740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Mr. Graves called at his request to leave some informal notes62 on thinking in the British Government in reference to a Japanese Peace Conference. Mr. Graves stated that he had been called home for two weeks’ consultation on Peace Treaty discussions and they would appreciate the reaction of the State Department to the views which [Page 530] they set forth. Following these discussions, it is likely that the British Government will present something formally to us on the subject. As Mr. Graves leaves early Friday afternoon, October 10, any comments which we may wish to make will have to be prepared immediately.
Mr. Graves stated that in their view there were two reasons which made it particularly important to go ahead with a Peace Conference now. The first of these is the fact that it may be extremely difficult six months or a year hence to develop the same interest in convening a Peace Conference which exists at present and if such is the case the Western powers could be accused of having acted in bad faith. The second point is that Mr. Graves doubts whether it would be possible to convene a Conference just prior to an election. They have concluded, therefore, that we should be prepared to go ahead without the Soviets, and that if we decide to do so the Chinese would find it to their interest to go along with us.
In discussing Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I told Mr. Graves that I had personally interpreted this article as not preventing the Chinese from making a separate peace as the present Japanese Government had already renounced aggressive intentions. I added, however, that officers in Le had pointed out that the clause “the high contracting parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan”, was separate and distinct from the second part of the article and that hence the Chinese Government may feel they cannot enter into negotiations unless the Soviets participate. Mr. Graves pointed out, however, that if the Chinese participated in negotiation to which the Soviets had been invited but had refused to participate, the Chinese would be in a different legal position from a position wherein they alone entered into negotiations with Japan.
In answer to a question as to their reaction to Dr. Evatt’s opinion that the Soviets would probably wish to join the Conference later to confirm their claims for the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, Mr. Graves answered that they did not think that would affect Soviet participation but that our position on Korea would have a direct bearing on Soviet participation. In other words, if it were clear to the Soviets that we intended to stay in Korea and prevent the Sovietization of Korea, they would be more likely to join the peace discussions.
I told Mr. Graves that I did not wish to comment at the moment on the points raised by him, but that I would try to have something available for him tomorrow.
- Infra.↩