Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.0011 PW Peace/9–2247

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] September 22, 1947.

Background:

1. The Policy Planning Staff has, in collaboration with FE, reviewed the position in regard to the Japanese peace settlement. Final recommendations by the Staff will be forthcoming shortly but it has definitely decided that we should not unduly delay initiation of discussions on a peace treaty for Japan.

2. There are, on the other hand, doubts as to the advisability of hastening negotiations until our basic position is firm, until we can better estimate the amount of support we can count on for this position and until the Soviets take a final stand on Germany, presumably in the CFM meeting in November.

3. All of the Powers we approached on July 11 regarding initiation of Japanese peace treaty discussions indicated general agreement with our proposals except:

a. The USSR, which stated, and reiterated in a note of August 29 in reply to our rebuttal, that “the question of convening a conference to draw up a treaty of peace with Japan should be preliminarily considered at the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China.”

b. China, whose doubts were most clearly set forth in a letter to you from the Chinese Foreign Minister of August 21⁵⁵ in which he proposed an informal meeting in the near future of the Foreign Ministers of the UK, China, US and USSR. In your reply to Dr. Wang of August 28 (Tab A)⁵⁶ you rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would prejudice this principle of eleven-Power participation and expressed the hope that China would participate in any conference to which the majority of the Powers directly concerned might agree. In his conversation with you on September 14 he advocated adoption of a voting procedure similar to the FEC, in which the rule of unanimity would apply to the Big Four (See Tab B). In his conversation with Mr. Bohlen on September 17, he reiterated this position (See Tab C).

It is questionable whether the USSR will participate in an eleven-Power conference, even if assured of a veto. It is felt, however, that we should make every effort to obtain Soviet participation. In the conversation between Mr. Bohlen and Dr. Wang, it was suggested that it might be advisable to sound out the Soviets to determine whether the Russians were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedure for the conference. In a memorandum of August 25, 1947 to Mr. Lovett the Legal Adviser stated: “In the event of a separate peace, concluded following exhaustive but futile efforts to make a just peace settlement with the participation of all the United Nations at war with Japan, the regime of control for Japan comprising SCAP, the Allied Council, and the FEC could be terminated without the assent of the USSR.” This position suggests that further efforts should be made to endeavor to obtain Soviet participation in the conference. Without taking such a step, the United States and the other Allies would face serious legal obstacles in making a separate peace or in terminating SCAP or the FEC without Soviet consent.

4. Dr. Evatt has been constantly pressing for early consideration of the Japanese peace settlement. He has strongly argued against a veto and discussion at Canberra on voting procedure was on the assumption that we would not change our original position of two-thirds vote. In his conversation with you on September 14, Dr. Evatt again advocated an early preliminary procedural meeting on the peace treaty and suggested Pearl Harbor as a preferable place (See Tab D). His statement that Soviet attendance at this stage was unimportant, as they would come in later to safeguard territorial commitments made to them, seems unrealistic as the Soviets are already in occupation of these territories and can continue to hold them in virtue of their rights as victors in the war against Japan. On September 2 we were informed by the British Embassy that the general feeling expressed at the Canberra conference was that Japanese peace treaty discussions should begin not later than the end of September. The Philippines and the French, particularly the former, are anxious for an early start on discussions. The Netherlands appears to have no strong convictions. China, as indicated above, would doubtless prefer postponement to a meeting which the Soviets refused to attend.

5. The British have raised the question of Pakistan participation in the treaty drafting. This is undesirable because it would (a) increase the “British bloc” representation to 6 or 50 percent of the participants, (b) open the door to applications from Burma and Outer Mongolia, and (c) represent a departure from our criterion for determining the participants, namely, membership in the Far Eastern Commission. On the other hand, areas in India directly involved in the war are included in Pakistan and it is likely that if we actively opposed her participation we would find ourselves in a minority and would incur considerable resentment. On balance, it is believed to be not in our interest to block such participation but that the question should be settled at the conference.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1. Our basic position on security and other vital issues involved in the Japanese peace settlement be decided, at the Secretarial level if necessary, not later than October 6.

2. In view of the suggestion made by Ambassador Koo during the conversation with Mr. Bohlen on September 17 that Dr. Wang sound out the Russians and British as to whether they were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedure for the conference, you inform Dr. Wang that we have no objection to his undertaking exploratory talks with the Soviets and British and others especially interested, such as the Australians, and that we should be glad to have at as early a date as possible his findings.⁵⁷

3. The decision on the next step which the United States should take might await the result of Dr. Wang’s conversations. Even though we may be prepared to agree to some form of four-Power unanimity rule, if it is clear that a majority of the other powers would accept such a procedure, we should give Dr. Wang no indication now of our willingness to adopt such a procedure. If we find it necessary to accept a four-Power unanimity rule, it is important that we do so reluctantly and with expressed skepticism as to the suitability of such a procedure to produce a satisfactory treaty. This position towards the veto is necessary in the event that a peace conference in which the veto is used develops in such a way that we may be called upon to break it up and adopt some other procedure which will produce an arrangement more satisfactory to us.

55. See telegram 1770, August 22, noon, from Nanking, p. 496.
56. See telegram 100, August 26, 7 p.m., to Petropolis, and footnote 40, p. 505.
57. Mr. Butterworth in a memorandum of October 2 reported a conversation with Dr. Wang who indicated that “he had proposed to Mr. Vishinsky as a possible compromise the same voting procedure as pertains to the Far Eastern Commission; that at his request Mr. Vishinsky had telegraphed Moscow for an official expression of his Government’s views.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–247)