740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen)
| Participants: | Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister |
| Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen |
In continuance of the conversation which the Secretary had with Dr. Wang54 concerning the procedures for the Japanese peace settlement, [Page 520] I had dinner last night with Dr. Wang and Wellington Koo. Dr. Wang developed the point of view of the Chinese Government concerning procedures for the Japanese peace conference which he had briefly outlined to the Secretary previously.
The Chinese Government believes that the most practicable and wisest method of handling the preparation for the Japanese peace treaty would be to adopt the membership and voting procedures of the Far Eastern Commission. The Chinese Government considers this preferable to their original idea to having an informal Four-power meeting in New York for an exchange of views on this subject.
Dr. Wang explained that the attitudes of his Government were based on the following two factors which he was giving in frankness and in confidence:
- 1.
- Chinese national sensibility would be wounded and there would be an adverse public reaction if China, having been excluded from the purely great power formulation of the peace terms for the European countries, particularly Germany should then be placed on the same footing as all of the eleven countries directly concerned with the peace settlement with Japan. He said that Chinese public opinion had always resented the fact that China had been excluded from the making of the European peace, but since the principle of special great power responsibility had been adopted in regard to Europe it would be very difficult for the Chinese Government to support before the people any procedures for the making of the Japanese peace which did not accord China some privileged position in view of the vital interest of China in the terms of the Japanese peace settlement.
- 2.
- The Chinese Government was apprehensive lest the Soviet Union would seize, from the fact that China had proceeded to negotiate and conclude a peace treaty with Japan without the participation of the Soviet Union, as grounds for abrogating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1945. He said that while this treaty with the Soviet Union had not fully led to the results hoped for by the Chinese Government, nevertheless it had, he believed, operated as a restraining factor in the Soviet attitude towards the Chinese Communists. If a pretext was offered the Soviet Union through the conclusion by China of a separate peace with Japan the Russians might have grounds then for openly supporting the Chinese Communists even possibly to the extent of recognizing a Communist regime in Manchuria and North China. He said these apprehensions might be groundless, but nevertheless his Government felt that they were a real possibility and in view of the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union his Government felt it would be unwise for them to take the risk.
I explained first of all to Dr. Wang that when we had made the suggestion for the composition and procedure of the Japanese peace conference we expressly stated that the conference itself would determine its own voting procedure and that our proposal for the two-thirds majority was, therefore, not definite but subject to consideration [Page 521] by the proposed members. I said we had been led to make the suggestion regarding the two-thirds majority because of the experience which we had had at every international conference and in the United Nations with the Russian abuse of the veto. I outlined to him the difficulties we had run into in the making of the European peace and in particularly in regard to Germany and Austria because of the previous adoption of the rule of unanimity. In the case of Germany we had finally been forced by the pressure of absolute necessity in connection with our zone to proceed with its development in conjunction with the British over Russian objection. Because of this experience we had felt that it might be wise to explore the possibility in connection with the Japanese settlement of doing away with the veto through the medium of a two-thirds majority. I pointed out that, of course, this meant that the U.S. was suggesting giving up its right of the veto but that we were fearful of a prolonged stalemate in the Japanese peace negotiations if the principle of unanimity which had so frustrated the establishment of conditions of peace in Europe were adopted for the Far Eastern settlement. I said that I fully understood the difficulties for China in this matter for the reasons mentioned by Dr. Wang, but that I wondered if those same difficulties would not be if anything enhanced should the four-power veto be adopted in the peace conference and then as a result of long obstruction by the Soviet representative it became absolutely necessary to proceed without the Soviet Union. I inquired whether under those circumstances if it would not be even more dangerous for China to proceed with the making of the Japanese peace excluding Russia if such should prove absolutely necessary in violation of the agreed upon procedure. I said it had been my experience that it was infinitely harder to move out of an existing organization than to establish it on a sound basis and let the Soviet Union as it were exclude itself from the beginning.
Dr. Wang said he recognized the validity of that point but it was one which would have to have consideration if and when the question arose. He said he did not feel that in the Japanese peace settlement the Russians would be as likely to obstruct as they had in Europe. In the case of Japan with the U.S. in sole occupation the Russians would undoubtedly be desirous of seeing the U.S. withdraw and, therefore, would be in favor of the early conclusion of a peace treaty. This was not true in regard to Germany where the Russians were in occupation of the Eastern zones. He cited, for example, the fact that in the Far Eastern Commission the Russians had not attempted to obstruct in anything like the same manner as they had in Europe.
I then raised the point as to whether Dr. Wang had any indication that an eleven power conference with the same voting procedure as the [Page 522] Far Eastern Commission would be acceptable to the Russians; in their replies to us they had proposed only that the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K., and the U.S. should draft the peace treaty following the same procedure which had been set up for the European treaties. Consideration, therefore, should be given as to whether the Russians would not refuse the suggestion of Dr. Wang and that we would, therefore, be exactly where we were now with the exception that the position of a two-thirds majority had been abandoned without profit.
Dr. Wang replied that he had no indication from the Russians on this point as he had specifically refrained from talking with them until he had discussed this matter with Secretary Marshall. Ambassador Koo said that in any case he thought that there should be no abandonment of the two-thirds majority principle until it was quite clear that the Russians were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedures for the conference. He suggested that it might be wise if Dr. Wang on his own initiative would sound out the Russians and the British on this point before any change were made in existing positions. If the Russians were willing to accept, the conference could be convened and could then adopt the Far Eastern Commission voting procedures. Dr. Wang pointed out that the American suggestion of two-thirds was in effect a modification of the Far Eastern Commission procedure and if it were not adopted it would then be easy for the conference to almost automatically retain the Far Eastern Commission procedures. Dr. Wang said that there would obviously be difficulty with the British Dominions, particularly Australia, although in a brief talk he had had with Dr. Evatt in San Francisco on his way here Dr. Evatt had suggested that the four powers should have informal discussions in an endeavor to iron out any differences they might have on the substance of the treaty before the conference convened. Dr. Wang said he had pointed out to Dr. Evatt that this in effect would mean the establishment of the same procedures which had been so difficult in Europe, namely, that the four powers would in effect draft the treaty and even under the two-thirds rule there would be no chance in a conference of eleven of effecting any changes in a draft they had agreed on.
I agreed to communicate the views of Dr. Wang to the Secretary and, I was sure that they would receive the most serious consideration and would communicate with him further regarding the position of the United States Government.
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