740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947
The British Embassy to the Department of State 63
We should be interested to learn whether the State Department has reached any conclusion on the course to be followed in the light of the Soviet and Chinese attitude over the opening of Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations.
We see an advantage in pressing ahead with plans for making peace with Japan with, or without, Russian participation because, in the interests of the whole of Asia, we wish to avoid the same state of continued uncertainty as exists in Europe and the blame which will attach to Western powers if they are responsible for delay. We also have in mind that 1948 will be a very busy year and one in which the Presidential election takes place.
It seems unlikely that the Russians will participate in a conference of eleven or in the Peace settlement except on their own terms. But we do not consider that the Russians are justified in insisting on the exclusive competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers. They are, however, likely to stick to their principle of demanding “Great Power unanimity”, and it may be that the least that would satisfy them at a conference of eleven would be a Steering Committee of some sort. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government would undoubtedly try to use this for obstructive purposes and we have little confidence that they would be less obstructive in the Far East than in Europe.
In our view it would be possible to conclude the Peace Treaty with Japan without Russian participation. The situation resulting from such a treaty would be influenced largely by United States plans for the withdrawal of their troops from Japan and the degree to which Communist penetration of Japan could be prevented. Control machinery might not be effective in this respect, although we are inclined to think that the Japanese themselves might take active steps against it if political conditions were suitable.
If the United States, Great Britain and the other countries concerned were to show determination to go ahead without Russia we very much doubt whether China would consider it in her interests to stand out.
Nevertheless, we have to take account of the effect for many years to come of concluding a Japanese settlement in which Russia is not included, and which she will undoubtedly attack in Japan as an imperialist diktat, and in China as an attempt to build up Japan against China. For both the United States and Great Britain it would probably be valuable in the future to be able to demonstrate irrefutably [Page 532] that Russia stayed out of her own free will. In order to make this clear, we consider that if Russia persists in her refusal to participate, and a conference is convened in her absence, the door should be left open for her to join the conference at any time. Furthermore, that the Treaty should be drafted so as to meet her legitimate claims, and that the conference should keep her informed of progress made, and that the draft should even perhaps be submitted to her for comment and amendment at some stage, though in so doing we should have to devise means to prevent the Russians from obstructing the progress of the Conference. For the same reason it might even be desirable, if the Russians do not bring the matter up themselves, to initiate further discussions of procedure with them either during the United Nations Assembly Meeting or the November Conference. It would also be necessary, in our opinion, to make it clear that the procedure adumbrated is not aimed at Russia’s large and legitimate interests in the Far East.
The foregoing represents merely the lines on which we have been thinking and the intention of this conversation is to ascertain whether our views are in general accord with those of the State Department.
- Presented to Mr. Borton by Mr. Graves on October 9.↩