740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. F. C. Everson, First Secretary, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director, FE |
Mr. Graves and Mr. Everson called at my request in order that a reply could be given orally to the informal notes on thinking in the British Government which Mr. Graves had left on October 9. I reported that there had been informal discussions in New York between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister on the Chinese position in reference to the question of voting procedure. I stated that the Chinese Foreign Minister had made it patently clear that the Chinese were anxious to go along with us on Japanese Peace Treaty matters but that he had emphasized the fact that they considered themselves to be in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in such areas as Sinkiang, Manchuria and North China, and that they did not wish to be placed in a position which would give the Soviets an excuse to abrogate the Sino-Soviet Treaty. I reported that Dr. Wang had offered on his own iniative to sound out informally Mr. Vyshinsky and possibly others in New York on the Chinese attitude toward some sort of a compromise proposal. We supposed that such a proposal might include a voting procedure similar to that in the Far Eastern Commission. I further stated that Dr. Wang was informed that we had no objection to such an approacch but that at the same time it was made abundantly clear to him that our agreeing to his making such an approach in no way implied that we had changed our position on the voting question, or that we had given serious consideration to changing our position. I added that Dr. Wang had already seen Mr. Vyshinsky but that he was awaiting a further reply from him.
Mr. Graves commented that one reason for their suggestion was to find out whether there was any possibility of an early decision on our position in reference to going ahead without the Soviets, but that in view of the complications raised by the Chinese position he assumed that no decision would be made in reference to our attitude toward Soviet participation until after the Chinese situation had been clarified. I told Mr. Graves that such was essentially the case.
[Page 536]Mr. Graves further stated that Mr. Everson would be taking over his duties on the Treaty while he was away, and I stated we would keep them informed of significant developments.
In answer to a question by Mr. Everson as to whether we felt the Chinese were sincere in placing their emphasis on the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I replied that we had no reason to believe otherwise. In reply to a further question as to whether I had any information on the contents of Dr. Evatt’s conversation with the President, I said I knew nothing more about it than had appeared in the press.