Office of the Historian

740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947

The British Embassy to the Department of State 64

Communicated Orally

The Foreign Office have sent us the following account of the Canberra meeting of representatives of the British Dominions. They make it clear that this is in no way a final report and does not purport to be exhaustive. The Conference was an exchange of views on the broad issues, and detailed discussion of technical matters, for which in any case there would have been insufficient time, was never contemplated, so that no statements of agreed policy were formulated and the Conference entailed no kind of commitment on any government represented at it.

2.
The consensus of opinion was that all countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission should be entitled to representation in the framing of the peace settlement and that in addition Pakistan’s claims for separate representation were incontestable. Decisions at the conference should be by two-thirds majority on matters of substance but by a simple majority on drafting and procedural matters; the use of the veto should be avoided. Washington was generally favoured [Page 533] as the venue of the conference. It was generally hoped that the conference would begin with a short initial meeting at a Governmental level as soon as possible.
3.
There was general agreement that the treaty could hardly do other than endorse the territorial agreements made at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam. In view of the uncertain future of Korea it was suggested for consideration that it might be advisable to leave Quelpart Island under Japanese sovereignty in spite of the fact that its population is Korean. The question was raised (but left unanswered) as to how the advantages of civil aviation bases in the Southern Kuriles could be obtained. It was generally contemplated that the Ryukyus and the Bonins should continue under United States administration presumably under some form of strategic trusteeship.
4.
The conference agreed that Japan should remain completely disarmed and demilitarised, that armament manufacture and naval shipbuilding should be prohibited and that there should be careful supervision to ensure the observance of these sections of the treaty.
5.
The majority of Delegations favoured the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft in Japan; internal operation by Japan should be confined to a limited number of imported civil aircraft for specified purposes and under strict control.
6.
The consensus of opinion was that the democratic principles broadly outlined in the Potsdam declaration and already included in the Japanese constitution should be written into the treaty but that the constitution itself should not be so written.
7.
There was general support for the view that provision should be made in the treaty for the protection of civil rights of alien residents in Japan who should be accorded treatment at least no worse than that enjoyed by Japanese nationals in their own countries and in accordance with generally approved international standards.
8.
On economic matters the majority of the Delegates were agreed that—
(a)
The manufacture of synthetic oil and rubber should be completely prohibited;
(b)
Although it would be impracticable to include detailed provisions in the treaty referring to the freedom of trades unions, the general principle of freedom of association should be included leaving the Japanese to work out the details for themselves;
(c)
It would be a mistake to incorporate any scheme of land reform in the treaty;
(d)
The process of dissolving the Zaibatsu should be completed by the Japanese Government as soon as possible;
(e)
The treaty should not attempt to lay down details regarding such subjects as economic equality, maintenance of full employment, fiscal policy;
(f)
Japanese external assets should be taken into account in assessing total reparations and their percentage distribution (Delegates did not discuss the division of shares of reparations in general):
(g)
Japanese shipping should be limited to vessels not exceeding 5000 gross registered tons. The construction of vessels should be limited to those not exceeding a stipulated speed. Japan’s total merchant shipping tonnage should be limited to a maximum sufficient for the conduct of such trade as the Allies deem necessary.
9.
With regard to post-treaty control the general feeling of the conference was that all the countries who share in the initial drafting of the treaty (i.e. the eleven Far Eastern Commission Powers plus any agreed additions) should be represented on whatever supervisory body may be set up. It was not thought that any military occupation force in Japan would be necessary after the treaty but it was considered that forces outside Japan should be available for enforcing the treaty if necessary. It was recognised that special regard should be paid to the views of the United States Government on this subject in view of the special responsibilties already undertaken by the United States. Voting in the supervisory body should be by simple majority. The conference gave consideration to the United Kingdom view that it might be desirable to conclude an agreement between the controlling powers separate from the treaty of peace. In order to minimise possible delays the treaty should come into force upon ratification by two-thirds of the the treaty-making powers.
10.
The conference recognised that provision should be made for the acceptance of the treaty by belligerents who did not participate in the drafting.
11.
The conference agreed that Japan should be compelled to observe the international whaling conventions if it were agreed that Japan should be allowed to participate in whaling at all.
12.
Amongst other aspects of the settlement discussed in general terms by the conference were atomic research, education, emigration, Japanese membership of international bodies.
13.
Copies of four documents submitted to the Conference by the U.K. delegation as a purely provisional expression of their views and in no way binding on His Majesty’s Government are enclosed. With reference to that relating to the territorial, political and general clauses, we attach some importance to a careful wording of the preamble of the treaty which might have useful and long-term political and propaganda effects both on the Japanese people and on the countries which were overrun and devastated by Japan.
[Washington], October, 1947.
  1. Presented to Mr. Borton by Mr. Graves on October 9.↩