of slavery under military government”.
In addition a joint message along the same lines addressed to the Allied Board was drawn up. The message referred to Rhee as “our trustworthy representative” to the UN Assembly. In the LNG [Legislative] Assembly 40 rightist members (a majority at the moment) on the 14th introduced a motion to oppose trusteeship but action was averted by adjourning the session for the 20th.11
Also Kim Koo and two of his main supporters called on General Hodge about trusteeship this week and remained obdurate in the face of arguments against anti-trusteeship agitation. From underground we have seized inflammatory anti-trusteeship and anti-military government handbills in course of printing by Rightist Youth Alliance, and have intercepted a message to Rhee from his headquarters here that demonstrations would begin on the 18th. We have been reliably informed that defections from military government and the policy [police?] may occur at the same time. According to the same source [Page 600] Kim Koo and Cho So Ang, his Under “Foreign Minister”, will assume responsibility for the demonstrations and seek martyrdom. In the last few days we have intercepted messages from Rhee to his headquarters indicating he is uneasy about possible repercussions to the developments from the demonstrations. His concern seems to be lest they assume the form of or be construed as an anti-foreign campaign. Measures have been taken by the leaders in Seoul to meet a threat to American personnel, since the neutrality or loyalty to military government of the police cannot be absolutely relied upon. Also on the 16th General Hodge issued a special statement on the anti-trusteeship covenant (this will be repeated in my ensuing telegram),12 while steps are being taken through General Brown to dissuade passage of an anti-trusteeship resolution in the assembly. It is thought here that the position of the American authorities could be eased by some action in Washington. The Department for example might consider a discussion by the Acting Secretary at an early press conference of the current anti-trusteeship agitation in Seoul, laying it on the line, so to speak. It might be pointed out that the agitation cannot have the slightest effect on the international program for Korean independence laid down in the Moscow decision, of which the US played a major role in formulating and to which it loyally adheres, that the agitators offer no practicable plan for independence in the light of actualities, and that agitating elements by their actions only prejudice their opportunities for participation in the forthcoming provisional government.
- Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. viii, p. 785.↩
- Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, chief U.S. representative on the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission, then recessed.↩
- Head of the so-called Chungking exile group of Koreans, of the Korean Representative Democratic Council, and of the Korean Independence Party (Hankook Dok Lib Dang).↩
- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan.↩
- At the meeting on the 20th, the resolution was passed, despite explanations by Generals Hodge and Lerch at a private meeting with members of the Legislative Assembly. The vote was regarded as a defeat for the middle-ground group. The situation was reported in telegram 15, January 27, from Seoul, which emphasized the unpopularity in South Korea of the idea of trusteeship (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747). Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch was Military Governor of the U.S. Zone (South Korea).↩
- Telegram 11, not printed; for statement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1947, p. 210.↩